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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic and political reforms have been introduced in Ethiopia and these have 
boosted private investment over the last two decades. Reforms have brought about 
measurable improvements, but the progress of the status of private investment has 
remained slow. This study was conducted with the objective of investigating the 
microeconomic level determinants of private investment in the manufacturing sector. 
These micro-level determinants of private investment in the State of Tigray, Ethiopia, 
were analysed using both descriptive and econometric methods. Thus, an 
econometric method of data analysis using a duration model was applied to analyse 
the microeconomic data collected. In addition, descriptive analysis was employed to 
analyse the survey data. Here, a chi-square test and factor analysis were used to 
analyse the relationship between variables and their constraints on the operations of 
the manufacturing sector. 
 
The major microeconomic determinants of private investment status in the State of 
Tigray were found to be investment areas, access to credit, infrastructure facilities, 
the judicial system, corruption, investment incentives and bureaucratic red tape. The 
econometric result revealed that infrastructure facilities, the judicial system, and 
investment areas negatively and significantly delayed the entire private investment 
status. However, interest rates and investment location were positively and 
significantly supported to continue their status of the entire private investors in the 
manufacturing sector. Infrastructure facilities, investment incentives, and investment 
areas were negatively and significantly related to the started group of investors’ 
progress. However, investment location was related positively and significantly to the 
started group and the ability of the implementation and operation statuses of private 
investors to proceed to operation status. In the case of the non-started group, 
infrastructure facilities and investment areas are related significantly and negatively 
to investment status delay. By contrast, interest rates and investment location 
significantly and positively affect private investment status delay. According to the 
descriptive analysis, access to credit, bureaucratic red tape and corruption were the 
additional major factors that hinder private investment from progressing from one 
 xii 
status to the next. The investor’s level of education, access to land and political 
instability risks in the survey were not determinants of private investment status. In 
addition, the survey of private investors for those who have already started 
production shows that infrastructural, technological, and economic and financial 
factors have the highest absolute value of the loading factors that hinders operations 
in the manufacturing sector. 
 
The results of this study revealed that most of the problems encountered in the 
manufacturing sector were institutional but some were related to the private investors 
themselves. Thus, the government should take measures to establish a true, 
independent and efficient institution so as to create access to credit and provide 
infrastructure facilities to the private sector. This could be done by minimising 
corruption and ensuring transparent investment regulations. Thus, the State of 
Tigray, Ethiopia, must attract and encourage private investors by applying and 
improving policies which promote private investment. In this way they will actively 
contribute to the overall development and growth of the Ethiopian economy. 
 
Finally, as this study is made on the causes of delay in each phases of investment, it 
contributes a new knowledge to all investment sectors in the developing countries as 
whole and particularly to all regions of Ethiopia for advanced polices and strategies 
development on investment decisions. Then, based on the results of the study and 
solving these identified problems of investment phases, all actors of investment can 
retain and encourage the existing and attract new private investors to enhance the 
economic development of the society. The findings from this study have important 
implications for prospective business owners, lenders, and policy makers on how to 
improve private investment and create conducive business environment.  
 
Key words: Determinants, private investment, status of investment, groups, 
duration model, State of Tigray, Ethiopia 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter provides a background to the study. In it, the statement of the study, 
research questions, objectives, significance, period covered by the study and 
organisation thereof are presented. It provides a definition of the term investment 
and addresses the problem gaps in the study area as well as the objectives of the 
study. The importance of the study to investors and other beneficiaries, the scope 
and limitation thereof and the chapter outlines are also discussed in detail. 
 
1.1. Background of the study 
 
The word investment can be defined in many ways and can be conceived in line with 
different theories and principles. Despite the fact that the word is defined in different 
ways, the meanings are more similar than dissimilar. Mertonson (cited in Bayai & 
Nyangara, 2013) states that the term ‘investment’ is essentially ambiguous. The 
definitions tend also to vary from one geographical area to the other. According to 
Legum (2005), the UK defines investment as ‘every kind of asset,’ and introduces a 
list of specific forms of investment with the indicative phrase. The list includes the 
following forms of investment: real estate or other tangible or intangible property that 
is acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other 
business purposes; interests arising from the commitment of capital or other 
resources put to economic activity; an enterprise; an equity security of an enterprise 
and a debt security of an enterprise. Generally, investment is the application of 
money for earning more money. Investment also means savings or savings made 
through delayed consumption. 
 
Investment is widely considered as one of the main drivers of economic growth in the 
world because it is a flow that increases the existence of capital in the economy. 
Over the years, this has been a particularly dominant variable in macroeconomic 
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development in developing countries1
                                                             
1 Developing countries incorporate all countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean as well 
as Asia and Oceania (UNCTAD, 2008). 
. Accordingly, practitioners and academicians 
have conducted a lot of research into the importance and determinants of the 
operations of investments. They argue that investment is key for economic growth 
because high investment rates are widely considered to be an essential condition for 
attaining a high and sustainable growth rate (Levine & Renelt, 1992). 
 
To strengthen this argument, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD, 2012) indicated that a strong investment sector contributes 
prominently to the economy of a country through creating more employment 
opportunities, generating higher production volume, increasing export and 
introducing innovations. Consequently, the promotion of investment has an important 
role to play in developing countries, and particularly in African countries where it will 
markedly improve the peoples’ standard of living and so decrease poverty. Ethiopia 
has also benefited from investment in different sectors. Job opportunities have been 
created, there has been an increase in the productivity of the society, and hard 
currency has been earned through participation in the export sector. 
 
Ethiopia had a total population of over 95 million in 2013, making it the second most 
populous country in Africa after Nigeria (World Population Review, 2014). According 
to the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 
1/1995 (FDRE, 1995), Ethiopia is a federal democratic republic composed of 9 
states: The State of Tigray, The State of Afar, The State of Amhara, The State of 
Oromia, The State of Somalia, The State of Benshangul/Gumuz, The State of the 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, The State of Gambela Peoples and 
The State of the Harari People. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
(FDRE) also has two city administrations: the Addis Ababa city administration and 
the Dire Dawa City Council (FDRE, 1995). 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Ethiopia 
 
Source: http://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-administrative-map-27-mar-2013 
 
From 1974-1991 the economy of Ethiopia was state-centered and state-controlled. 
After these 17 years, changes in the country enabled Ethiopia to start building a 
market-oriented economy. Numerous macroeconomic reforms have been 
implemented with the objective of achieving macroeconomic stabilisation and 
growth. The macroeconomic reforms included the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises, liberalisation of trade policy, reduction of import tariff rates, elimination of 
non-tariff barriers, and the devaluation and deregulation of price and exchange rate 
controls (UNCTAD, 2002). 
 
In general, Ethiopia has continued to maintain a double-digit growth rate which 
averaged 10% over the last eight years. In the 2014/15 fiscal year, the real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth was 10.2% compared to the 4.4% forecast for Sub-
Saharan African countries. This robust and broad-based economic growth placed 
Ethiopia among the top performing African and developing Asian countries (NBE 
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annual report, 2014/15). In terms of economic sectors, agriculture and allied 
activities accounted for 38.8% of GDP, industry 15.2% and services 46.6 percent. 
Similarly, agriculture contributed 24.5&, industry 29.4& and service 46.1 percentage 
points to the 10.2% real GDP growth in 2014/15 (Ibid). 
 
Investment in Ethiopia has been gradually increasing over the past seven 
years owing to the favorable investment climate. There are visible trends that 
Ethiopia is becoming an investment focal point in the horn of Africa. The 
Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA) and regional Investment Offices licensed 
some 69,079 investment projects with an aggregate capital of Birr 1.3 trillion 
during 1992/93-2012/13. Of these projects, 58,735 (85%) were domestic, 
10,220 (14.8%) foreign and 124 (0.2%) public. In terms of capital, Birr 518.2 
billion (38.8%) was from domestic investors, Birr 515.6 billion (38.6%) from 
foreign investors and Birr 303.0 billion (22.6%) from the public sector. In 
2012/13, a total of 7,011 investment projects with a combined capital of Birr 
112.10 billion were approved. The number of domestic investment projects 
reached 6,273 which accounted for more than 89.5% of the total projects 
approved during the review period (NBE, 2012/13). 
 
The most appropriate definition of investment as the term is used in this research is 
provided by Chhibber and Leechor (1995) who say that private investment is an 
investment which is made by privately owned business firms on new buildings, 
plants, and equipment that are used in the production of goods and services. 
Semenescu (cited in Bayai & Nyangara, 2013) describes private investment as the 
spending on additions to a firm’s capital assets such as buildings and machinery. 
Private investment is one aspect of investment and as such it contributes 
significantly to economic growth and the ability of a country to reduce or alleviate 
poverty and improve the lives of its citizens. Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2006) and 
Frimpong and Marbuah (2010) attribute this to the fact that private investment plays 
an important role in the expansion of the economy’s production capacity and long-
term economic growth. They add that private investment is a crucial pre-requisite for 
economic growth because it allows entrepreneurs to set economic activity in motion 
by bringing resources together to produce goods and services. 
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Private investment has been the major economic driver in developing countries such 
as Fiji, Ghana and Pakistan, a fact that was foreseen by a number of researchers 
(Seruvatu & Jayaraman, 2001; Asante, 2000; Bayai & Nyangara, 2013). According to 
Reinhart, Ghura and Hadjimichael (all cited in Bayai & Nyangara, 2013), private 
investment is still key to solving economic problems such as poverty and 
unemployment, especially in developing countries. 
 
Rapid and sustained growth is facilitated by a virtuous circle whereby 
entrepreneurship and investment lead to higher productivity, making it possible to 
invest larger sums in the future. During the course of this process, jobs are created 
and new technologies are introduced, especially through international trade and 
investment linkages. Successful mobilisation of private investment is thus 
increasingly important for creating employment, raising growth rates and reducing 
poverty. Private Sector Development (PSD) is about enabling the enhanced 
utilisation of labor and other resources through the growth of private business by 
creating an enabling environment both in the domestic and overseas markets 
(MoFED, 2000). 
 
Although private investments play an important role in economic growth, there are 
factors affecting the status of private investment operations (Frimpong & Marbuah, 
2010). Manufacturing is one of the private investment sectors whose operations are 
affected by various factors. Even if the performance of Africa’s manufacturing sector 
has generally been quite poor, many people still believe that manufacturing can act 
as an engine of growth on the continent. This growth is fueled by the creation of 
skilled jobs which ensures positive spillover effects and also the modernising of the 
economy (Bigsten & Soderbom, 2006). 
 
Many empirical studies have been carried out on the determinants of private 
investment in the manufacturing sector (PIMS) with a view to enhancing its 
performance and benefits. However, the validity of investigations into the 
determinants of the private investment sectors in Ethiopia are affected by time 
constraints and no study has been conducted to determine how the delay of 
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operations in each investment status2
In addition, the investment law has been amended several times in order to meet the 
demands of both domestic and foreign investors (Woldemeskel, 2008). Investment 
offices at federal and state levels were also established to encourage, promote and 
facilitate investment activities. Between 1992 and August 2012, 30% of the total 
private investments approved by the State of Tigray Investment Office were licensed 
to work in the manufacturing sector and these projects encompassed all three 
investment statuses (TIO, 2012). Their total capital and capacity of creating 
employment opportunity were about 19% and 10% respectively of the total private 
investments. However, although the government provides different support and 
reform mechanisms, around 75% of the total private investments in the 
manufacturing sector are in the pre-implementation and implementation status of 
 affects the manufacturing sector. Moreover, 
the gap between approved investment permits and implemented project operations 
provides insight into the fact that the implementation aspects of private investment is 
problematical in Ethiopia (Deneke, 2001). Deneke’s (Ibid) research also shows that 
out of the total domestic private investment projects approved, only 32% were 
operational in eight years. The rest (68%) had either been terminated or were 
lagging well behind schedule because of numerous reasons which have yet to be 
studied. The researcher observed this and identified additional relevant and 
important points from reports and data at federal and state levels in Ethiopia. It is 
from these insights that the research problem addressed by this study was identified. 
 
The investment sectors currently experience various problems in spite of the fact that 
one of the principal undertakings of the Ethiopian Government since 1991 has been 
to transform the country from a centrally commanded economic system into market 
oriented-economy. The government has instituted a broad range of policy reforms, 
including the liberalisation of the foreign trade regime, decentralisation of economic 
and political power, deregulation of the domestic price and a devaluation of the 
national currency. 
 
                                                             
2 The three different investment statuses are: 1) Pre-implementation: up to the point when new land, 
machines, building materials etc. have been bought; 2) Implementation: up to the point when the 
production plant is being built; 3) Operation: when the production plant is already in use (Federal 
Investment Bureau, 2009). 
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investment (TIO, 2012). The researcher observed that private investments in the 
manufacturing sector did not progress from one status to the next as per the 
requirements3
Despite the importance of these facts, the researcher was unable to find any 
research into the identified problems or gaps in the State of Tigray. The researcher 
therefore decided to focus on private investment in this area. Before the current 
government came to power, there was no public investment at all and very little has 
changed since then. In addition, most of the problems identified above are more 
apparent in the manufacturing than other sectors, and the government has decided 
to shift from an agricultural-led economy to an industrialised one. Manufacturing 
establishes important linkages throughout the economy. It is connected upstream 
and downstream to agriculture, resource industries, construction, transportation, 
telecommunications, utilities and services, as well as being a major activity driver in 
these sectors (Assefa, Bienen & Ciuriak, 2013). The researcher took all this into 
account in this study and focused specifically on the determinants of PIMS at micro 
economic level and the constraints for private investors in the production phase in 
the State of Tigray, Ethiopia. 
 set by the municipal office of the State of Tigray. Consequently 
investors are held back and their investments delayed for long periods of time. 
 
 
1.2. Statement of the problem 
 
The private investment sector plays a vital role in the growth process of developing 
countries and it determines the rate at which physical capital is accumulated 
(Jongwanich & Kohpaiboon, 2006). Private investment has been a major economic 
powerhouse for developing countries (Ouattara, 2005). Empirical evidence (Ghura, 
1997) indicates that private investment has a stronger, more favorable effect on 
growth than government investment, probably because private investment is more 
efficient and less closely associated with corruption. In Ethiopia, private investment 
sectors also have an important contribution to make to economic development and 
poverty reduction (Haile & Assefa, 2005).                                                              
3 The requirements allow for six months for pre-implementation, two and half years for implementation 
then require that the project enter into operation status. 
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Lesotlho (2006) however identified that private investment sectors are affected by 
various factors that delay projects and so affect the importance they render to 
economic development. Other studies have shown that private investment in 
developing countries is determined mainly by microeconomic variables and 
macroeconomic instability (Khan & Khan, 2007). Because the manufacturing sector 
is so important, researchers have begun to investigate the determinants of private 
investment. However, knowledge in this area is still very sparse and no studies 
specifically examine the investment status delay (ISD) of the manufacturing sector in 
Ethiopia (Hussien, 2000). 
 
The studies in this area that do exist have shown that the determining factors affect 
all private investment sectors and do not discriminate among the various statuses of 
investment. But, reports in Ethiopia (EIA, 2012) show that project stagnation and 
delays of operations exist at all statuses of the investment sectors. In addition, a 
study by Hussien (2000) shows that in spite of the enormous number of projects 
licensed, the real investment rate is very unsatisfactory and more than 50% of 
projects have not yet started to be realised. According to the empirical data analysed 
by Deneke (2001), the process of investment from preparation to implementation 
must pass through a long and cumbersome bureaucratic process. This accounts in 
part for the big gap between approved and operational projects, and also for the fact 
that the number of projects completing the project cycle is low (Workie, 1996). This 
reality shows that there are problems which should be investigated so as to 
encourage and promote private investors at each investment status. This problem is 
evident in the manufacturing sector of the State of Tigray and is negatively impacting 
the promotion of private investment and the overall economic development of the 
country. 
 
In support of the problem highlighted above, the data of the Tigray Investment Office 
(TIO) in August 2012 shows that out of the total number of firms registered (i.e. those 
granted investment permits) and licensed as a PIMS, 47% are in pre-
implementation, 28% in implementation and 25% in operation status. In addition, the 
number of private investments in the manufacturing sector is increasing from year to 
year, but the status of investment in the sector has shown a slowdown or even halt in 
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progression from one status to the next according to the requirements of investment 
in the State of Tigray. 
 
In general, private investments in the manufacturing sector are delayed for a long 
period of time. According to the data of TIO (2012), out of the total number of private 
investors registered or who have secured investment permits in the manufacturing 
sector, most of them have not proceeded to the next status as per the schedule or 
requirement set by the municipal office of the State and EIA. That means that the 
duration to be promoted from the first status to the second and then the last was not 
met by the private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
These problems have not been investigated recently which is strange considering 
Ethiopia’s commendable economic performance over the last seven years in relation 
to the determinants that affect the operation in each status of the PIMS. 
 
This study thus seeks to analyse the determinants of private investment (since 1991) 
to uncover why the promotion of private investment status has remained sluggish 
and contrary to the rules on private investment. The researcher believes that there is 
a need to identify the micro level determining factors that cause this delay of private 
investment status and their resultant constraints on the operations4
A further significant factor is that scholars have not reached consensus on the 
measurement and determinants of private investment theories because of 
differences in the definition and measurement of private investment. For example, 
Mwangi (2015) defines it as all additions to the stocks of assets (purchases and own-
account capital formation), less any sale of second-hand and scrapped assets. 
Adugna (2013) also measures nominal private investment which is a proxy for the 
performance of the private sector in the economy. Others measure net fixed 
investments computed as the annual differentiation in total net fixed assets 
normalised by the start of year (Omet, Yaseen and Abukhadijeh, 2015), and 
 of the 
manufacturing sector, specifically in the State of Tigray. Recommendations to help 
alleviate the problems will then be made. 
 
                                                             
4 Operation refers to the action of functioning or being active and effective. 
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Guimarães and Unteroberdoerster (2006) define it as real private fixed capital 
formation. In addition to this variation is the fact that there exists different theories on 
the determinants of private investment and that earlier studies on this were 
conducted in developed countries. Consequently it is necessary to investigate if the 
previous theories and evidence on determinants of private investment status 
operations can be applied in the context of less developed countries like Ethiopia. 
 
A third factor is that none of the objectives and research questions of existing 
research was similar to this research, nor was the methodology adopted (see 
Appendix F for a list of studies and a summary of their models and variables). The 
variables used in this study are the micro level variables found in studies conducted 
in other developing countries, and those used in the context of the state. In terms of 
research methodology, this research makes use of a duration model in order to 
thoroughly investigate the impact of ISD. 
 
Much of the focus of previous studies has been on all sectors of investment and at 
continent, or at least multiple country level. The focus of this study is on private 
investment  in the manufacturing sector only. In addition, the study area is on only 
one state in Ethiopia (the State of Tigray) as its investment has grown over the last 
two decades. To the best of author’s knowledge, this has never been researched 
before. 
 
A further factor is that most of the related reviewed studies on private investment in 
Ethiopia and other developing countries made use of variables at a macroeconomic 
level. Examples are inflation, real interest rate, openness and real exchange rate 
(Bigsten, Collier, Dercon, Gauthier..., 1999). There are however a few 
microeconomic (firm) level determinants of variables of PIMS which can be used, 
such as educational level, access to land, bureaucratic red tape and infrastructure 
(Zerfu, 2001; Baye, Fufa & Wakjira, 2005). These firm-level variables were not 
examined in the existing literature (see Appendix F). 
 
The research design of this study integrated as many explanatory variables at the 
micro level as possible into one equation so as to get a complete picture of the 
determinants of private investment status in the manufacturing sector. In other 
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words, this study comprehensively examines additional explanatory variables that  
have only been considered separately before. The results of previous studies have 
been inconsistent and contradictory, and have been unable to identify the 
determinants of private investment. Many variables indicated as having a positive 
effect in one study have been found to be negative in another. These inconsistencies 
show a clear need for further investigation. Table 1.1 below presents some of the 
incongruities, for instance, credit to investors and political instability in one study has 
a negative effect but in another they have a positive effect. 
 
Table 1.1: Effects of earlier studies’ variables on private investment 
Ser. 
No. 
Author and year  Method or techniques 
used  
Findings (Independent variables)  Sig. (effect)  
1 Nainggolan, Ramli, Murni 
Daulay and Rujiman 
(2015) in Indonesia 
Error Correction Model 
(ECM) method 
Investment credits  Positive 
Government investment, interest rates Negative 
2 Adugna (2013) in Ethiopia  Multiple regressions – 
using OLS (Ordinary Lease 
Square ) model 
Public investment, external debt Positive  
3 Karagoz (2010) in Turkey Auto-regressive distributed 
lags (ARDL) Approach 
Ratio of private sector credit to GDP, 
private external debt  
Positive 
Trade openness Negative 
4 Ambaye, Berhanu and 
Abera (2014) in Ethiopia  
Autoregressive Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) model 
External debt and government 
expenditure 
Positive 
Domestic credit and domestic saving Negative 
5 Naa-Idar, Ayentimi and 
Frimpong (2012) in 
Ghana  
co-integration and error 
correction modeling 
Political stability Positive 
6 Hussien (2000) in 
Ethiopia  
Eclectic version of flexible 
accelerator model 
Credit availability to private sector Positive 
7 Molapo and Damane 
(2015) in Lesotho  
ARDL appraoch Level of economic growth Positive  
Increases in the price level Negative 
8 Agu (2015) in Nigeria  Cointegration and Error-
Correction Methodology 
Increased lending rate, political 
instability and infrastructure 
Negative 
9 Ogunbayo, Sangodoyin, 
Lawal and Okoruwa 
(2014) in Nigeria  
Error correction model 
(ECM) 
Credit to private sector Positive 
Corruption perception index; saving 
rate; political instability  
Negative 
10 Abazi and Kalaj (2015) in 
Albania  
OLS method Sales, liquidity, profit, firm size Positive 
Debt, experience Negative 
11 Michael and Aikaeli 
(2014) in Tanzania  
Error Correction Model Public investment, credit to private 
sector 
Positive 
(Source: Self compiled 2015) 
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1.3. Research questions 
 
Based on the gaps and factors identified above, this study addresses the following 
research questions. 
 
1.3.1. Main research question 
 
The major research question is: What are the micro-level determinants of private 
investment status delay and operational constraints of private investment in the 
manufacturing sector in the State of Tigray, Ethiopia? 
 
1.3.2. Specific research questions 
 
The study also seeks to answer the following specific research questions: 
 
i. What are the major firm level determinants that cause the delay of private 
investment status or factors that delay the promotion of private investment 
from one status to the next in the manufacturing sector in the State of Tigray, 
Ethiopia? 
ii. What are the factors that constrain the operation of private investors found in 
the production phase in the manufacturing sector? 
 
1.4. Objective of the study 
 
1.4.1. General objective 
 
The general objective of this study is to investigate the micro-level determinants of 
private ISD and the major operational constraints of PIMS in the State of Tigray so 
as to come up with possible recommendations to be considered in future intervention 
strategies of the state. 
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1.4.2. Specific objectives 
 
i. To find the major factors for the delay in the progress of private investment 
statuses in the manufacturing sector in general. 
ii. To discover the major factors causing the delay to start the 
operation/production status of PIMS. 
iii. To identify the major factors causing the delay to start implementation status 
of PIMS. 
iv. To determine the major operational constraints of private investors found in 
the production phase in the manufacturing sector. 
 
1.5. Significance of the study 
 
The development of investment is essential for the economic growth of any country 
and especially for developing countries like Ethiopia. Investors spend their money 
and time to sell their products and services by competing with other investors in the 
sector. The government also attempts to construct infrastructures and create an 
environment conducive to attracting and encouraging investors. In spite of this, the 
contribution of private investment to the overall development in Ethiopia is still at a 
very low level (Alehegn, 2008). 
 
As a result, it is very important to study the factors that deter the development of 
private investment in general and that of the manufacturing sector in particular. This 
study, however, mainly focuses on the status delay and limitations of private 
investment in the State of Tigray on a micro level. Once complete, this will help the 
investment offices at the state level to identify appropriate solutions for improved 
future performance of private investment. In general, the results may benefit 
investors by helping them to understand the major determinants of private 
investment, and researchers by providing literature to be used for future study. Policy 
makers will also have additional information to use when they develop and redesign 
their investment policies and strategies to minimise ISD. 
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1.6. Scope and limitations of the study 
 
The study set out to identify the micro economic determining variables of the PIMS in 
the State of Tigray. To identify the microeconomic determinants of the sector, 
primary data was collected through a structured questionnaire, interviews and focus 
group discussions (FGD). 
 
For the purpose of this study, the investors selected to be respondents were only 
those private investors who were registered (licensed) by the State of TIO and 
operated in the state during the data collection period.  The study did not include 
micro and small enterprises (MSE), public investment, endowment fund investments, 
non-governmental organisations (NGO) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The main 
limitation of this study is that it did not investigate or consider the determinants of 
private investment sectors other than the manufacturing sector. Important 
contributors to the economy like agriculture, service and construction were not 
considered. 
 
1.7. Period covered by the study 
 
This study covers the period from 1992 to 2012. This start date was selected 
because it was in 1992 that Ethiopia adopted a market-oriented economic 
development strategy. This is also a period in which private investment in general 
and investment in the manufacturing sector specifically has flourished in the country. 
 
1.8. Organisation of the study 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is the introduction and 
provides background information, the statement of the problem, research questions 
identified, objectives and significance, the scope and limitations and the organisation 
of the study. The second and third chapters review related theoretical and empirical 
literature respectively. The fourth and fifth chapters describe the hypothesis and 
methodologies employed in conducting the research. The sixth chapter presents the 
results of the data collected through the various tools described in the methodology. 
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The final chapter comprises discussions, conclusions, recommendations and 
research contributions. It also identifies further study areas based on the findings of 
the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
This chapter discusses the literature related to the study and investigates the 
theoretical framework of investment in general and private investment in particular. It 
is mainly focused on theories of the determinants of investment in developing 
countries, African countries and specifically in Ethiopia. 
 
A basic definition of investment is the flow of expenses that increases the physical 
stock of capital. According to Dornbusch and Fischers (1994), investment spending 
is important as it accounts for much of the movement in the business cycle. 
Generally, investment constitutes an important macroeconomic component and this 
matters for economic growth (Collier & Gunning, 1999). 
 
Parker (cited in Bayai & Nyangara, 2013) noted that economists usually reserve the 
term investment for transactions that increase the amount of real aggregate wealth in 
the economy. This includes mainly the purchase (or production) of new real durable 
assets such as factories and machines. Under the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Convention, investment encompasses any 
reasonable activity or asset, that is any form of investment, which adds to the 
existing capital formation of a country and so has a positive effect on the gross 
output of a country. 
 
Investment is generally classified into four major components: private domestic 
investment, public domestic investment, FDI and portfolio investment. Private 
domestic investment refers to gross fixed capital formation plus net changes in the 
level of inventories whereas public investment includes investments made by the 
government and public enterprises on social and economic infrastructures, real 
estate and tangible assets. The combination of private investment and public 
investment is normally referred to as gross fixed capital formation and this is 
distinctive from their counterpart – foreign investment. When foreign investment is on 
a tangible asset, it is referred to as a direct foreign investment; when it is in shares, 
bonds, securities, etc., it is called portfolio investment (Bakare, 2011). 
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Different approaches to theory are generally considered when identifying the 
determinants of investment. There are a great many competing theories of 
investment behavior and this study reviews some of the more important and widely 
discussed ones. According to Ghura and Goodwin (2010), there are four general 
approaches to modeling investment common in the existing investment literature. 
These broad categories are the flexible accelerator model (associated with Keynes, 
1936); the neoclassical model (associated with Jorgenson, 1971); Tobin’s Q model 
(1969); and the expected profits model and financial factor. The last mentioned has a 
number of alternatives. 
 
2.1. Flexible accelerator model 
 
The basic notion behind the flexible accelerator model is that the larger the gap 
between the existing capital stock and the desired capital stock, the greater a firm’s 
investment (Ghura & Goodwin, 2010). The hypothesis is that firms plan to close a 
fraction of the gap between the desired capital stock K*, and the actual capital stock 
K, in each period. Within the framework of the flexible accelerator model, output, 
internal funds, the cost of external financing and other variables may be included as 
determinants of K* (Chirinko, 1993). 
 
Keynes (1936) first called attention to the existence of an independent investment 
function in the economy when he insisted that there is no reason for ex-ante savings 
to be equal to even though they are identical ex-post. The next development in 
investment theory is accelerator theory which suggests that investment is a linear 
proportion of changes in output. According to Chenery and Koyck (cited in 
Salahuddin, Islam & Salim, 2009), in accelerator models, investment is independent 
of the price of capital. Jorgenson (1971) and others accommodated this missing 
element in the neoclassical model of investment. Both the accelerator and the 
neoclassical models of investment behavior are output-based models. In sharp 
contrast to these models, Tobin’s Q theory of investment attempts to explain 
investment behavior in terms of portfolio balance (Tobin, 1969). 
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More recent literature has introduced an element of uncertainty into investment 
theory due to irreversible investment (Pindyck, 1991). The argument is that since 
capital goods are often firm-specific and have a low resale value, disinvestment is 
more costly than positive investment. He argues that the net present value rule, 
invest when the value of a unit of capital is at least as large as its cost, must be 
modified when there is an irreversible investment because when an investment is 
made, the firm cannot disinvest should market conditions change adversely. This lost 
option value is an opportunity cost that must be included as part of the cost. 
 
Accordingly, “the value of the unit must exceed the purchase and installation cost, by 
an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option active” (Pindyck, 
1991). Rodrik (1991) introduces another element of uncertainty, i.e. policy 
uncertainty, as a determinant of private investment. When a policy reform is 
introduced, it is very unlikely that the private sector will see it as one hundred percent 
sustainable. A number of reasons may be adduced, among them the expectation 
that the political-economic configuration that supported the earlier policies may 
resurface. There is also the fear that unexpected consequences may lead to a 
reversal. Investors must then respond to the signals generated by the reform for it to 
be successful. However, rational behavior calls for withholding investment until much 
of the uncertainty regarding the eventual success of the reform is eliminated (Asante, 
2000). 
 
The fiscal deficit of a government, whether it is financed through printing additional 
bank notes or through taxation (which equally leads to inflation), decreases the real 
return on investment (Serven & Solimano, 1992). Moreover, in many developing 
countries, it is apparent that due to excessive government borrowing, the financial 
resources available for the private sector are limited and the interest rate is high. On 
the other hand, expansionary fiscal policy may be important for the expansion of 
public sector investments in infrastructure (UNCTAD, 1998). In general, the overall 
impact of fiscal deficit on investment as empirically tested by different studies is 
ambiguous. This means that excess borrowing by governments boosts inflation and 
less borrowing affects the construction of large infrastructure and so also investment 
development. 
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Chirinko’s (1993) study reports that in the neoclassical approach, the desired or 
optimal capital stock is proportional to output and the user cost of capital. This in turn 
depends on the price of capital goods, the real rate of interest, the rate of 
depreciation and the tax structure. Therefore, an investment equation results from 
the gap between desired capital and the actual capital stock. 
 
Finally, because of the data limitations involved in empirical models of developing 
economies, especially for capital stock and appropriate measures of return on 
investment, some studies have used the variants of the flexible accelerator model, 
where the speed of adjustment is influenced by a number of observable variables 
(Ghura & Goodwin, 2010). These observable variables may include public 
investment, credit to the private sector, inflation, the real exchange rate, trade, GDP 
growth and interest rates. 
 
2.2 Neoclassical model 
 
The neoclassical theory of investment, based on the work of Jorgenson (1963), 
treats the value of the capital stock desired by a competitive enterprise as a positive 
function of its output level. Accelerator theory also suggests that as demand or 
income increases in an economy, so does the investment made by firms. 
Furthermore, when demand levels result in excess demand, firms increase 
investment to match demand (Rehman, Khan & Khan, 2009). 
 
Neoclassical investment theory has also hypothesised that private investment is 
affected positively by income level, as countries with a higher income level would 
tend to dedicate more of their wealth to domestic savings which would then be used 
to finance investment (Greene & Villanueva, 1991). According to Chirinko and 
Ndikumana (cited in Lesotlho, 2006), it also suggests that the growth rate of real 
output is positively related to investment because it indicates changes in aggregate 
demand for output that investors seek to meet. The real interest rate is also 
considered an important variable in determining the level of investment by 
neoclassical theory. A negative relationship is expected theoretically because of 
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increases in the interest payable being a disincentive to investment (Rehman, Khan 
& Khan, 2009). 
 
However, McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) suggest that there could be a positive 
relationship between investment and the real rate of interest rate because a higher 
real rate of interest would increase savings, the volume of domestic credit would 
increase as a result, and equilibrium investment would be higher. This hypothesis, 
known as the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis is based on the assumption that the 
quantity of financial resources is the main constraint on investment rather than the 
cost of financial resources (Khan & Khan, 2007). According to the early neoclassical 
approach, interest rate differentials are the main reason for firms to become a 
multinational company. From this standpoint, capital moves from a country where the 
return on capital is low to a place where the return on capital is high. This approach 
is based on perfect competition and capital movement free of risk assumptions 
(Harris, 2000). Wai and Wong (1982), Greene and Villanueva (1990) and Fielding 
(cited in Seruvatu & Jayaraman, 2001) identified that the neoclassical investment 
theory suggests that the growth rate of real GDP influences private investment in a 
positive manner. This is also known as the “accelerator effect.” 
 
The neo-classical theory also suggests that, as high interest rates discourage 
investment by raising user cost of capital, private investment is negatively related to 
the interest rate. Since the real interest rate has become positive only very recently, 
mainly because of financial sector reforms, the interest rate can have a negative 
effect only on investment through the saving channel. This is in accordance with 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Low or negative interest rates discourage saving and 
so reduce the amount of savings for investment (Seruvatu & Jayaraman, 2001). 
 
Theoretically, interest rates should be a crucial variable (Shafik, 1992b). The sign of 
the real interest is an empirical issue and depends on whether the data supports the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis or the neoclassical view (Ndikumana, 2000). The 
neoclassical view is that real interest rates are expected to affect private investment 
negatively since higher interest rates raise the user cost of capital and therefore 
reduce investment (Ndikumana, 2000). Under the neoclassical investment model, 
the real interest rate is treated as a key component of the user cost of capital and 
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therefore affects private investment negatively (Frimpong & Marbuash, 2010). On the 
other hand, as Agrawal posits (cited in Lesotlho, 2006), the McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis states that interest rates affect private investment positively. 
 
2.3. Tobin’s Q and profit models 
 
In the Tobin Q theory of investment, the ratio of the market value of existing capital 
stock to its replacement cost (the Q ratio) is the main force driving investment 
(Chirinko, 1993; Ghura & Goodwin, 2010). That is to say, enterprises will invest if the 
increase in the market value of an additional unit exceeds the replacement cost. 
 
There are theories hinging on profits or profits earned by business units and 
industries instead of output. This analysis of profit and investment relationship has 
several variants, one of which is that investment is affected by current profits, the 
amount of retained profits, or by other variables like output, price and sales, which 
reflect profits (Chirinko, 1993). The profit theory hypothesises that the greater the 
gross profits, the greater will be the level of internally generated funds and so also 
the rate of investment (Zebib & Muoghalu, 1998). 
 
In addition, there is the disequilibrium approach, which views investment as a 
function of both profitability and demand for output (Chirinko, 1993). In this instance, 
investment decisions have two stages: the first is the decision to expand the level of 
productive capacity; the second is the decision about the capital intensity of the 
additional capacity (Serven & Solimano, 1992). The first decision depends on the 
expected degree of capacity utilisation in the economy and it provides an indicator of 
demand conditions. The second decision depends on relative prices such as the cost 
of capital and labor. The investment decision takes place in a setting in which firms 
may be facing current and expected future sales constraints. Therefore, investment 
depends on both profitability and the prevailing sales constraints which in turn 
determine the rate of capacity utilisation (Serven and Solimano, 1992). 
 
Another approach named “neoliberal” (Galbis, 1979) emphasises the importance of 
financial deepening and high-interest rates in stimulating growth. The proponents of 
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this approach are McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The core of their argument 
rests on the claim that developing countries suffer from financial repression (which is 
generally equated with controls on interest rates in a downward direction) and that if 
these countries were liberated from their repressive conditions, this would induce 
savings, investment and growth. Not only will liberalisation increase savings and 
loan-able funds, it will result in a more efficient allocation of these funds. Both 
contribute to higher economic growth. 
 
In contrast with the neoclassical theory, the neoliberal view is that investment is 
positively related to the real rate of interest. The reason for this is that a rise in 
interest rates increases the volume of financial savings through financial 
intermediaries and thereby raises investible funds, a phenomenon that McKinnon 
(1973) calls the “conduit effect.” 
 
It is clear from the discussion in this section that private investment depends on 
three broad categories of variables: Keynesian, neoclassical, and uncertainty 
variables. Variables that may be included in the Keynesian tradition include the 
growth rate of GDP, internal funds (for example, change in credit to the private 
sector) and capacity utilisation. The neoclassical determinants of private investment 
include Tobin’s Q, real interest rate, the user cost of capital and public investment 
ratio. There are three uncertainty variables. The first is variability of the user cost of 
capital, real exchange rate, inflation rate, distortions in the foreign exchange market 
and real GDP. The second uncertainty variable is the debt/GDP ratio and the third is 
debt service as a ratio of exports of goods and services (Asante, 2000). 
 
2.4. Financial factors 
 
Financial factors play a limited role in traditional models of investment. For example, 
in the neoclassical model, firms choose inputs of capital (and labor) so as to 
maximise the present discounted value of their income streams. Financial factors 
enter only through the cost of capital which in turn is independent of the way the firm 
finances it. This independence arises because capital markets are assumed to be 
perfect. Thus, firms are able to secure external finance for a project if its expected 
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marginal return exceeds its cost of capital. In this world, the availability of adequate 
cash flows is not a constraint on investment and the financial characteristics of the 
firm do not influence its cost of capital (Mauskopf, 1990). 
 
Some firms (particularly small firms) have limited access to external sources of 
funding. Smaller firms have difficulty raising funds from capital markets for a variety 
of reasons. For example, Woo and Lange (1992), note that limited access may arise 
as a result of prohibitions or barriers to entry that specifically preclude small firms 
from gaining funds, either through regulation or in terms of the costs involved. Cash 
flows will be their primary, and in some cases, only source of funds. 
 
There are also issues of taxation, shareholder dilution, control of information, the 
need to maintain flexibility and liquidity that may have an impact on a firm’s financing 
choices. Financial factors may, therefore, affect the cost and availability of capital 
and so influence the investment decision (Mills, Morling & Tease, 1994). 
 
Financial factors are generally introduced to standard investment models through 
information asymmetries or through agency costs. The introduction of these 
assumptions helps explain how a given level of investment will be funded and how a 
firm's financial position will influence its investment (Ibid). Informational asymmetries, 
where managers have more information about a firm than potential debt or equity 
holders, make it difficult for potential creditors and equity holders to evaluate the 
prospects of different firms. If creditors cannot distinguish between good quality and 
poor quality potential borrowers, then the market interest rate is likely to incorporate 
a premium - good quality borrowers would be charged more than they would in a 
perfectly informed market (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). Similarly, new 
equity issues may trade at a discount to their value implied by the underlying 
prospects of a firm (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The firm may also incur agency costs - 
costs borne by owners of the firm resulting from potential conflicts between 
managers, debt holders and equity holders (Harris & Raviv, 1991). 
 
The effect of these information problems is to boost the cost of external finance 
relative to internal finance. These cost differentials provide some insight into how a 
given level of investment will be funded - cash flows will be preferred to debt which, 
 24 
in turn, will be preferred to new equity issues. This financing hierarchy results 
because cash flows will be the cheapest source of funds, followed by debt and then 
by new equity. The debt will be cheaper than new equity financing because the debt 
contract can be structured in such a way as to minimise the consequences of the 
informational problems. A number of studies confirm the existence of financing 
hierarchies. Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) and Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) 
found evidence that firms prefer internally sourced funds to external securities. Direct 
management surveys such as Allen (1991) and Pinegar and Wilbricht (1989) confirm 
these findings. 
 
The theoretical extent of asymmetric information problems and agency costs can be 
shown to be a function of the structure of a firm's balance sheet. Accordingly, the 
structure of a firm's balance sheet will influence its investment decision and shocks 
to the balance sheet will alter the evolution of investment over time. Firms can alter 
the cost of funding investment in a number of ways. Higher cash flows directly 
reduce the cost of funds because firms will be less dependent on more costly 
external funding. They also help reduce the costs of external funds by increasing the 
collateral backing of external finance. Evidence from the United States suggests that 
firms should build up their stock of financial assets before undertaking large 
investments (Whited, 1991; Eckstein & Sinai, 1986). They do this either because 
they have limited access to external finance or because it provides them with 
collateral to obtain external funding at a lower cost. Shifts in cash flows, financial 
assets and leverage may thus influence the dynamics of investment. 
 
Because the degree of asymmetric information and agency costs depend on firm 
characteristics, certain firms may be more sensitive to financial factors than others. 
For example, investors are likely to be less well-informed about smaller companies. 
This may hinder their ability to raise funds and boost the costs of external funding. 
 
Changes in cash flows may thus be a more important determinant of investment for 
smaller companies (Gertler, 1988; Fazzari, Hubbard & Peterson 1988). Also, the 
investment of firms with higher leverage may be more sensitive to cash flows than 
that of firms with lower leverage. The increased debt servicing obligations resulting 
from higher leverage mean that the available cash flows of higher-geared firms are 
 25 
smaller and thus they have less of a barrier against disturbances. Consideration of 
these links between investment and the balance sheet position of the corporate 
sector enriches the theoretical representation of the way that monetary policy is 
transmitted. In simple models, monetary policy affects corporate investment directly 
by altering the rate at which the expected returns to investment are discounted and 
indirectly through its effects on demand in the economy generally (Mills et al., 1994). 
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW –  
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter deals with the studies made in the field of private investment and its 
current findings. Several hypotheses are assessed in order to explain variations in 
private investment in economies. The determinant factors of private investment in 
developing countries, in Africa and in Ethiopia are examined. In addition, the trend of 
private investment in Ethiopia and its conceptual framework is studied. The lists of 
variables below are factors of private investment and are the main focus of 
discussion. 
 
3.1. Determinants of private investment 
 
Private investment is a crucial pre-requisite for economic growth because it allows 
entrepreneurs to set economic activity in motion by bringing resources together to 
produce goods and services. Rapid and sustained growth is facilitated by a virtuous 
circle whereby entrepreneurship and investment lead to higher productivity, making it 
possible to invest larger sums in the future. In the course of this process, jobs are 
created and new technologies are introduced, especially through international trade 
and investment linkages. Successful mobilisation of private investment is thus 
increasingly important for creating employment, raising growth rates and reducing 
poverty. 
 
The main determinants of investment in a given country can be at a micro and macro 
level. However, as the study emphasises the micro level, the following discussion 
focuses mainly the main determinants of private investment on a microeconomic 
level and using different kinds of literature. 
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3.1.1. Access to credit and Interest rate 
 
• Private investment in developing countries  
 
Nainggolan, Ramli, Daulay and Rujiman (2015) examined the determinants on 
private investment in the North Sumatra Province of Indonesia using secondary data 
spanning a 32-year period. The results indicated that in the long and short terms, 
GDP, exchange rate, and investment credits have a positive and significant effect on 
private investment, whilst interest rates, government investment, inflation and 
economic crises have a significant but negative effect on private investment. 
 
Suhendra and Anwar (2014) researched the determinants of private investment and 
the effect of economic growth in Indonesia using panel data. Their results show that 
the availability of investment financing in the form of investment loans has a positive 
and significant effect on private investment. They added that the increase of banks’ 
role in financing investment through bank loans to business or real sector investment 
would increase the level of investment. The analysis concluded that there was a 
positive relationship between the availability of debt finance for investment purposes 
and the growth of private investment. 
 
Bhaumik, Das and Kumbhakar (2011) studied firm investment and credit constraints 
in India at the turn of the century using a stochastic frontier approach. The results 
suggested that the degree of credit constraint of an average firm increased over time 
during the sample period, despite significant reforms in the Indian banking sector. 
They also found that the degree of credit constraint decreases with cash flow and 
assets, i.e. credit constraints are alleviated by cash flows and assets of firms, but 
aggravated by a high leverage level. Furthermore, a threshold effect of leverage 
exists and the degree of credit constraint is greater for highly leveraged firms. 
Finally, the study found that business groups alleviate credit constraints of member 
firms, but their ability to do so declines over time. 
 
Munir, Awan and Hussain (2010) examined the long run and short run link between 
investment, savings, interest rate and bank credit in the private sector in Pakistan. 
They found that the long run results of private investment show that bank credit to 
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the private sector, public investment, and private savings determine the success of 
private investment. This means that the supply of bank credit to the private sector 
enhances private investment. In addition to this, private savings speed up private 
investment and play a complementary role in boosting the private investment. The 
value of the coefficient of the real rate of deposits, though positive and statistically 
significant, is very small. The study however found out that results of the short run 
show that the change in the bank credit to the private sector has a very small impact 
on the change in private investment in the short run. The short run impact of the 
change in public investment on the change in private investment is also negative, 
which shows that public investment crowds out the private investment in the short 
run. The change in the real rate of interest on deposits also has a negative impact on 
the change in private investment. Private savings positively affect the change in 
private investment in the short run. 
 
Karagoz (2010) analysed the determining factors of private investments in Turkey 
between 1979 and 2005 using the Auto-Regressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) model. 
The result of their analysis shows that in the long run real GDP, real exchange rate, 
the ratio of private sector credit to GDP, private external debt, inflation, and trade 
openness have a significant impact on private investments. The impacts of first and 
last variables are negative whilst others are positive. 
 
The impact of the interest rate on investment in Jordan was investigated by Bader 
and Ibrahim (2010) using co-integration analysis. The results of the study showed 
that the impact of the real interest rate on investment is negative and that the 
influence of the real interest rate on investment is higher than the influence of 
income. 
 
Gűnçavdi, Bleaney and Mckay (2008) found out that financial factors are important in 
the determination of private investment behavior in Turkey. In particular, the 
borrowing constraints and indebtedness of firms are the most important factors 
influencing investment demand. In addition to this, they examined the role of 
financial constraints in the investment process and evaluated the impact of financial 
liberalisation programmes. 
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A study by Poncet, Steingress and Vandenbussche (2008) regarding financial 
constraints on Chinese firms to test the existence of a "political-pecking order" in the 
allocation of credit, found that private Chinese firms face severe financial constraints 
while there are no such constraints for state-owned and foreign enterprises. They 
argued that the discrimination against private firms by financial institutions is at odds 
with the observation that these firms are the engine of growth in the Chinese 
economy. The findings are that firstly, private Chinese firms are credit constrained 
while state-owned and foreign-owned firms are not. Secondly, that the geographical 
and sectorial presence of foreign capital alleviates credit constraints faced by private 
Chinese firms. And thirdly, that the geographical and sectorial presence of state 
firms aggravates financial constraints for private Chinese firms (“crowding out”). 
 
A study by Gűnçavdi and McKay (2003) conducted on macroeconomic adjustment 
and private manufacturing investment in Turkey examined the main determinants of 
PIMS and the impacts of structural adjustment (particularly financial liberalisation as 
an integral part of the reform). The study showed that liberalisation policies in 
financial markets appear to have positive effects by reducing the stringency or 
rigidity of quantity constraints on investment while the high-interest rates resulting 
from financial liberalisation had no significant impact on investment. Macroeconomic 
instability, proxied by the variability of the inflation rate, seems to have discouraged 
investment in manufacturing. The study also examined the roles of credit and foreign 
exchange constraints in the determination of private investment in the manufacturing 
industry in Turkey and found that private manufacturing investment is affected by 
different factors in the long and the short run. In the long run, the accelerator effect 
and credit are the two influential factors in the manufacturing industry. The growth 
rates of demand (as an accelerator variable) and credit stock to the private sector 
are also important in explaining the short-run fluctuations in the manufacturing 
investment. The availability of foreign exchange is important, but not as much as the 
growth of demand and credit. Macroeconomic uncertainty appeared to have no 
significant effect. 
 
Hallward-Driemeier, Wallsten and Xu (2003) showed that a firm’s performance is 
positively correlated with foreign ownership, research and development, information 
and communications technology, staff quality, the share of the firm's labor force that 
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receives training from the firm, and access to external finance. Excess capacity is 
negatively correlated with a firm’s performance, whilst time spent with regulators is 
negatively correlated with total factor productivity. In summary, a firm-level 
investment climate analysis reveals that the main determinants of positive 
performance in China are international integration, entry and exit, labor market 
issues, technology use, and access to external finance. 
 
• Private investment in Africa 
 
Agu (2015) analysed the determinants of private investment in Nigeria between 1970 
and 2012 using error-correction modeling. The conclusion was that the investment 
rate is positively correlated with both the growth rate of disposable income and the 
real interest rate on bank deposits. This study discovered that investment has been 
slowed down in Nigeria as a result of increased lending rates, reduced public 
expenditure, reduced savings, political instability and inadequate infrastructure. 
 
A study by Kehinde, Felix, Kayode and Adedamola (2012) showed that private 
sector output, GDP, and credit to the private sector have all been significant 
determinants of private investment rates. The empirical evidence suggested that if 
the sector lacks adequate credit, there would be a reduction in the level of private 
investment with an adverse effect on the long-term productive capacity of the private 
sector. The results also suggested that the interest rate is inversely related to private 
investment, but that it is not significant. It means that when interest rate rises, the 
cost of borrowing increases, so there will be a decline in future profits and as a 
result, the motivation to invest declines. The result provided evidence that private 
investment in Nigeria is constrained by the unavailability of financing, and that 
monetary policy could be used to influence private investment decisions. 
 
In Addition, Harupara (1998), in his investigation of determinants of private 
investment in Namibia, identified that credit granted to the private sector positively 
affected private investment in the country. Credit availability is also positively and 
significantly related to private investment in Ghana (Akpalu, 1997). Oshiokya (1994) 
found out that credit disbursement to the private sector had strong positive and 
significant effects on private investment in African countries. Some argue that the 
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availability of finance, rather than the cost of finance, has an influence on 
investment. It seems rational to take into account the availability of finance 
represented by the proportion of credit disbursed to private investors, as a 
determining factor rather than the interest rate. The expected sign is positive 
because as the availability of finance increases, people can have the finance 
required to invest, and this in turn increases the rate of private investment (Harvey, 
1985). 
 
The study on credit constraints in manufacturing enterprises in Africa by Bigsten 
(2003) examined whether firms in the manufacturing sector in Africa are credit 
constrained. It suggested that demand for credit is strongly related to size and that 
demand for formal loans among African manufacturers is low. According to the 
study, most firms obtained loans, but there are big differences in firm size. Loan 
applications are less common among small firms, and the success rate here is lower 
than that of large firms. The study concluded that on the supply side, banks allocate 
credit to those firms that can earn more profits. 
 
According to Habyarimana (2003), firms affected by the banking crises are more 
likely to report being credit constrained, suggesting that losing a banking relationship 
hampers investment. 
 
Similarly, Mbugua (2000) in his Kenyan case study, showed that the interest rate 
was negatively associated with private investment. This finding was also supported 
by Akpalu (1997) on determinants of private investment in Ghana. He found that the 
real interest rate was negatively associated with private investment. 
 
Investigating the determinants of domestic investment in Africa, Mlambo and 
Oshikoya (2001) further showed that macroeconomic factors such as fiscal deficit, 
domestic credit to the private sector, the real exchange rate, and macroeconomic 
uncertainty explain a substantial part of the weak investment performance in Africa. 
They, therefore, concluded that the establishment of a sound macroeconomic 
framework is a prerequisite for sustained investment recovery in the continent. 
Further, they argued that in order to encourage domestic investment, the stability 
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and predictability of the incentive framework (relative prices, interest rates, exchange 
rate, etc.) might be more important. 
 
Bigsten and Soderbom (2006) conducted a study on lessons learned during a survey 
of a Decade of Manufacturing Enterprise Surveys in Africa. They found that 
investment in physical capital has remained low, more because of uncertainty than 
because of a severe credit constraint. There is some evidence that a lack of credit 
has been a problem for small firms, but although the profit effect on investment is 
larger for small than for large firms, it is still quite small. Analysis of firms’ borrowing 
behavior paints a similar picture: on average the desire for formal credit has been 
relatively modest, although demand for credit is relatively high among very small 
firms. The most likely explanation for why a lack of credit has not been a major factor 
in explaining the low levels of investment over the last decade is that few firms could 
identify strong investment opportunities during this period. Next, exports have 
remained low throughout the period, and research indicates that the high costs of 
entering the export market may be part of the reason. This has two potentially 
important policy implications. First, if incentives can be created, firms enter the 
export market and are likely to remain in the market for some time. Second, high 
entry costs imply that there is a large set of firms that remain focused on the 
domestic market, even though they are internationally competitive. Reducing entry 
costs will give these firms access to a larger market. 
 
A study by Record and Davies (2007) in Malawi, highlighted the following four top 
constraints: macroeconomic instability, finance, electricity supply and the availability 
of skilled workers. Macroeconomic instability was the primary constraint to doing 
business. The study also reported access to and cost of finance as being a major 
constraint. This is a reflection of the macro instability that has driven real interest 
rates very high in Malawi. The Investment Climate Assessment (ICA) data also 
shows that most of the firms have access to some form of banking services, while 
few firms have access to longer term financing. Both the cost and consistency of 
supply of utilities are major constraints to private sector investment, and this was 
stressed by the managers in the ICA survey. In this survey, it was also reported that 
the unavailability of skilled workers is a major constraint to investment rather than 
labor regulations. Additional constraints, while not the leading problems, include the 
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costs associated with crime and corruption. Malawian firms lose 4% of sales to crime 
(double the average for Sub-Saharan Africa), and pay on average 2% of sales to 
public officials to “get things done.” 
 
A study by Raphael (2014) on determinants of private sector investment in Nigeria 
suggested that interest rates and credit to the private sector has not been able to 
contribute effectively or boost private investment in Nigeria. Changes in the volume 
of bank credit to the private sector are suggested to have had a positive impact on 
private investment activity in the developing countries (Oshikoya, 1994; Ndikumana, 
2000). 
 
According to a study by Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2003), the leading constraint 
cited by enterprise managers in Africa is financing, followed by corruption, 
infrastructure and inflation. Pooling data across all regions, the researchers found a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between the growth in sales and 
investment, and taxes, regulations and financing. Quantitatively, the largest effect is 
that of financing constraints on sales growth. One implication of a poor business 
environment is that the costs for certain services important to manufacturers will be 
high. The study showed that African firms have high indirect costs (transport, 
logistics, telecommunications, water, electricity, land and buildings, marketing, 
accounting, security, and bribes) compared with firms in Asia and that African firms 
suffer substantial losses from power outages, crime, shipment losses, and the like. 
Furthermore, economic risk in Africa is typically high, credit is expensive or 
unavailable, skilled labor is relatively expensive and domestic markets are typically 
very small. 
 
Moreover, Abuka, Egesa, Atai and Obwona (2006), carried out an analysis of firm-
level investment determinants and constraints using data collected by the Bank of 
Uganda. The bank used the Uganda Business Inquiry (UBI) Survey and private 
sector investment surveys. They found out that turnover, profit and credit are 
significant determinants of firm-level investment. The results further showed that the 
profit effect is larger for small and medium sized enterprises compared to large firms. 
However, contrary to expectation, credit was not a significant factor on investment 
for small and medium-sized firms. It is possible that small and medium-sized firms 
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use their own contributions and profits as sources of capital rather than credit. This 
would imply that credit is required to ease temporary cash flow problems as opposed 
to the new capital formation.  
 
A study by Naudé, Oostendorp and Serumaga-Zake (2000) on determinants of 
investment and exports of South African manufacturing firms, showed that labor 
costs in South African manufacturing firms were found to be high in comparison to 
other African countries where similar surveys were conducted. Moreover, it was 
believed that manufacturing firms perceive their environment to be less uncertain 
than their counterparts in Kenya and Zimbabwe, suggesting that uncertainty is less 
of a deterrent to investment in South Africa than in other African countries, and credit 
constraints are even less of a problem for the present. 
 
Bigsten and Soderbom (2006) review the research results on manufacturing firms in 
Africa. They examine the business environment and place particular emphasis on 
risk, access to credit, labor, skills and infrastructure. The study looks in some detail 
at what has been learned about four key aspects of a firm’s performance: growth, 
investment, technology acquisition and exports. The business environment has 
emerged as the prime suspect for poor enterprise performance in Africa and 
improving the investment climate is seen to be a priority for the continent (World 
Bank, 2005). Labor costs and the supply of labor in general, and specific skills in 
particular, are important for good performance. Two general results in this area have 
emerged from the research on the African survey data, one related to earnings and 
education and one to earnings and firm size. The first is that earnings are positively 
correlated with education. The way for firms to grow and remain profitable is through 
improved performance in the form of higher productivity. 
 
• Private investment in Ethiopia 
 
Ambaye, Berhanu and Abera’s (2014) study on the determinants of domestic private 
investment in Ethiopia identified that domestic credit given to the private sector 
reduces domestic private investment because the credit may be diverted to non-
productive activities. The study further identifies that the appreciation of the real 
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exchange rate discourages domestic private investment and vice versa. In short, the 
high value of local currency constrains domestic investment. 
 
Dawit (2010) showed that the following are the success factors for private investment 
in Mekelle City: the maintenance of good accounting records by firms, good 
managerial skill, experience, government support and training. The major problems 
are a lack of proper planning and feasibility studies, lack of skilled staff, delays in 
securing bank loans, a lack of market for output, infrastructure problems and 
inflation. 
 
Lastly, a study by Workie (1996) on constraints to entry, operation and expansion of 
private investment in Ethiopia using investor level information showed that 
bureaucratic procedures, a lack of infrastructure, power supply problems and access 
to finance were the leading constraints for operations. The other areas of the 
business environment (such as political/policy uncertainty and labor regulations) 
were relatively less important. The survey ultimately confirmed that the availability of 
finance rather than the interest rate is a crucial determinant of private investment in 
Ethiopia. Macroeconomic instability and political/policy uncertainty were not found to 
be significant determinants of private investment. 
 
 
3.1.2. Judiciary system, Bureaucratic red tape, Corruption and Political 
instability  
 
• Private investment in developing countries 
 
Soneta, Bhutto, Butt, Mahar and Sheikhet (2012) found out that investment in 
infrastructure is inversely proportional to the productivity and growth of the 
manufacturing sector in Pakistan because of the political instability and economic 
conditions of the country. Due to these conditions, new investors do not want to 
invest in Pakistan and existing investors wish to move their businesses to abroad. 
 
Asiedu and Freeman (2009) studied three important economic areas: transition 
countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. They found 
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that corruption has an adverse effect on investment growth in transition countries, 
but has no significant effect in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Furthermore, among the variables (firm size, firm ownership, trade 
orientation, GDP growth, inflation and openness to trade) corruption is the most 
important determinant of investment growth for transition countries. This shows that 
the overall effect of corruption on investment is negative. 
 
A study by Basar and Zyck (2012) on the impact of corruption on investment showed 
that corruption was among the most significant obstacles facing investment cited by 
Afghan business people. Others included access to land, anti-competitive behavior 
and tax administration, all closely related to corruption. The World Bank’s report on 
the investment climate in Afghanistan identifies the major obstacles to investment as 
being electricity, access to land, corruption and access to finance. 
 
The survey made by Seruvatu and Jayaraman (2001) on determinants of private 
investment in Fiji indicated that the principal factors hindering investment are largely 
policy-related issues. This suggested that while investment incentive schemes might 
go some way in promoting investment, the key to improving the investment climate is 
clear policy direction and simple bureaucracy and regulation. The top major 
obstacles to investment were government policy uncertainty, bureaucratic red tape, 
government regulations, finding skilled labor, volatile political situations, land issues, 
law and order instability, a lack of infrastructure, and high utility costs like water and 
electricity. Consumer confidence, interest rates, shipping costs, profitability, bank 
fees and charges, price controls, tax rates, racial issues, medical/education facilities, 
finding suitable land/premises, availability of work/sales, lack of bank lending, wages, 
cash flow, contract security, and exchange controls were relatively less important. 
Other impediments to investment include expatriate permits, a lack the Board of 
Directors’ support and interest, lack of management focus and prioritising, trade 
union issues, lack of local equity, labor rigidity, trade relations, lack of raw material, 
international tax treaties, and coups and crime (Ibid). 
 
According to the findings of the study by Pun (2005) on strategy determinants and 
choices in manufacturing enterprises in two Chinese cities – Hong Kong and 
Shanghai – marketing strengths are the leading strategy determinants. Product and 
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service quality, company reputation and production and operations costs were also 
key components of strategy determinants. The study also found that Shanghai 
respondents stressed the importance of research and development and innovation 
capabilities, whilst Hong Kong respondents favoured management commitment. So, 
the study indicated that both corporate and marketing strengths affect strategy 
choices in many manufacturing enterprises. It was also found that for the Hong Kong 
group, no strong statistical evidence exists for technology strengths versus proactive 
strategies. For both groups, there was little to differentiate operational strengths from 
proactive strategies. 
 
• Private investment in Africa 
 
Ogunbayo, Sangodoyin, Lawal and Okoruwa (2014) used error-correction modelling 
of analysis to examine the behavior of private investment in Nigeria and investigate 
the factors responsible for them. The macroeconomic analysis of the determinants of 
private investment in Nigeria reveals that there is a link between private investment 
and economic growth vis-à-vis public investment, exchange rate, Corruption 
Perception Index, inflation, saving rate, terms of trade, political instability and credit 
to the private sector. These variables are all significant and have a negative 
relationship with private investment, except domestic credit to the private sector 
which has a positive relationship. 
 
Bayai and Nyangara (2013) conducted a study on the analysis of the determinants of 
private investment in Zimbabwe for the period 2009-2011. Variables identified for the 
study include political risk, national savings, inflation, interest rates, public 
investment, trade terms and debt servicing. The study identified political risk, interest 
rate, debt servicing, and trade terms as key determinants of private investment over 
the study period. 
 
Naa-Idar, Ayentimi and Frimpong (2012) measured the influence of political stability 
on private investments. This variable recorded a significant positive correlation both 
in the short and long runs. This implies that constitutional overthrows or military 
takeovers will affect private investment negatively by creating an adverse climate to 
private investment. This signifies that multi-party democracies can serve as an 
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inducement to private investment. Thus, a present democracy which appears 
considerably stable must have contributed positively to private investments in 
Ghana. 
 
The study by Mbugua (2000) on the micro and macroeconomic determinants of 
PIMS in Kenya, found out that inefficient infrastructure, corruption, insecurity, weak 
institutional framework and inefficient bureaucratic public service are the greatest 
hindrances to PIMS in Kenya. 
 
A study by Weder (1998) on Sub-Saharan African countries’ using data on 
institutional factors is also of relevance. The institutional factors employed by this 
study were qualitative information on annual ratings of the following indicators: 
quality of bureaucracy, the rule of law, policy surprises, credibility of announcements, 
extent of availability of information on new rules, the degree to which business can 
participate in making new rules, predictability of judiciary enforcement, theft and 
crime, security of property rights, frequency of corruption, uncertainty of corruption, 
and corruption were all perceived as obstacles to business. The study concludes that 
factors related to predictability of judiciary enforcement; theft and crime; security of 
property rights and uncertainty of corruption are the most significant. 
 
A study by Anyanwu (2006) on promoting investment in Africa examined the trend, 
constraints, promotion and prospects of investment in Africa. In particular they 
looked at domestic investment, FDI and private portfolio investment, and they 
identified a number of reasons for the low level of investment in Africa. It ranged from 
political and macroeconomic instability to inhospitable regulatory frameworks and 
weaknesses in infrastructure provision, governance, and institutions in general. The 
major factors that are examined in the study are: 
i. The fact that African financial markets (money and capital) are inefficient, 
underdeveloped and inaccessible to most savers and credit-seekers. This 
hinders adequate domestic savings mobilisation and the attraction of foreign 
capital for domestic investment. 
ii. A relatively high degree of uncertainty on the continent, which exposes firms 
to significant risks like the lack of the rule of law, high corruption and volatility 
in real exchange rate, a high incidence of wars, frequent military interventions 
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in politics, and religious and ethnic conflicts, high frequency of government as 
well as policy changes on the continent and the lack of transparency in 
macroeconomic policy. This last is of concern because it increases 
transaction costs, thereby reducing the incentives for investment. 
iii. Weak law enforcement stemming from corruption and the lack of a credible 
mechanism for the protection of property rights. 
iv. A low investment in human capital which leads to high illiteracy levels, 
inadequate access to health services, a lack of skills and adaptation to 
technology as well as the low capacity to absorb physical capital. 
v. The lack of a favorable investment climate, including slow and complicated 
business requirements, inefficiency, and bureaucratic system of work. 
vi. The absence of adequate supporting infrastructures such as 
telecommunications, transport, power supply and skilled labor, discourages 
domestic investment. 
 
The study showed that Africa needs increased investment for higher and sustained 
growth. There is a need to increase the productivity of its investment (in terms of 
domestic exchange returns) through increased capacity utilisation, skilled and 
technological development as well as other supporting national, regional and 
international policy measures. With respect to domestic resource mobilisation, it is 
worth noting that many African countries have undertaken financial reforms to 
enhance savings through liberalising interest rates, eliminating credit controls, and 
reducing directed credit programs. These measures constitute the first steps towards 
rendering the financial systems more responsive to mobilising resources. Other 
measures that are being taken include improving banking infrastructures; developing 
non-bank financial instruments, and supporting microfinance. 
 
A study by Busia (2007) on the overview of challenges of the investment climate 
stated that potential investors in Africa are confronted with a number of challenges 
including prolonged delays in starting a business, getting requisite licenses, legal 
regimes for hiring and firing workers, registering property, obtaining credit, protecting 
investments and enforcing contracts. In addition, the overall favorable political 
environment for investment including peace and security are not guaranteed, and 
there is a ever present perception of corruption in the region. 
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According to the 2013 World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Rank, which assesses 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering 
property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency, 37 of the 50 lowest ranking countries 
(out of 189) are in Africa. The unfavorable investment climate in many African states 
results from poor governance, institutional failures, macroeconomic policy 
imperfections and inadequate infrastructure, as well as uncontrolled corruption, 
bureaucratic red tape, weak legal systems and a lack of transparency in government 
departments. In addition, the overall poor image of Africa as the locale of physical 
insecurity and lack of peace and stability have made it difficult for the continent to 
attract foreign capital and mobilise adequate and sustained levels of domestic 
private investment to attain the levels of growth. More fundamentally, good 
governance (the other dimension of a good investment climate) is critical for 
increasing domestic investment (Busia, 2007). 
 
3.1.3. Infrastructure facilities, Land access, and Investment incentives 
 
• Private investment in developing countries  
 
Vergara (2004), in his study on taxation and private investment in Chile, confirmed 
that investment was positively affected by tax reforms because lower taxes induced 
a higher private investment ratio. Private investment was negatively affected by 
higher corporate tax rates. 
 
The survey made by Seruvatu and Jayaraman (2001) on determinants of private 
investment in Fiji indicated that the principal factors hindering investment are largely 
policy-related issues. This suggested that while investment incentive schemes might 
go some way in promoting investment, the key to improving the investment climate is 
clear policy direction and simple bureaucracy and regulation. The top major 
obstacles to investment were government policy uncertainty, bureaucratic red tape, 
government regulations, finding skilled labor, volatile political situations, land issues, 
law and order instability, a lack of infrastructure, and high utility costs like water and 
electricity. Consumer confidence, interest rates, shipping costs, profitability, bank 
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fees and charges, price controls, tax rates, racial issues, medical/education facilities, 
finding suitable land/premises, availability of work/sales, lack of bank lending, wages, 
cash flow, contract security, and exchange controls were relatively less important. 
Other impediments to investment include expatriate permits, a lack the Board of 
Directors’ support and interest, lack of management focus and prioritising, trade 
union issues, lack of local equity, labor rigidity, trade relations, lack of raw material, 
international tax treaties, and coups and crime (Ibid). 
 
• Private investment in Africa 
 
Several studies of growth determinants in Africa, especially the study by Collier and 
Gunning (1999) entitled Explaining African Economic Performance showed that poor 
infrastructure is a serious constraint to growth on the continent. Compared with other 
regions, public expenditure as a share of GDP has been higher in Africa but service 
provision has been worse. The poor infrastructure in Africa is likely to be a 
particularly severe constraint to manufacturing growth. 
 
• Private investment in Ethiopia 
 
Adugna (2013) undertook a study covering the period 1981-2010 using Ordinary 
Lease Square (OLS) regression to model the determinants of private investment in 
Ethiopia. Findings from the study showed that public investments in basic 
infrastructures and social overheads are essential for private investment. In addition, 
the rising real per-capital income of the people has a crucial positive effect on private 
investment by way of increasing market demand for goods and services. These in 
turn trigger private investment. Likewise, external debt has a favorable effect on 
private investment in countries like Ethiopia where there is a serious shortage of 
finance. 
 
A study by Baye et al. (2005) on the macro and microeconomic determinants of 
private investment both at national and regional levels in Ethiopia showed that at the 
micro level the probability of individual’s to invest is significantly and positively 
influenced by the level of education, access to land and investment incentives. The 
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influence of bureaucratic red tape was also found to be negative and significant. 
Moreover, Deneke’s (2001) study concluded that unclear land policy, compounded 
by investors’ fear of political instability, has impeded PSD. 
 
Getachew (1997) studied the determinants of private industrial investment in 
Ethiopia using descriptive statistics to analyse micro-level determinants. He found 
that the real interest rate did not have a significant impact on private investment in 
Ethiopia. The study revealed that private investment was positively affected by credit 
disbursement to the private sector in Ethiopia. It also found that severe constraining 
factors to private manufacturing investment were market, financial, infrastructure, 
policy, technology, and input related ones. 
 
3.1.4. Investment types and location 
 
• Private investment in developing countries 
 
Pun et al. (cited in Pun 2005) identified a list of common success factors and 
problem areas for manufacturing businesses in Hong Kong. The success factors are: 
accessibility to markets, availability of funds and capital, availability of workforce, 
company’s location, company’s mission, company’s policies, company’s reputation, 
company’s strategies, cost of production and operations, customer services, 
employee involvement, information technology or system, management commitment 
and communication, market share, market positioning, materials supply, product mix 
and range, product or service quality, research and development or innovation 
capabilities, and workforce skills or abilities and training. The problem areas are: 
cash flow problems, effects of protectionism, few current and potential markets, few 
suppliers and/or vendors, high employee turnover, increasing production costs, 
insufficient research and development, strong local competition, lack of government 
support, low productivity (including poor employee morale), political influence, and 
strong overseas competitors. Management commitment, the company’s mission, and 
the availability of funds and capital are key determinants for organisational success 
in various endeavors. 
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• Private investment in Africa 
 
According to Abuka, Egesa, Atai and Obwona (2006), carried out an analysis of firm-
level investment determinants and constraints using data collected by the Bank of 
Uganda, location is significant and firms located within the central region are likely to 
invest less than those located outside the central region in Uganda. Concerning size, 
it is indicated that large sized firms are more inclined to reinvest over time as 
opposed to small and medium sized enterprises. This could possibly be attributed to 
an easier access to credit for large firms as well as the possibility of large firms 
investing more from retained earnings. Lastly, the effect of sector location is also 
found to be significant for firms in agriculture, manufacturing, and services (Abuka, 
Egesa, Atai and Obwona, 2006). 
 
Table 3.1 below provides a summary of the major factors discussed in the literature 
above that affect investment – both positively and negatively.                              
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Table 3.1: Determinants of investment identified in previous studies 
Variables Positively related to 
Investment  
Negatively related with 
Investment  
Educational level Bigsten & Soderbom (2006); 
Egesa (2010) 
Seruvatu & Jayaraman (2001) 
Access to credit Suhendra & Anwar (2014); 
Munir, Awan & Hussain (2010); 
Harupara (1998); Record & 
Davies (2007); Nainggolan, 
Ramli, Daulay & Rujiman (2015); 
Hussien (2000); Michael & 
Aikaeli 2014, Ogunbayo, 
Sangodoyin, Lawal & Okoruwa 
(2014) 
Batra, Kaufmann & Stone (2003); 
Ambaye, Berhanu & Abera 
(2014); Egesa (2010) 
Interest rate  Agu (2015); Kehinde, Felix, 
Kayode & Adedamola (2012); 
Bader & Ibrahim (2010); 
Seruvatu and Jayaraman (2001); 
Mbugua (2000); Nainggolan, 
Ramli, Daulay & Rujiman (2015) 
Infrastructure 
facilities 
 Soneta, Bhutto, Butt, Mahar & 
Sheikhet (2012); Seruvatu & 
Jayaraman (2001); Collier & 
Gunning (1999); Getachew 
(1997) 
Access to land  Deneke (2001); Seruvatu & 
Jayaraman (2001) 
Judicial system  Record & Davies (2007) 
Bureaucratic red tape  Busia (2007); Seruvatu & 
Jayaraman (2001); Mbugua 
(2000) 
Corruption  Asiedu & Freeman (2009); Basar 
& Zyck (2012); Record & Davies 
(2007); Ogunbayo, Sangodoyin, 
Lawal & Okoruwa (2014) 
Investment 
incentives 
Baye, Fufa & Wakjira (2005); 
Seruvatu & Jayaraman (2001) 
 
Political instability 
risk 
 Agu (2015); Pun et al. (cited in 
Pun 2005); Mbugua (2000); 
Ogunbayo, Sangodoyin, Lawal & 
Okoruwa (2014) 
Investment location 
& areas 
Pun et al. (cited in Pun 2005)  
(Source: Self compiled, 2014) 
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3.2. Trends of private investment in Ethiopia 
 
In the above sections, the determinants of private investment identified in existing 
literature were highlighted and discussed. In this section, the trends of the 
investment climate in Ethiopia will be reviewed during three distinct periods,  the 
imperial era (prior to 1974), the Dergue Era (1975-1991) and the post-Dergue period 
(1991 to date). 
 
3.2.1. Private investment trends during the imperial era (prior to 1974) 
 
During the imperial period, important reforms were introduced and these impacted 
on investment development in Ethiopia. The development of basic infrastructure 
began in the late 1950s in Ethiopia and this included a system of administration, road 
construction, Ethiopian airlines, banking and electric power. All these contribute well  
to planned development. 
 
The first legislation on investment was introduced and enacted in 1950 but it did little 
to encourage high investment. In 1954, agricultural and industrial expansion 
proclamations had a good impact on investment because it required industrial and 
agricultural investment from both domestic and foreign investors. 
 
During the period 1941-1955, a number of manufacturing industries began operating. 
In line with this, the government introduced tax incentives, high levels of tariff 
protection and favorable credit terms to encourage and attract an inflow of capital 
into different sectors. From then till 1974, different enterprises were started and 
these included foreign owned initiatives in the manufacturing sector. 
 
The Investment Decree No. 51 of 1963 (Imperial Government of Ethiopia, 1963) was 
issued at a time when infrastructure development (road transport, air transport, 
banks, power generation, etc.) was taking place at a rapid pace. Private investment 
was singled out for attention and this led to the import substitution strategy which 
was adopted in the five-year development plans. 
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A system of attractive incentives (including tax holidays, low or no taxation on 
imported capital goods, satisfactory remittance of profits, etc.) was built into the 
investment proclamation and foreigners were permitted to establish companies and 
carry on all kinds of business in Ethiopia in the same way as Ethiopian nationals 
could. 
 
In the 1960s, with the issuance of the above decree, the rate of private investment 
(both domestic and foreign), increased. Private investment was expected to play a 
leading role in mining and housing while investments in infrastructure, education, 
health and social welfare were undertaken by the public sector as part of various 
development plans between 1968 and 1973. 
 
3.2.2. Private investment trend during the Dergue period (1975-1991) 
 
During the Dergue period the focus was on nationalisation and the public ownership 
of most economic sectors. Proclamation No. 26/1975 (Military Government of 
Ethiopia, 1975a), was a decree which introduced widespread nationalisation and  
large numbers of private businesses were nationalised. 
 
Proclamation No. 76/1975 (Military Government of Ethiopia, 1975b) issued at about 
the same time as the nationalisation proclamation restricted private operations to a 
few lines of activities and imposed capital ceilings on them. Only individual business 
was allowed (without branches) and private businesses were organised in the form 
of partnerships where membership was restricted to 5 persons. 
 
Government policies during the Dergue regime strictly limited private sector 
investment capital and placed a ceiling amount of Birr 500,000 on investors. They 
were also not allowed to hold a license for more than one line of business and this 
had to be run by only one individual entrepreneur who did not have any other 
permanent job. 
 
The tax structure was very harsh with the maximum rate on personal income being 
as high as 89% (MoFED, 1999). In addition, interest rates were higher for private 
borrowers than for public enterprises and cooperatives. These policing mechanisms 
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severely hampered the potential for expansion of the manufacturing sector during 
the Dergue period and private sector activity was effectively incapacitated. 
 
In 1983, joint ventures were allowed (Military Government of Ethiopia, 1983) but only 
if they involved government and foreign capital. According to this proclamation, the 
government must have the majority share in all such joint ventures. Consequently 
few joint ventures were established. 
 
The Special Decree No 11/1989 (Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1989), 
amended Proclamation No. 235/1983 and permitted domestic private capital 
participation in joint ventures, and lifted the restriction on the duration of the joint 
venture agreement and the provision for majority shareholding by the government. 
 
In March 1990, there was a change of course when the government chose to pursue 
the “mixed economic” policy. Special Decree No. 17/1990 (Peoples Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia, 1990) was issued in May 1990 and it removed most restrictions 
imposed on domestic private businesses and foreign investment in previous 
legislations. 
 
As the policy was so restrictive and marginalised the private sector, it is not 
surprising that the private investment ratio in Ethiopia did not fare well when 
compared to the average for Sub -Saharan African countries during the same period. 
At this time the average investment ratio for Sub-Saharan African countries 
excluding South Africa was about 10% of GDP, whilst that of Ethiopia was on 
average (between 1975-1991) 2.4% of GDP. On the other hand, public investment in 
GDP did increase during the time of the intensification of the establishment of the 
state-owned enterprises. 
 
3.2.3. Private investment trend post -1991 
 
After the seizure of power by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) in 1991, 
most of the policy distortions of the Dergue were rectified. The new economic policy 
of Ethiopia adopted by the TGE pursued a market-oriented economy by rationalising 
its role and encouraging greater participation of the private sector. To revitalise the 
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economy and stimulate growth, the Economic Reform Program (ERP) was launched 
in 1992/93 and this was further strengthened by the FDRE in order to redress the 
structural bottlenecks of the Ethiopian economy. 
 
Like many African countries, Ethiopia adopted a structural adjustment program 
following the change of government (MoFED, 1999). The exchange rate was 
devalued, government monopolies were abolished, domestic markets and imports 
were liberalised and export disincentives were largely rectified. 
 
A major structural reform in the monetary and financial sector during the reform 
program has been the introduction of a competitive financial sector, including the 
establishment of private banking and insurance companies. 
 
In order to realise the policy of encouraging PSD, Proclamation No. 15/1992 
(Transitional Government of Ethiopia, 1992) was enacted in May 1992. The 
proclamation signified a major departure from the previous regime’s investment 
Special Decree 17/90 (Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1990). It provided 
new areas of investment, particularly for domestic investors, in areas such as air 
transport, electricity production and distribution, banking and insurance. Moreover, it 
allowed foreign investors to enter into joint ventures with domestic private investors 
without limiting them to joint ventures with the government. 
 
In June 1996 Proclamation No. 37/1996 (FDRE, 1996) was enacted. In it, investment 
objectives, areas and incentives were defined, as were forms of investment and 
capital requirements for foreign investors, investment permits, transfers of 
technology, loans, the utilisation of foreign currency and remittance of funds, and 
investment administrative requirements. This proclamation clarified some of the 
ambiguities that prevailed in the first one. 
 
With regard to the institution to implement investment policy and incentives, 
Investment Office of Ethiopia (then known as the Ethiopian Investment Commission, 
EIC) was established. The commission was accountable to the Investment Board 
which was chaired by the Prime Minister. The responsibility of the EIC process 
investment application was to issue investment certificates and the grant investment 
 49 
incentives provided for in the proclamation. The EIC was responsible for investors 
with and above a capital amount of Birr 250,000 for domestic investors, and USD 
500,000 or equivalent for foreign investors. If investors were unhappy with the 
decision of EIC, they could appeal to the Investment Board whose ultimate decision 
was final. 
 
Investment Proclamation No. 280/2002 (FDRE, 2002) was enacted in order to 
accelerate the economic development of the country and improve the living standard 
of its peoples, and in particular that of domestic investors. It also aimed to widen the 
scope of participation of foreign investors and facilitate conditions which enhanced 
the country’s investment activities and made the administration system of investment 
transparent and efficient. 
 
The Council of Ministers Regulations No. 84/2003 (FDRE, 2003) outlined investment 
incentives and investment areas reserved for domestic investors. These regulations 
were issued to amend the definition of powers and duties of executive organs of the 
FDRE and re-enactment of investment proclamations. This includes the investment 
activities eligible for income tax exemption and exemption from the payment of 
customs duty. The last regulation of investment activity is the Council of Ministers 
Regulation No. 146/2008  (FDRE, 2008) and it amended the investment incentives 
and investment areas reserved for the domestic investor. 
 
Due to the policies and activities introduced by the government and investors on 
investment, economic development was encouraged in different sectors. Table 3.2 
below shows that since 1998/99, the GDP of the country showed an increasing trend 
and this was caused by the economic policy reforms adopted by the then 
government. According to the trend of Real GDP growth, from 1998/99 to 2001/02 
the GDP increased. The following year showed a decrease after that there has been 
a steady but fluctuating increase. Investment during this period is higher when 
compared to previous governments. This might be because of the new economic 
reform programs and investment codes launched by the government. They 
measurably contributed to and promoted the participation of investment sectors in 
economic activities. 
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Table 3.2: GDP and Real GDP 1998/99 to 2012/13 
Year GDP in Millions of Birr Real GDP growth 
1998/99 58,838.5 5.2 
1999/00 62,299.4 5.9 
2000/01 66,920.7 7.4 
2001/02 68,014.2 1.6 
2002/03 66,586.9 -2.1 
2003/04 74,397.1 11.7 
2004/05 83,804.0 12.6 
2005/06 93,474.5 11.5 
2006/07 104,499.7 11.8 
2007/08 116,178.6 11.2 
2008/09 127,737.5 10.0 
2009/10 141,187.7 10.6 
2010/11 157,464.0 11.4 
2011/12 162,389.0 8.8 
2012/13 169,754.0 9.7 
(Source: Annual Report, NBE, 2013/14) 
 
In addition, the number of domestic private investments also increased from year to 
year. The total number of private investors engaged in domestic investment in the 
manufacturing sector is presented in Table 3.3 below. Capital and job opportunities 
are also noted. 
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Table 3.3: Licensed domestic manufacturing sector by regions (1992-2013) 
Regions No. of Projects Capital mln Birr Perm. Empl. 
Addis Ababa 3,508 28,966 178,994 
Harari 118 267 3,492 
Tigray 857 9,425 31,063 
Afar 5 24 229 
Amhara 464 6,143 18,449 
Oromia 1,634 25,482 100,706 
B. Gumze 13 58 275 
Dire Dawa 289 2,812 7,933 
Gambella 2 7 19 
SNNP 444 2,260 16,293 
Somali 23 300 583 
Total 7345 244,967 1,071,536 
(Source: EIA, 2013) 
 
Table 3.4 below shows that the number of industries between  2008/09 and 2010/11 
increased in almost all areas of the industrial group found in Ethiopia. It is interesting 
to note that though there is an increment within the stated period, there is also high 
fluctuation from year to year in a few industrial groups. Food products and 
beverages, other non-metallic minerals and furniture account for about 30%, 29%, 
and 18% respectively of the total industrial group. 
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Table 3.4: Number of establishments in the private manufacturing sector 
 
Industrial Group 
Number of establishments 
2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 Total Percent 
Food products and 
beverage 
451 529 541 1867 30 
Textiles 16 40 32 117  
Wearing apparel 19 41 51 117  
Tanning and Dressing of 
leather, luggage, and 
handbags 
79 86 110 234  
Wood and products of 
wood and cork 
39 37 39 139  
Paper and paper 
products, printing and 
services 
127 115 113 457  
Chemicals and chemical 
products 
64 75 87 278  
Rubber and plastic 
products 
78 82 130 350  
Other non-metallic 
mineral 
464 585 462 1773 29 
Basic Iron and steel 13 16 37 76  
Fabricated metal products 97 116 137 402  
Machinery and equipment 4 5 15 29  
Assembly of motor 
vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
11 9 9 66  
Furniture 284 349 271 1121 18 
Total 1766 2075 2034 6214  
(Source: www.csa.gov.et.) 
 
Figure 3.1 below depicts the trend of private investment in the State of Tigray 
between 1994 and 2012. Although there is a fluctuation in the number of investors 
from year to year, an overall increment in private investment in the state is evident. 
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Figure 3.1: Trend of private investment in the State of Tigray 
 
(Source: Tigray Investment Office, 2012) 
 
3.3. Conceptual framework 
 
The current study was conducted based on a conceptual framework drawn from the 
empirical literature reviewed and explained above. The main determinant variables 
at macroeconomic and microeconomic levels in various research literatures were 
identified but the study only makes use of independent variables at a microeconomic 
(firm) level. This research also focused on studying the major determinants that are 
critical to ISD in the State of Tigray, Ethiopia. From the literature review above, the 
following schematic representation of the conceptual framework/model for this study 
was developed. It depicts the relationship of variables within the investment status 
and shows the 12 independent variables and 1 dependent variable selected. 
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Figure 3.2: Conceptual framework 
 
 (Source: Adapted from Pun, 2005) 
Independent Variables 
Level of education  
Investment areas  
Access to credit 
Interest rate  
Access to infrastructure facilities 
Access to land 
Judicial system 
Bureaucratic red tape 
Corruption 
Investment incentives 
Risks of political instability  
Investment locations 
Dependent Variable 
Investment status delay 
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEFINITION, MEASUREMENT AND  
HYPOTHESIS OF VARIABLES 
 
In this chapter the operational definitions and measurements of the variables, 
research hypothesis, and ethics embraced are described, and the dissemination of 
the study is discussed. 
 
4.1. Operational definition and measurement of variables 
 
The study hypothesises that multiple variables affect private investors’ operations in 
the study area. The major variables that were expected to have an influence on the 
progress of the private investors in the manufacturing sector in the study area are 
presented and explained below, together with the direction of their effect and 
measurement following the definition of dependent variables. 
 
Dependent variable: Investment status delay (isd) is the dependent variable and it 
refers to the three types of investment status operations. Private investors who 
started pre-implementation are categorised as ‘1,’ private investors who have started 
implementation are categorised as ‘2,’ and those who have started 
operation/production are categorised as ‘3.’ 
 
Explanatory variables: The independent variables are selected based on existing 
theories and empirical evidence from researchers such as Bayai and Nyangara 
(2013), Basar and Zyck (2012), Kehinde et al., (2012), Soneta et al., (2012), Munir et 
al., (2010), Asiedu and Freeman (2009), Baye et al. (2005) and Record and Davies 
(2007). They are contextualised to the study. 
 
Level of education (levedu): This variable shows the level of formal education 
attended by the private investors in the sample group and its delay impact on 
investment status. In this study, primary school complete is labeled ‘1,’ secondary 
school complete ‘2,’ college diploma ‘3,’ first-degree graduate ‘4’ and Master’s 
degree graduate and above ‘5.’ 
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Investment areas (invare): This refers to a type of product line within the 
manufacturing sector which an investor already invests in, for example, food, 
beverages, textiles and textile products, leather and leather products, wood 
products, paper and paper products, printing, chemical and chemical products, 
rubber and plastics products, other non-metallic mineral products, basic metals, 
fabricated metal products, electrical products, and other industries. The variable 
therefore investigates which investment area is more delayed in the manufacturing 
sector. 
 
Access to credit (accred): This refers to the possibility that individuals or 
enterprises can access financial services like credit, deposit and other related 
services. Access to loans by financial institutions (availability of bank credit to private 
investors) significantly affects the operation of private investors in all statuses. This 
study investigates whether the investor has delayed in their investment status due to 
the actual access to credit facilities. The investors consider collateral requirements, 
bureaucracy, interest rate, officials’ corruption, credit amount, etc. as being important 
factors. Thus, in this study, if access to loan delayed impact it is labeled ‘1’ and if 
not, ‘0.’ 
 
Interest rate (intrat): This is the user cost of capital, and it helps to analyse the 
feelings of the investors towards the interest rate of bank loan. The investors express 
their feeling on the interest rate level impact on the investment status by comparing 
the cost and benefits of the credit. In this study, it is labeled ‘1’ if interest rates had a 
negative impact on investment status progress and ‘0’ if not. 
 
Access to infrastructure facility (accinf): This refers to whether the investor 
experienced a delay because of the lack of access to infrastructure facilities or not. 
(Reference is made to quality and efficiency of infrastructure services delivered by 
the public agencies.) If there are adequate infrastructure facilities like road, water, 
electric, telephone, etc., more investors would be attracted to invest and so this 
positively contributes to promoting investment status. In this study, good access to 
infrastructure facilities that assist investment status progress is labeled as ‘1,’ and 
bad access is labelled ‘0.’ 
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Access to land (acclan): Land access is broadly defined as the processes by which 
people individually or collectively gain rights and opportunities to occupy and utilise 
land. The use is primarily for productive purposes but also for other economic and 
social purposes and can be of a temporary or permanent nature (Quan, 2006). The 
private investors were asked whether they experienced a delay due to access to 
land for their investment activities or not by considering the land tenure system, 
bureaucratic procedures, lease prices and the size of land. Thus, in this study, if 
private investors encounter any problems in securing land for investment that 
delayed their investment status, it is labeled ‘1,’ and if not, ‘0’. 
 
Judiciary system (judsys): This refers to the respondents' perception towards the 
functions of the legal5
Corruption (corrup): The encyclopedic and working definition of corruption used by 
the World Bank and Transparency International is that it is the abuse of public power 
for private benefit or profit (Tanzi, 1998). The act often consists of paying bribes to 
 and judiciary system in the state. It was measured by the time 
required to accomplish any task related to a government institution as well as the 
following factors: quality, the degree of honesty, degree of freedom or independence 
in making decisions (especially the judiciary’s ability to enforce rulings), motivation, 
and corruption among employees. Thus, in this study, if the judicial system is 
efficient that had no impact on ISD, it is labeled ‘1’ and ‘0’ if not. 
 
Bureaucratic red tape (bureta): Bureaucratic red tape refers to the existence of 
complicated rules and procedures which can cause long delays. This variable refers 
to the respondents’ perception towards bureaucratic procedures of government 
organisations. It was measured by the time spent in getting services from 
government organisations. Here, the investors considered services required to get 
investment licenses, bank loans, land access, utilities and vehicle registrations. 
Thus, in this study, if there are delays in getting public services due to the 
bureaucratic red tape, it is labeled ‘1’ and ‘0’ if not. 
 
                                                             
5 A legal system is defined as a synergy of legal rules, legal principles, legal standards, legal polices, 
legal structures, legal tradition, legal actors, legal extension and legal penetration operating in a given 
geographical area (Muradu, 2009).  
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public officials by private beneficiaries as compensation for the abuse (Sarkar & 
Hasan, 2001). Another widely used definition is that corruption is a transaction 
between the private and public sector actors through which collective goods are 
illegitimately converted into private ones through payoffs (Heidenheimer, 1989:6). In 
line with this, the private investors were asked what their perception of corruption in 
the State of Tigray was. They were asked to consider different services areas such 
as: securing a bank loan, investment permits and licenses, municipality works, and 
infrastructure facilities related to their investment status. Thus, in this study, if private 
investors are affected their investment status by corruption to get services in the 
state, it is labeled ‘1’ and ‘0’ if not. 
 
Investment incentives (invinc): Barbour (2005) defines an incentive as being ‘any 
measurable advantage given to specific enterprises or categories of enterprises by 
(or at the direction of) government.’ Incentives can be fiscal or non-fiscal, direct or 
indirect. Fiscal incentives include direct ‘cash’ grants or tax breaks; non-fiscal 
incentives include fast-track approval processes or exemptions from certain 
regulations. 
 
Putting in place various incentives would promote investment status by attracting 
more investors to invest in the manufacturing sector. Incentives given to private 
investors in the form of duty-free import of machinery and equipment, income tax 
holidays, access to the bank loans and low lease price of land, and market 
incentives were measured. Thus, in this study, this item was valued as ‘1’ if 
investment incentives have contributed to proceeding the investors’ status and ‘0’ if 
not. 
 
Political instability (polins): Political instability is defined as the presence of conflict 
between objectives of investors and governments. Campos and Nugent (cited in 
Busari & Amaghionyeodiwe, 2007) summarised the different measures of socio-
political instability into two categories, namely: those that stress regular and irregular 
government transfers, and those that are much harsher, such as revolutions, civil 
wars and political homicides. Political instability measures competitiveness and the 
regulation of political participation, regulation, competitiveness, openness of 
recruitment, and the legal and operational independence of the chief executive 
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(Busari & Amaghionyeodiwe, 2007). Thee investors in this study considered the 
border conflict, security system, unnecessary interference, and trade restrictions in 
the state as factors impacting their investment status. Thus, in this study, if the 
political instability affected the progress of investment status in the state, it was 
valued as ‘1’ and ‘0’ if not. 
 
Investment location (invloc): This refers to the place where the firm of a sample 
investor is found. According to Feder (cited in Baye et al., 2005), it is appropriate to 
include location specific dummy variables when observations from different socio-
economic or ecological/environmental areas are included in the sample. These could 
capture other area-specific factors affecting investment decisions such as access to 
the market, access to infrastructure, distance to raw materials, and and costs 
incurred specifically due to the location of the enterprise. Thus, in this study, if 
problems of this nature exist that affect the firm’s investment status because of their 
investment location, it was valued as ‘1’ and ‘0’ if not. 
 
4.2. Research hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses were identified during an extensive literature review. The factors 
that are examined in this study are those which were found to be significant in most 
of the previous studies. To study the determinants of PIMS on a microeconomic 
level, the researcher hypothesises a relationship between the investment status 
delay (isd) and the following identified independent variables. Therefore, 
independent variables that can have an influence on private investment status 
progress are explained below. 
 
The independent variables: The following are firm-level characteristics and 
investment climate (economic factor) indicators of the micro-level determinants of 
private investment operations in the manufacturing sector in each investment status. 
They include the level of education, investment area, access to credit, interest rate, 
access to infrastructure facility, access to land, the judiciary system, bureaucratic red 
tape, corruption, investment incentives, political instability, and location of 
investment, and these are outlined together with their details. 
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4.2.1. Hypothesis of independent variables 
 
Hypothesis 1: Level of education vs. isd 
It is undeniable that education is an important contributing factor to making wise 
investment decisions as it helps to minimise investment risk. Before embarking on an 
investment activity, investors should assess all the pros and cons of their decision. 
The study by Egesa (2010) indicated that skilled managers increase firm survival. 
Moreover, a study on private investment determinants at the micro level by Baye et 
al. (2005) has also shown that the level of education significantly and positively 
influences the probability of an individual to invest. Thus, the following hypothesis is 
made: 
 
Ho0: The more the private investor is educated, the less the probability of 
investment status delay. 
Ho1: The more the private investor is educated, the more the probability of 
investment status delay. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Investment type vs. isd 
Many studies have concluded that the type of investment makes a difference to 
private investment delay in the manufacturing sector (Baye et al., 2005). Accordingly, 
the following hypothesis is formulated. 
 
Ho0: All private investment areas of the manufacturing sectors are, more likely, 
equally subject to investment status delay. 
Ho1: All private investment areas of the manufacturing sectors are, more likely, not 
equally subject to investment status delay. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Access to credit vs. isd 
According to Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon (2006), the availability of financing is a 
key factor influencing investment behavior independently of the cost of capital. 
Economic theory has also shown that access to credit plays a significant role in 
enhancing or promoting investment. Empirical studies have similarly shown that debt 
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servicing has a significant positive relationship with private investment (Bayai & 
Nyangara, 2013). 
 
However, access to finance is the leading constraint for entry, operation, and 
expansion of private investment in Ethiopia (Mitiku, 1996). Egesa (2010) also found 
out that the lack of credit adversely affects the survival of firms. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is made: 
 
Ho0: There will be no negative influence of access to a bank loan on the 
investment status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Access to a bank loan will have a negative effect on investment status delay 
of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Interest rate vs. isd 
There are varying views on the effect of the real interest rate on the level of private 
investment. Private investment could be positively related to interest rates in 
developing countries (Greene & Villanueva, 1990). On the other hand, a high-interest 
rate level raises the real cost of capital and therefore dampens the private 
investment level. Similarly, the economic theory on real interest rate states that it has 
a negative impact on investment (Bader & Ibrahim, 2010, Bayai & Nyangara, 2013, 
Kehinde et al., 2012). Based on these ideas, the following hypothesis is drawn. 
 
Ho0: The interest rate on bank loans has a negative impact on the investment 
status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: The interest rate on bank loans has a positive impact on the investment status 
delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Access to infrastructure facility vs. isd 
This hypothesis investigates whether the investor has access to infrastructure 
facilities or not. If there are adequate infrastructure facilities like water, electricity and 
telephone lines, more investors would be attracted to invest and so it contributes to 
promoting investment. According to the study by Soneta et al. (2012), investment in 
public infrastructure has an insignificant effect on the manufacturing sector in 
Pakistan. In addition to this, the lack of infrastructure (particularly power) is the 
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leading constraints for entry, operation and expansion of private investment in 
Ethiopia (Mitiku, 1996). However, the study by Munir et al., 2010 showed that private 
investment is positively affected by public infrastructure in the long run in a 
developing country. The following is therefore the hypothesis drawn: 
 
Ho0: Access to infrastructure facilities has a negative effect on the investment 
status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Access to infrastructure facilities has a positive effect on the investment status 
delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Access to land vs. isd 
One of the major factors of production according to economic theory and different 
empirical pieces of evidence is access to land. Mitiku (1996) and Deneke (2001) 
found that access to and the cost of land is the specific leading entry constraint to 
private investment in Ethiopia. And, the results at a micro level showed that the 
probability of individuals to invest is significantly and positively influenced by access 
to land (Baye et al., 2005). Based on the above evidence, the following hypothesis is 
made: 
 
Ho0: Access to land has a negative effect on investment status delay of private 
investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Access to land has a positive effect investment status delay of private 
investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Judiciary system vs. isd 
According to the study by Baye et al. (2005), the legal and judiciary system are not 
significantly related to the probability of individuals to invest in private investment; 
Record and Davies (2007) however reported that it relates negatively to investment. 
Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
Ho0: Judicial system affects negatively the investment status delay of private 
investor in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Judicial system affects positively the investment status delay of private 
investor in the manufacturing sector. 
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Hypothesis 8: Bureaucratic red tape vs. isd 
Bureaucratic procedures are the leading constraints for entry, operation and 
expansion of private investment in Ethiopia (Mitiku, 1996). Thus, the next hypothesis 
is formulated as follows: 
 
Ho0: Public services delay due to bureaucratic red tape has a negative impact on 
the investment status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Public services delay due to bureaucratic red tape has a positive impact on 
the investment status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 9: Corruption vs. isd 
According to Asiedu and Freeman (2009), corruption may deter the entry of firms 
into investment and the overall effect of corruption on investment may be negative. 
These researchers add that the effect of corruption on investments varies 
significantly across regions: corruption has a significant negative effect on 
investment growth for firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact on 
firms in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, Mulunga (cited in Baye et 
al., 2005) found that corruption has a negative impact on investment. Consequently, 
the following hypothesis is drawn: 
 
Ho0: Investment status delay is negatively affected by the level of private investors’ 
perception of corruption in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Investment status delay is positively affected by the level of private investors’ 
perception of corruption in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Investment incentives vs. isd 
Incentives are used as tools to boost investment and growth (Barbour, 2005). That 
is, availing incentives for investors would promote investment by attracting more 
investors. Similarly, the study at the micro level by Baye et al. (2005) showed that 
the probabilities of individuals to invest are significantly and positively influenced by 
investment incentives. However, The International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Chua, 
1995) takes the firm line that tax incentives do not stimulate investment significantly 
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and that, when they do, the cost often outweighs the benefits (cited in Barbour, 
2005). From the above evidence, the following hypothesis is drawn: 
 
Ho0: Investment incentives to private investors positively influences investment 
status delay in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: Investment incentives to private investors negatively influences investment 
status delay in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 11: Political instability vs. isd 
A study on private investment and political instability (Busari & Amaghionyeodiwe, 
2007) shows that the political environment does not significantly affect the rate of 
change of domestic expenditure if private investment grows faster. Moreover, 
political instability does not seem to have any significant, direct impact on private 
investment. According to Mitiku (1996), political/policy uncertainty are not significant 
determinates of private investment. However, political risk or political uncertainty 
relates negatively to private investment (Bayai & Nyangara, 2013). From this point of 
view, the following hypothesis is drawn: 
 
Ho0: There will be no negative impact of political instability risks on investment 
status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: There will be a negative impact of political instability risks on investment 
status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Investment location vs. isd 
According to the study by Pun et al. (cited in Pun 2005) and Baye et al. (2005), 
investment locations are not significantly related to the probability of individuals to 
engage in private investment. On the other hand, the effect of sector location is also 
found to be significant for firms in agriculture, manufacturing and service provision 
(Abuka et al., 2006). In the context of this study, the last hypothesis was derived: 
 
Ho0: The investment location of private investors relates positively to investment 
status delay in the manufacturing sector. 
Ho1: The investment location of private investors relates negatively to investment 
status delay in the manufacturing sector. 
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4.3. Ethics and dissemination 
 
Research ethics refers to the application of fundamental ethical principles (honesty, 
objectivity, integrity, carefulness, openness, confidentiality, etc.) to a variety of topics 
that are part of scientific research. These include various aspects of academic 
scandal including scientific misconduct (such as fraud, fabrication of data and 
plagiarism), the regulation of research, etc. As per the UNISA policy on research 
ethics, the researcher obtained an Ethical Certificate before conducting this study. 
 
When the researcher distributed his questionnaire, its objective was clearly 
explained and the respondents understood that the information would only be used 
for academic purpose and that the outcome of the research would benefit society. All 
information was kept confidential. In addition to the primary data, all secondary data 
was safely kept. The final result of the research will be disseminated to all 
stakeholders, including investor associations, university communities, investment 
offices and other users of the research output. On completion the researcher will 
publish a peer-review article in a reputable journal.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the research methodologies employed 
in this study. It starts with a description of the study area and is followed by a 
presentation of study design, the sampling procedures and data collection methods 
used. The latter includes sampling techniques, sample size, sources and methods of 
data collection. Finally, this chapter presents the method of data analyses – the 
descriptive and econometric methods. 
 
5.1. Description of the study area 
 
The research data was collected in the State of Tigray. This state was chosen as the 
study area for the analysis of microeconomic determinants of PIMS because it was 
noted that there was an increase of private investment in the area. This study 
identifies factors influencing private investors in the sector and also changes and 
developments that will support the balanced development of private investors in the 
regional states of Ethiopia. It was believed that a PhD level study should be rigorous 
and treat the topic in depth, thereby avoiding broad and unmanageable research 
designs. Moreover, the researcher believes that the results of the research can be 
applicable to the situations in other states of Ethiopia, and lessons drawn could 
promote countrywide improvement. The topography, location and demographic 
characteristics of the state are now presented. 
 
The State of Tigray is located in the northernmost part of the nine states of Ethiopia. 
It is bordered by the State of Afar in the East, Eritrea in the North, the State of 
Amhara in the South and Sudan in the West. The State of Tigray has an 
approximate area of 53,386 square-kilometers (about 7% of Ethiopia) and an 
estimated population of 5,062,000 (www.citypopulation.de). 
 
According to the new administrative setup, the State of Tigray is divided into seven 
zones. These are western, northwestern, central, eastern, northeastern, southern, 
and Mekelle (the state capital). The topography of the state is characterised by 
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mountain plateau and the mountains vary in altitude from 2000-3000 meters above 
sea level. The western plateau comprises mostly of lowland areas with depressions 
in the boundaries of the State of Afar. One of the notable physical features of the 
State of Tigray is hills and valleys. More than 80% of the population live in the rural 
areas and are engaged in agriculture. Kiremt (summer) is the main rainy season. 
The peak agricultural season is from June to August while the slack period is from 
December to April (Gebrehiwot, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.1: State of Tigray, administrative map 
 
(Source: http://reliefweb.int/map/ethiopia/ethiopia-administrative-map-27-mar-2013) 
 
The State of Tigray is one of the rapidly growing states (regions) in the country. It 
attracts investors from different sectors and benefits from this progress. Between 
1992 and August 2012, the State of Tigray enjoyed 10% of the total domestic PIMS 
in Ethiopia (EIA, 2012). The total number of private investors in the State of Tigray in 
the manufacturing sector was 857 in August 2012. 
 
According to the zonal distribution of projects that were granted investment 
certificates in the state, the share in the Mekelle zone was high in number. Of the 
total projects approved in PIMS, 578 projects (67%) were in Mekelle zone (TIO, 
2012). The northeastern zone of the state surrounds Mekelle zone and very few 
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investors were located here, opting rather to invest in Mekelle. Consequently the 
northeastern zone is not included in the sample area. 
 
From July 1992 to August 2012, among the total approved projects in domestic 
PIMS, 212 (25%) of the projects started operating in the state. There were 237 
(28%) and 408 projects (47%) respectively in the implementation and pre-
implementation status (TIO, 2012). In other words, out of the 857 total private 
investments in the manufacturing sector, most of the investments were found in the 
pre-implementation stage. This indicates that the majority of investment projects 
approved could not be implemented on time. 
 
Table 5.1: Number and percentage of status and zones (1992 to August 2012) 
Zones 
Pre-
implementation Implementation Operation Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Mekelle 265 0.65 176 0.74 137 0.65 578 0.67 
Southern 15 0.04 8 0.03 5 0.02 28 0.03 
Eastern  41 0.10 21 0.09 27 0.13 89 0.10 
Central 22 0.05 12 0.05 24 0.11 58 0.07 
North 
western 36 0.09 11 0.05 12 0.06 59 0.07 
Western 29 0.07 9 0.04 7 0.03 45 0.05 
Total 408 0.48 237 0.28 212 0.25 857 1.00 
(Source: TIO, 2012) 
 
5.2. Study design 
 
To achieve the objectives of the study, a positivist paradigm study design was used. 
Positivist ontology dictates that reality is designed and its epistemology is based on 
objective understanding. In this study, what determines the success or failure of 
private investor operations is the positivist ontology (objective) studied based on 
objective information, independent of the researcher who utilises both quantitative 
and qualitative data. The epistemology is explanatory, as the study aims to explain 
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reality based on positivist ontology. Broadly speaking, a research approach can be 
qualitative, quantitative, or mixed. This study design is explanatory and the 
methodology employed is a mixed approach, one clearly based on a positivist 
paradigm. Mixed methods of research provide better (stronger) inferences, help to 
capitalise on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative approaches and 
remove any biases that exist in any single research method (Creswell, 2003). The 
overriding research approach is however a quantitative one. As a result, positivist 
methods were applied to both the data collection and analysis processes. 
 
5.3. Sampling procedures and data collection 
 
5.3.1. Sampling techniques and sample size 
 
In this study, an individual private investor in the manufacturing sector was 
responsible for making decisions on investment activities. Thus, an individual 
investor was the basic sample unit or unit of analysis. Because of heterogeneity 
among investors, a stratified sampling technique was applied in order to obtain a 
representative sample. Considering the types of status of the PIMS and their 
investment zones, the stratified random sampling (i.e. first stratification and then 
simple random sampling) were used to select the items from each stratum to 
constitute a sample. All investors in the PIMS were grouped  into strata defined by 
their status type and investment zone. Finally, samples were proportionately 
selected from each status of investment and zones using simple random sampling. 
 
The total number of private investors who received investment permits from the 
State of Tigray were stratified into three groups using their investment status and 
zones. The type of population (or universe) of this study is a finite universe and the 
main stratification units are investment status and zone. The total number of private 
investors (i.e. the sampling frame or source list) was 857. They were classified or 
stratified as follows a total of 212 investors were in the operation status, 237 in the 
implementation status and 408 in the pre-implementation status. According to Kish 
(cited in Mahmoud, 1994), taking a confidence level of 95% and an error limit of 
0.05, the actual sample size was obtained using the following equation: 
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n =   n’       ’ 
   1+n’/N 
 
Where: 
n’ = S2 
  V2  
 n’ = Sample size from an infinite population 
 n = Sample size from a finite population 
 N = Total population 
S2 =  The variance of the population elements (a maximum value at P = 0.5, 
S2 = P (1-P) = 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25 
P = The proportion of population elements that belong to the defined class 
V =  Standard error of sampling population, that is: 
V = (0.05/1.96) = 0.0255 (for a total error of 0.05 and confidence level of 
95%, t = 1.96) 
 
Therefore, based on the above sample size formula: 
 
n’ = S2 =   0.25        =   0.25    = 384.6 
  V2 (0.0255)2  0.00065 
 
n =    n’      =     384.6           
 
 = 265 
  1+n’/N 1 + (384.6/857) 
 
From the above result, the sample size is around 31% of the total population. 
 
The number of items selected from each stratum or the allocation of the sample size 
of each stratum (i.e. status and zones) was based on the method of proportional 
allocation under which the sizes of the samples from the different strata was kept 
proportional to the sizes of the strata. That is, if Pi represents the proportion of 
population included in the stratum, and n represents the total sample size, the 
number of elements selected from stratum is n*Pi (Kothari, 2004). 
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Therefore, it is determined that the sample of size n is 265 and was drawn from a 
population of size N = 857, which was divided into strata of three sample sizes of 
investment status (pre-implementation, implementation and operation) and sample 
size of zones. The three strata sizes are: pre-implementation = 408, 
implementation = 237 and operation = 212. Adopting proportional allocation, the 
sample sizes for the different strata were calculated as follows: 
 
For strata with pre-implementation = 408, then 408/857. Hence the sample 
size for pre-implementation = 265 (408/857) = 126. The same procedure was 
followed to determine the sample size of the other statuses of private 
investment. 
 
To determine the allocation of a sample size to zones, the pre-implementation status 
determined above was used and the same procedure followed using the proportional 
allocation method below. 
 
Strata in the southern zone = 15, then 15/408. Hence the sample size for the 
southern zone = 126 (15/408) = 5. The same procedure was followed to 
determine the sample size for private investment in the other zones. 
 
Table 5.2 below presents the results of these calculations and shows the distribution 
of the sample size relative to all statuses and zones. 
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Table 5.2: Sample size and number by statuses and zones 
Zones 
Pre-
implementation Implementation Operation Totals 
No. 
Sample 
size No. 
Sample 
size No. 
Sample 
size No. 
Sample 
size 
Mekelle 265 82 176 54 137 42 578 179 
Southern 15 5 8 2 5 2 28 9 
Eastern  41 13 21 6 27 8 89 28 
Central 22 7 12 4 24 7 58 18 
North 
western 36 11 11 3 12 4 59 18 
Western 29 9 9 3 7 2 45 14 
Total 408 126 237 73 212 66 857 265 
Percentage 
of status 0.48 
 
0.28 
 
0.25 
 
1 
 Sample size 
by status 
 
0.48 
 
0.28 
 
0.25 
 
1 
Sample size 
out of 
universe 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
 
0.31 
(Source: TIO, 2012) 
 
In accordance to Burgess (cited in Mahmoud, 1994), the elements of this sample 
(private investors) were selected using tables of random numbers to assure 
randomness, independence and representativeness. When a private investor 
selected chose not to participate for whatever reason, a substitute private investor 
was selected using the same tables. Reasons for non-participation could be because 
of private investors’ unwillingness to co-operate, a change their field of business, the 
fact that they had gone out of business, or because they changed their address and 
could not be contacted. 
 
5.3.2. Sources and methods of data collection 
 
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to collect 
primary and secondary data for analysis. The survey was conducted in the State of 
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Tigray and secondary data was gathered from different sources like EIA, TIO, 
financial institutions (banks) and offices of the municipality. 
 
i. Primary data source and collection 
 
The primary data was collected between May and October 2013 using a semi-
structured questionnaire. Respondents were from private manufacturing firms 
operating in the State of Tigray and the questions were composed to examine the 
microeconomic determinants of PIMS. Six enumerators and the researcher 
administered the questionnaire. The enumerators were trained on the content of the 
questionnaire and interview techniques that would be appropriate. The 
questionnaires were pre-tested for reliability and validity through a pilot test because 
the quality of the questionnaire partly determines the quality of the research. On the 
basis of the results obtained, necessary modifications were made. Rosters, which 
consisted of lists of investors, were obtained from the investment office of the State 
of Tigray. 
 
265 copies of the structured questionnaire were administered to the sample of 
private investors in the State of Tigray. The questionnaire was designed in such a 
way that it enabled the collection of data on personal firm-level characteristics and 
investment climate indicators. Major variables expected to have a significant 
relationship with private investment delay as perceived by the private investors in the 
manufacturing sector (level of education, type of product line (investment areas), 
access to credit, interest rate, bureaucratic red tape, judicial system, access to land, 
access to infrastructure facility, corruption, investment incentives, political instability 
risks and investment location), were incorporated in the questionnaire. 
 
In addition, FGDs were conducted with selected private investors in the 
manufacturing sector in all three statuses and organisation types. They are 
considered to be experts in the area. The investors were selected according to their 
level of experience in investment activities and from different statuses and firms’ 
product line. This helped to extract the major factors affecting their decision making 
and ability to participate in private investments. Based on this, the number of 
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participants in the FGD was seven: one from each of the three investment statuses 
and the others from different officers or because they were experts in the area. 
 
The interview method was used to collect data from financial institutions and Tigray 
investment and municipality offices. The interviews aimed to elicit information on the 
implementation of investment activities and other related investment policies and 
decisions in the manufacturing sector and also to strengthen the data from the 
primary source. 
 
ii. Secondary data source 
 
Journals, books, Ethiopian investment proclamations and policies from different 
offices was obtained in order to strengthen the analysis. Institutions included the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), National Bank of Ethiopia 
(NBE), Central Statistical Agency (CSA), Ethiopian Investment Agency, Addis Ababa 
Investment Office, the State of TIO, and other secondary data. 
 
5.4. Method of data analysis 
 
5.4.1. Descriptive analysis 
 
To establish a clear picture of the characteristics of the sample units, the study used 
descriptive statistics for analysis. Using descriptive statistics enables one to compare 
and contrast different categories of the sample units with respect to the desired 
characteristics. This analysis helps to identify the variables that influence and delay 
investors’ status. In other words, the analysis shows why they are delayed their 
status progress. The Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) was used to 
analyse the quantitative data. Using SPSS software, descriptive statistics (including 
frequency of occurrence, percentages and chi-square test results) were used for all 
independent variables to reveal their relationship with the dependent variable. The 
cross-tabulation table produced by SPSS contains the number of cases that fall into 
each combination of categories. In addition to this, this analysis is based on the two 
assumptions of chi-square tests. These are that: 
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i. It is imperative that each private investor contributes to only one cell of the 
contingency table, in other words, a chi-square test of a repeated measure 
design cannot be used. For example, if an investor was in the pre-implementation 
status, they could not also be included in the implementation status sample as 
the Pearson’s chi-square test would not be able to be generated. 
ii. The expected frequencies should be greater than 5. Although it is acceptable in 
larger contingency tables to have up to 20% of expected frequencies below 5, the 
result is a loss of statistical power (meaning that the test could fail to detect a 
genuine effect). 
 
The Pearson’s chi-square test examines whether there is an association between 
two categorical variables (i.e. the type of status group and whether the private 
investors delayed or not due to the independent variables). As part of the crosstabs 
procedure, SPSS produces a table that includes chi-square statistic and its 
significant value. The Pearson chi-square statistic tests show whether the two 
variables are independent. If the significance value is small enough (conventionally 
Sig. must be less than .05) then the study rejects the hypothesis that the variables 
are independent and gain confidence in the hypothesis that they are in some way 
related. Here, if the p-value is .05, this means that the statistic is considered to be 
significant (meaning that the researcher can be 95% confident that the relationship 
between the two variables is not due to chance). 
 
Finally, content analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data to triangulate and 
support the quantitative results. Tables and figures are presented to provide a 
descriptive picture of the different statuses of PIMS in the study area. 
 
5.4.2. Econometric analysis 
 
In addition to descriptive analysis, the study used one econometric model – the 
duration model – to test the relationships between variables and to draw 
conclusions. The duration model is a more recent statistical tool and it has gained a 
lot of popularity recently. The technical definition used in most of the studies for the 
hazard rate is the probability of exit faced by firms that survive up to a particular point 
in time (Egesa, 2010). In this study, duration analysis involves several related 
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techniques that focus on times until the event of interest occurs. Although the event 
could be good or bad, by convention, the study refers to the event as a “failure.” The 
time until the failure is “survival time.” Survival analysis is important in this research, 
as it can be applied equally well to other fields from engineering to social science. In 
this study for example, time was modeled until the investor began operation, or there 
was a single exit from pre-implementation to another exit period. 
 
A Cox proportional hazard model is applied on the cross-section data collected from 
259 private investors in the State of Tigray to identify factors that determine the exit 
of a firm from pre-implementation status to implementation and then to operation 
status at the optimal time. This regression employs proportional hazard models. The 
hazard rate for failure at time t is defined as: 
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This hazard is modeled as a function of the baseline hazard )(0 tH  at time t and as 
the effect of one or more explanatory or X variables. Baseline hazard means the 
hazard for an observation while all X variables equal to zero. 
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)(tH  is a survival time data that contains, at a minimum, one variable measuring 
how much time elapsed before the certain event occurred to each observation. The 
literature often terms this event of interest a “failure” regardless of its substantive or 
functional meaning. When a failure has not occurred to an observation by the time 
that data collection ends, that observation is said to be “censored.”  The duration of a 
firm’s status is time taken (duration of months elapsed) before an investor leaves 
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one investment phase to enter another, or study ended and it is a time variable. 
Failure refers to a situation where an investor is shifted from one phase to another 
(for example, from implementation to operation status) before the end of the survey 
period. Censored is when the investor remains in one phase for longer than the time 
limit set by TIO or the study period is ended before the firm leaves the stage it has 
already started. 
 
To implement the duration model, the period (duration) of all the private investors in 
the study were counted in months from the survey questionnaire. That is, an investor 
in the pre-implementation status was counted the periods stayed in months. An 
investor in the implementation status was counted the periods stayed in the pre-
implementation status and implementation status. And, an investor in the operation 
status was counted the periods stayed in the pre-implementation, implementation 
and operation status. 
 
The data set is constituted of private investors (firms) at three states: pre-
implementation, implementation and operation. During the survey period in 2013 the 
study had 66 firms in the operation, 73 firms in implementation and 126 firms in the 
pre-implementation stages. Since, the objective of firms’ and the interest of the 
government is to see progressing upward direction (from pre-implementation to 
operational stage), at any given point in time, firms are at risk of experiencing some 
event, where an event essentially represents a change or transition from one status 
to another status. To estimate the hazard function, for those in the implementation 
and operational stage, in addition to the conditioning covariates, detail data 
regarding entry time, and failure time, for each stage was collected. Since detail 
information was collected (the time they entered into the pre-implementation and 
time to an event); firms in the operation stage during the survey period, by taking the 
information the time they entered into the pre-implementation and time event 
(implementation stage) occurred for each firm, the study managed to increase our 
sample size in our estimation processes. Then, the private investor is either 
transferred within the specified period for transition or is not observed experiencing 
an event; that is, no transition is made from one status to another. The name of the 
investor, status of the firm/organization, date of investment permit, starting date of 
implementation status and date of business license (operation status) were collected 
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to support for the status of the private investors and identify their event during data 
collection (refer survey questionnaire of the thesis). Based on the above data, an 
investor’s status, when an investor registered as an investor, how many months 
elapsed in each statuses and when production starts helped to identify the event of 
an investor. Such information allows to establish the investment operation spell for 
each firm, and the spell might be either completed or right censored at the time of 
survey. 
 
Moreover, SPSS for Windows Version 20, factor analysis, was used to examine the 
constraints of operations of private investors reached in the production phase. The 
suitability of the data for factor analysis was checked by finding significant (p< 0.05) 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, and having a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sampling 
adequacy index of at least 0.6. Confirmatory factor analysis was computed because 
the variables had already been carefully chosen by a very large number of prior 
studies. Principal components analysis (PCA) extraction was used to obtain an 
empirical summary of the data set. 
 
5.5. Summary of research design and analysis 
 
The study was conducted in the State of Tigray. The research method used was a 
mixed approach. Data was collected from 259 private investors engaged in the 
manufacturing sector. Both primary and secondary data were used for the study. The 
primary data includes a questionnaire, FGDs and interviews. Both SPSS and Stata 
statistical software were used for the data analysis. For the descriptive analysis, chi-
square test and factor analyses were used to measure the relationship of the 
variables and constraints respectively. For the econometric analysis, a duration 
model was used to establish the influence of the explanatory variables on the 
dependent variables. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RESULTS 
 
In this chapter the main findings of the study are presented. The source of 
information is the data gathered from the respondents operating in the three 
investment statuses of the private investors in the manufacturing sector in the State 
of Tigray. Some respondents completed questionnaires and others were interviewed 
or participated in FGDs. Descriptive and econometric analyses were used to analyse 
the data. The first section of this chapter discusses the descriptive statistical results 
of the study and the second discusses the results of the econometric model used. 
The last section focuses on the operational constraints of private investors found in 
the production phase. All these show the pattern of relationships between ISD and 
its determinants. Generally, this chapter identifies the effect of each explanatory 
variable on the dependent variables. 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistical analysis 
 
6.1.1. Introduction 
 
For the purpose of investigating the determinants of private ISD, a sample of 265 
private investors were selected in the State of Tigray and a semi-structured 
questionnaire was distributed to those randomly selected private investors from the 
sample frame. However, while checking for completeness of the questionnaire, 259 
copies (97.7%) were found complete and 6 (2.3%) were found incomplete. These 6 
were excluded from the analysis. As a result, only data collected from 259 subjects 
was used for analysis purposes. Moreover, FGDs were conducted with 76
                                                             6One from each Investment status (i.e. 3x1), 1 from the regional investment office, 1 from Zonal 
Investment Office, 1 from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia and 1 from Mekelle Municipality Office. 
 randomly 
selected private investors, bank officials and experts in the area of investment. This 
section focuses on the descriptive analysis of the data. For the descriptive analysis, 
frequencies of the descriptive statistics and chi-square test using SPSS were 
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employed to identify the variables that affect the ISD of the private investors in the 
State of Tigray, Ethiopia. 
 
Private investment has three statuses: pre-implementation, implementation and 
operation. Private investors receive investment permits and investment land in the 
pre-implementation status. Those who have started practical activities (such as civil 
engineering works, the construction of factory buildings or installation of purchased 
machinery and equipment) are considered to be in the implementation status. Those 
who have started with production are in the operation status (Hussien, 2000). 
Participants were asked to determine the status of their investment by labeling ‘1’ for 
pre-implementation status, ‘2’ for implementation status and ‘3’ for operation status. 
 
Table 6.1: Private investor distribution by investment status 
Investment status Freq. % Valid % Cumulative % 
Pre-implementation 125 48.3 48.3 48.3 
Implementation 72 27.8 27.8 76.1 
Operation 62 23.9 23.9 100.0 
Total 259 100.0 100.0  
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As depicted in Table 6.1 above, out of the total respondents of private investors in 
the survey during the data collection period, about 48% of the respondents were 
found to be in the pre-implementation status, 28% in the implementation status and 
24% of respondents were in the operation status. 
 
6.1.2. Categorisation of investment status 
 
a) Categorisation of groups 
 
The standard period/duration for private investors to move from the pre-
implementation to operation status is determined by the State of Tigray and 
Ethiopian Investment Agency. Accordingly, the period allowed to proceed from pre-
implementation status to implementation status is six months and the period to 
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proceed from implementation status to the operation status is thirty months. The 
investor is required to enter the operation status within 36 months of collecting the 
investment permit from the investment office (TIO, 2012). 
 
For the purpose of this study, the investment status was divided into ‘non-started’ 
and ‘started’ groups. Private investors who have not yet started any implementation 
activities are part of the non-started group; those that have commenced 
implementation and/or are in operation status are called the started group. For this 
sample set, all three statuses are considered in the analysis of the identified 
explanatory variables. 
 
Table 6.2: Respondents’ investment status delay 
Delay status  
Investment status groups Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Delayed 121 97 65 49 186 72 
Not delayed 4 3 69 51 73 28 
Total 125 100 134 100 259 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
According to the information in Table 6.2 above, 97% of the respondents in the pre-
implementation status were delayed and had not yet proceeded to the next status 
(implementation status). Only 3% of the respondents of the group were expected to 
implement on time. But, in the started group, 49% were delayed from proceeding to 
the operation status. The remaining 51% were not delayed and could still proceed to 
the operation status on time. Overall, 72% of the total respondents were delayed 
from proceeding from one status to the next; the remaining 28% were not delayed. 
 
b) Gender and age of private investors  
 
The study revealed that most of the respondents in the non-started group (93.6%) 
were males and only 6.4% were females. Likewise, for those in the started group 
92.5% were males and only 7.5% were females (see Table 6.3). 
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Overall, out of the total private investors surveyed, 241 were males (93.1% of the 
total) and of these 124 (92.5%) were found in the started and 117(93.6%) in the non-
started group. Moreover, 18 private investors were females (6.9% of the total 
females) and of these, 10 (7.5%) were found in the started group and the remaining 
8(6.4%) were in the non-started group. 
 
Table 6.3: Investment status groups and gender of respondents 
Attributes 
Non-started Started Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Male 117 93.6 124 92.5 241 93.1 
Female 8 6.4 10 7.5 18 6.9 
Total 125 100 134 100 259 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
Figure 6.1: Gender of all private investors 
 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
Out of the total private investors surveyed, 238 (91.9%) were above 30 years of age 
and of these 116 (48.7%) were in the non-started group and 122 (51.3%)in the 
started group. 
 
The study showed that of those in the non-started group, 92.8% were older than 30 
and only 7.2% were younger than 31 years of age. Likewise, for those in the started 
group 91% were older than 30 and 9% were younger than 31 (see Table 6.4). 
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Table 6.4: Investment status group and age of respondents 
Attributes 
Non-started Started Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Age up to 30 9 7.2 12 9 21 8.1 
Age from 31 up to 40 45 36 25 18.7 70 27 
Age from 41 up to 50 47 37.6 50 37.3 97 37.5 
Age above 50 24 19.2 47 35 71 27.4 
Total 125 100 134 100 259 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
 
6.1.3. Descriptive Analysis on Determinants of Investment Status 
 
a) Level of education and investment status group 
 
The level of education of private investors and its impact on ISD was studied. The 
educational level of respondents included in both groups varied from primary school 
to master’s degree level. Concerning ISD, out of the total respondent investors 
whose investments are delayed, 80% were found to have either primary or 
secondary level of education. The remaining 20% had at least a diploma. The impact 
of educational level on ISD was found to be similar in the started and non-started 
groups (see Table 6.5). Furthermore, it was found that the greatest number of private 
investors delayed had a secondary school education. 
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Table 6.5: Educational level of respondents by status groups 
Attributes 
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Primary 19 16 0 0 25 38 20 29 44 24 20 28 
Secondary 78 64 3 75 27 42 26 38 105 56 29 40 
Diploma 14 12 0 0 4 6 11 16 18 10 11 15 
Degree 7 6 1 25 6 9 8 12 13 7 9 13 
Masters  3 2 0 0 3 5 3 5 6 3 3 4 
Total 121 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As stated in the descriptive analysis section above, the Pearson’s chi-square test 
examines whether there is an association between two status groups of variables 
(i.e. the type of status group and whether the private investor is delayed or not) and 
shows whether the two variables are independent. This is used to test whether the 
two status groups (started and non-started) are equally affected by the independent 
variables or not. This means that if the value of the chi-square statistic is significant 
then the effect of an independent variable on the two status groups is different and 
visa versa. Therefore, this test is used for all the explanatory variables in the 
descriptive analysis made below. 
 
The value of the chi-square statistic is 5.397. This value is slightly significant 
(p = .020), indicating that the type of status group found had a significant effect on 
whether an investor would be delayed in the manufacturing sector (see Appendix A). 
The significant result shows that there is a very small association between type of 
investment status group and whether the investor was delayed or not due to 
educational level. This means that the proportion of private investors that are 
delayed to the proportion that are not in the two status groups is significantly small. 
That is, there is a difference of impact due to the educational level of investors in the 
non-started group and started group. Or, the impact of the educational level has a 
significant difference if private investors are found in the non-started or started 
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groups of investment. This significant finding reflects in Table 6.5 above the fact that 
when found in the non-started group, 75% did not affect private investors in the 
secondary level of education and when private investors found in the started group 
about 67% did not affect the primary and secondary level of education. 
 
b) Investment areas and investment status group 
 
Table 6.6 below (produced by SPSS) presents the ISD of all private investorsin the 
different investment areas within the manufacturing sector. Of the total delayed 
respondents, 53 private investors were from the food industry type of investment 
(29% of the total that were delayed). Of these 23 (35%) were in the started group 
and 30 (25%) were found in the non-started group. The next highly delayed group 
was in the non-metallic mineral products industry. 28 (15%) private investors were 
from this industry and of these 7 (11%) were found in the started group and 21 (17%) 
in the non-started group. The third most delayed investment area is the basic metals 
industry. Out of the total delayed private investors, 20 (11%) were delayed and of 
these 7 (11%) were found in the started group and 13 (11%) in the non-started 
group. The remaining private investors fell into one of the other 12 investment areas 
represented and they were delayed on average less than 4% each in both status 
groups. 
 
The highest ISD rate, around 55%, was in those investment areas involving a high 
number of investors like the food, other non-metallic mineral products, and basic 
metals industries. During the interviews with different investment office experts, it 
came to light that the major problems are a lack of credit and delayed 
implementation of infrastructure facilities in the working place. 
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Table 6.6: Investment areas of respondents by status group 
Attributes 
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Food  30 25 2 50 23 35 26 38 53 29 28 39 
Other non-
metallic 
mineral 
products 
21 17 0 0 7 11 12 18 28 15 12 17 
Basic 
metals 13 11 0 0 7 11 11 16 20 11 11 15 
Others (12 
investment 
areas) 
57 47 2 50 28 43 19 28 85 45 21 29 
Total 121 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
According to the SPSS results, the value of the chi-square statistic is 0.576. This 
value is insignificant (p = .448), indicating that the type of status group found had an 
insignificant effect on whether a private investor would delay (see Appendix A). This 
insignificant result indicates that there is no association between the type of status 
group and whether the private investor delayed or not due to a particular investment 
area. This association means that the pattern of responses (i.e. the proportion of 
private investors that delayed because of their investment area to those that did not) 
in the two status groups is insignificant; they are almost the same. This insignificant 
finding reveals that when found in the non-started group, about 53% of participants 
invested in food, other nonmetallic mineral products and the basic metals industries, 
were delayed in their investment. Interestingly it is almost the same for the started 
group (about 57% had an impact in the same industries). 
 
In addition, most (31%) private investors were more invested in the food industry. 
The second and third industries in order of their number of investors more heavily 
engaged were non-metallic mineral products (16%) and the basic metals (12%) 
industries respectively (see Appendix B). According to the interview with the 
investment and municipality offices, the major reason for concentrating in specific 
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areas was because of the interest of the investors. The selection and submission of 
investment proposals is decided on by the private investors themselves. Investors 
are kept informed during the vetting process up until the stage that a decision is 
reached. However, some investors complained that decisions were delayed by the 
TIO and said that this affected the need to change their investment area. 
 
c) Source of finance of private investors 
 
The financial source for the investors in the manufacturing sector were analysed and 
the data is presented in Table 6.7 below. 96% of the respondents replied that the 
main source of finance for their investment was their own contributions. Only 4% 
made use of other sources of finance. 92% of the started group used their own 
contributions and all private investors found in the non-started group made use of 
their own contributions. 
 
In addition to their own contributions, around half of the respondents replied that 
other sources of finance for their investment were loans from formal financial 
institutions (mostly banks). However, almost all the respondents replied that sources 
of finance from share contributions and informal financial services contribute a 
maximum of 3% to their investment (see Table 6.7). 
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Table 6.7: Source of finance to private investors 
Source of finance  Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Own contribution Yes 125 100 123 92 248 96 
No 0 0 11 8 11 4 
Formal financial 
institutions 
(Banks) 
Yes 61 49 67 50 128 49 
No 64 51 67 50 131 51 
Share 
contributions 
Yes 0 0 7 5 7 3 
No 125 100 127 95 252 97 
Informal financial 
inst. 
Yes 0 0 1 1 1 0.4 
No 125 100 133 99 258 99.6 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
 
The information in Table 6.8 below shows that out of the respondents who used 
other sources of finance in addition to formal financial institutions, about three-
fourths of the respondents said that sources of finance other than bank loans were 
not difficult to obtain. However, one-fourth of the respondents replied that sources of 
finance for their investment (own contributions, excluding bank loans) were difficult to 
obtain. The level of difficulty of the source of finance (other than formal financial 
institutions) was also almost equal for both status groups. 
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Table 6.8: Difficulty of non-formal financial sources 
Level of 
difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Very easy 20 16 33 26 53 21 
Easy 59 48 50 40 109 44 
Medium 13 11 12 10 25 10 
Difficult 29 24 19 15 48 19 
Very difficult 2 2 12 10 14 6 
Total 123 100 126 100 249 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The level of difficulties of the source of finance from own contributions for investment 
was discussed during the FGD with the private investors. Accordingly, the following 
merits and challenges of own contributions were raised: 
i. Own contribution is easy to get because bank loans have long procedures 
which must be followed. 
ii. Own contributions were easy to get because it was collected from previous 
businesses. 
iii. Even though it is easy to save money to investment, the amount of savings 
required takes a long time to collect. 
 
The major source of finance for private investors is their own contributions and bank 
credits. Own contributions are problematical as discussed in the FGDs above, but 
they are easily accessible and available for use. 
 
The discussion now focuses on the number of private investors who applied for a 
bank loan, and the impact of the loan on ISD and related problems. 
 
Data was gathered concerning whether the private investors requested a loan from a 
financial institution. Overall, around 66% (170 investors) of the respondents applied 
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to financial institutions for loans for their investment activities, but the remaining 34% 
did not (see Table 6.9). 
 
Table 6.9: Request for credit by private investors 
Requested credit from 
financial institutions  
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Yes 84 67 86 64 170 66 
No 41 33 48 36 89 34 
Total 125 100 134 100 259 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
Based on this, reasons for not requesting credit from banks were sought during the 
FGDs and the following reasons were given: 
i. Some private investors had enough capital for their investment from the 
beginning. 
ii. Bank loans are not granted before the finalisation of the work in the 
implementation phase. 
iii. Some private investors did not have enough collateral to get a bank loan, and 
it was difficult to fulfill all the requirements of bank loan processes. 
iv. The religion of some private investors did not allow for the borrowing of 
money from a bank and paying of interest on loans. 
 
d) Access to credit and investment status group 
 
The impact of access to credit on private investors in the manufacturing sector is a 
significant variable. This section also considers factors like collateral, interest rates, 
bank paperwork, officials’ corruption, business plans and inadequacy of credit. 
Table 6.10 below was generated using SPSS and shows that 90 private investors 
(76% of the total that delayed) had a constrained investment status due to problems 
with access to credit and of these 25 private were found in the started group (66%) 
and 65 in the non-started group (80%). Therefore, two-thirds of the respondents in 
the started group were delayed and more than three-fourths of the respondents in 
the non-started group were prevented from proceeding to the implementation status 
 91 
due to a lack of credit from the financial institutions. Considering all private investors 
who requested bank credit, only 29 (24%) were not adversely impacted due to 
access to credit problems, even though they were delayed their investment. Of these 
respondents, 34% were found in started group and the other 20% were found in the 
non-started group. 
 
Table 6.10: Access to credit impact on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 65 80 3 100 25 66 19 40 90 76 22 44 
Didn’t have 
impact 
16 20 0 0 13 34 28 60 29 24 28 56 
Total 81 100 3 100 38 100 47 100 119 100 50 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As part of the crosstabs procedure of SPSS, the value of the chi-square statistic is 
15.625. This value is highly significant (p< .001) and indicates that the type of 
investment status group had a significant effect on whether a private investor in the 
manufacturing sector would delay due to access to credit (see Appendix A). 
 
The highly significant result indicates that an association exists between the type of 
status group and whether the private investor delayed or not because of access to 
credit. This association shows that the pattern of responses (i.e. the proportion of 
private investors that delayed to the proportion that did not) in the two status groups 
is significantly different. This significant finding reflects the fact that when found in 
the non-started group, about 80% of the private investors become affected (i.e. 
delay) and 20% do not, whereas when found in the started group, it is less: about 
66% become inclined to delay and 34% do not (see Table 6.10). 
 
The complexity of securing a bank loan for those private investors who requested 
credit was also studied. Accordingly, around 85% of the respondents replied that 
bank paperwork/bureaucracy or delays in loan delivery and inadequate credit for the 
investment were the major problems experienced in securing loans from financial 
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institutions. Collateral requirements by financial institutions and the corruption of 
officials were the next most commonly cited difficulties to securing bank loans. By 
contrast and on average, interest rates and the need for a detailed feasibility study 
(business plan) from the customer were not obstacles to acquiring bank loans for 
investment activities (see Table 6.11). 
 
Table 6.11: Constraints of private investors due to bank loan access 
Problems  Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Collateral 
requirement  
Yes 50 60 44 51 94 55 
No 34 40 41 49 75 45 
Bank 
paperwork  
Yes 77 92 67 78 144 85 
No 7 8 18 22 25 15 
Interest rate Yes 48 57 33 38 81 48 
No 36 43 52 62 88 52 
Corruption Yes 72 86 27 31 99 58 
No 12 14 58 69 70 42 
Inadequate 
credit 
Yes 77 92 65 76 142 84 
No 7 8 20 24 27 16 
Feasibility 
study 
Yes 29 35 31 36 60 35 
No 55 65 54 64 109 65 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The problems in acquiring bank loans are presented below, ranked according to their 
severity. According to Table 6.12, the non-started group identified inadequate credit 
as their chief problem and the started group, bank paperwork. The corruption of bank 
officials working for financial institutions was the second biggest problem for non-
started investors, and interest rates were the second biggest hurdle for the started 
group. 
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Table 6.12: Ranking of problems experienced when trying to secure a bank loan 
Level of difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started  
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Bank paperwork (1) 7 9 28 34 35 21 
Inadequate credit (1) 28 34 22 27 50 31 
Inadequate credit (2) 26 33 26 36 52 34 
Corruption of bank (3) 47 62 11 18 58 43 
Interest rate (3) 27 36 15 25 42 31 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In addition to these difficulties in securing a bank loan, private investors identified 
other challenges in the FGDs; interviews with bank officials noted others still. These 
are: 
i. The long time it takes to process bank loan applications from private investors 
and the resulting delay of private investment status. 
ii. According to the investment loan policy, if investors could not cover 30% of 
the initial cost, the Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) could not extend 
loans on time for the remaining 70% of the investment cost. 
iii. Construction and the installation costs of investment are not always accepted 
by banks as collateral for bank loan requests. 
iv. Due to a shortage of cash experienced by the financial institutions, banks 
prioritise within the type of investment as per the policy of the government and 
minimise the credit requests made by the investors. 
 
e) Interest rate and investment status group 
 
As per the survey results, Table 6.13 below shows that in total, the ISD of 26 private 
investors were affected by the high-interest rate paid to financial institutions (23% of 
the total that delayed) and of these 8 were found in the started group (22%) and 18 
in the non-started group (23%). The analysis also showed that 87 (77%) private 
investors who requested loans did not cite the interest rate as a factor impacting their 
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ISD even though their progress was delayed. Out of these investors, 28 (65%) were 
found in the started group and 59 (77%) in the non-started group. 
 
Table 6.13: The impact of interest rates on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 18 23 1 33 8 22 16 35 26 23 17 35 
Didn’t have 
impact 
59 77 2 67 28 78 30 65 87 77 32 65 
Total 77 100 3 100 36 100 46 100 113 100 49 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In the analysis of the crosstabs procedure of SPSS result, the value of the chi-
square statistic is 0.839. This value is insignificant (p = .360), indicating that the type 
of status group found did not have a significant effect on whether an investor would 
delay due to interest rate levels (see Appendix A). The insignificant result indicates 
that no relationship exists between the type of status group and whether the private 
investor delayed or not. A relationship is evident when the pattern of responses in 
the two status groups is not significantly different. This means that whether the 
investors are in the non-started or started group, the effect of interest rates has an 
insignificant impact on ISD. The study did not find any evidence to support the null 
hypothesis that there is an association between the type of status group and delay in 
private investment. This finding (see Table 6.13) reveals that of the investors in the 
non-started group, about 23% are influenced by the interest rate of bank loans and 
77% are not. When found in the started group, it is almost similar – about 22% were 
influenced and 78% were not. 
 
The FGDs with private investors brought additional information to light concerning 
the interest rate of bank loans. Some of the relevant points are summarised below. 
The interviewee’s opinions on the interest rate are that: 
i. It is fair compared to the benefits the loan offers to their investment activities. 
ii. If the loan is properly utilised for the intended objective, the interest rate does 
not have a negative impact. 
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iii. Compared with other financial institutions, the interest rate of commercial 
banks is low. 
iv. The interest rate is fair, but the loan application procedure and limits on the 
loan amount is not, and does not meet the investor’s requirements. 
v. It promotes economic development. 
 
Conversely, other participants in the FGD felt that the interest rate level stated that 
interest rates of bank loans was high because: 
i. They were required to pay as per the regulation of the commercial banks and 
the NBE. 
ii. Inflation has its own impact on the interest rate increment. 
iii. Bank officials, and especially engineers of the banks, are highly corrupt. 
iv. The repayment period of the loan is too short. 
v. In relation to the ability of the loan to increase productivity and output, the 
interest rate is deemed high. 
 
f) Infrastructure facilities and investment status group 
 
The variables used to evaluate the quality and efficiency of infrastructure service 
deliveries to private investors in the manufacturing sector are discussed below. 
These infrastructure establishments are: road authority, telecommunication authority, 
electric power corporation, water/sewerage agency, postal service agency, port 
service authority, investment office, municipality, and customs and revenue authority. 
 
According to Table 6.14 below, the lack of infrastructure facilities influenced 30 
private investors (18% of the total that delayed) and of these 9 (16%) were found in 
the started group and 21 (20%) in the non-started group. Of the private investors 
found in both groups, 134 (82% of the total that delayed) said that problems with 
infrastructure facilities did not have an impact on ISD. This means that though there 
was an investment delay, it was not due to a lack of infrastructure.  
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Table 6.14: The impact of infrastructure facilities on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 21 20 3 75 9 16 10 17 30 18 13 20 
Did not 
have an 
impact 
86 80 1 25 48 84 50 83 134 82 51 80 
Total 107 100 4 100 57 100 60 100 164 100 64 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As part of the crosstabs SPSS result, the value of the chi-square statistic is 22.615. 
This value is highly significant (p < .001) and indicates that the type of status group 
found has a significant effect on whether a private investor delays because of 
infrastructure facility difficulties (see Appendix A). This means that there is an 
association between the type of status group and whether the private investor 
delayed or not. It also shows that the proportion of private investors that delayed to 
the proportion that did not in the two status groups is significantly different due to 
access to infrastructure facilities. This shows that of the investors in the non-started 
group, 75% of non-delayed private investors were impacted by infrastructure 
facilities and 25% were not, whereas in started group, the percentage impacted by 
infrastructure facilities decreases to about 17% and those that were not, to 83% (see 
Table 6.14). 
 
According to the FGDs, private inventors found in all statuses said that the quality 
and efficiency of service deliveries of the electric power corporation and municipal 
office were not good. However, the other institutions listed above were generally felt 
to be delivering efficient and quality services to private investors in the manufacturing 
sector. The main reasons for the obstacles experienced by the above two facilities 
were discussed in the interviews with the State of TIO, Mekelle municipality office 
and Tigray Electricity Agency experts. According to the interviewees, there is a high 
demand for electric power in the country because of the expansion of investment 
during the past two decades. To solve this problem, the government is working on 
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increasing the current capacity to 10,000 megabits in the next five years. Problems 
experienced with the municipality office were said to be because of a lack of human 
capacity and commitment to taking responsibility for a problem. 
 
g) Access to land and investment status group 
 
Table 6.15 below presents the problem of access to land and considers the land 
tenure system, bureaucratic procedures and lease price of land for private investors 
in the manufacturing sector. To summarise, the status of 63 private investors 
delayed (34% of the total that delayed) because of problems of access to land and of 
these 19 (29%) were found in the started group and 44 (36%) were in the non-
started group. Moreover, the ISD of 123 private investors (66% of the total that 
delayed) were not impacted by problems of access to land for their investments. 
Here, 46 (71%) were found in the started group and the other 77 (64%) were in the 
non-started group status. This means that even though there was an ISD, it was not 
because of the problem of access to land. 
 
Table 6.15: The impact of access to land on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 44 36 1 25 19 29 18 26 63 34 19 26 
Didn’t have 
impact 
77 64 3 75 46 71 50 74 123 66 53 74 
Total 121 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The value of the chi-square statistic is 1.734 and this value is insignificant (p = .188), 
indicating that the type of status group did not have a significant effect on whether a 
private investor would delay or not (see Appendix A). This insignificant result shows 
that there is no association between the type of status group and whether the private 
investor delayed or not due to land access. That is, the pattern of responses in the 
two status groups shows an insignificant difference. This insignificant finding reflects 
the fact that of the private investors found in the non-started group, 36% of delayed 
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private investors had land access problem and 64% did not. In the same way when 
found in the started group, about 29% were influenced by land access problems and 
71% were not because they had easy land access. In the case of the non-delayed 
private investors the impact in both statuses was almost the same (see Table 6.15). 
 
The means of access to land by the investors were discussed in the FGDs and the 
following responses were given: 
i. Some of the private investors used their own land. 
ii. Some got the land for investment through purchase and through a lease. 
iii. There are no complicated procedures for accessing land. 
iv. Some of the investors got the land from the foreclosure of bank bids. 
 
According to Table 6.15 above, in the case of private investors who felt that there 
was a delay due to the problems of access to land (i.e. 63 investors), around 82% of 
respondents said that the existing land tenure system and bureaucratic procedures 
were obstacles to accessing land for their investment by both status groups. 
However, around half of these respondents reported that the land lease price was 
not a problem to gaining land for investment purposes (see Table 6.16). 
 
Table 6.16: Problems of land access to private investors 
Problems Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Land tenure 
system 
Yes 38 84 30 79 68 82 
No 7 16 8 21 15 18 
Bureaucratic 
procedure 
Yes 36 80 33 87 69 83 
No 9 20 5 13 14 17 
High lease 
price 
Yes 26 58 16 42 42 51 
No 19 42 22 58 41 49 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
Table 6.17 below ranks the severity of land access problems that creates delays to 
all status respondents. Based on this, the most severe problems of access to land 
among the private investors are bureaucratic procedures, the existing land tenure 
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system, and lease price of land. These are ranked from one to three respectively for 
all status groups. 
 
Table 6.17: The ranking of problems for land access to private investors 
Level of difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Bureaucratic procedure (1) 32 71 20 53 52 63 
Land tenure system (2) 27 84 16 55 43 71 
High lease price (3) 24 96 8 57 32 82 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In addition to the problems related to access to land, private investors in the FGDs 
added the following land-related problems: 
i. The fact that they had to wait to get land for investment until the government 
had paid reparation to the farmers who were previously farming the land. 
ii. The fact that private investors did not get the land on time, nor was it the size 
requested or in the location required for their investment. 
iii. The investment permit is issued at the regional level, and this created 
problems for those who invested at a zonal level. 
 
h) Judicial system and investment status group 
 
The respondents were also asked about the impact on ISD from the efficiency of the 
judicial system, for example, the lack of independence, inability to enforce rulings, 
delay in court rulings, lack of motivation and corruption in the State of Tigray. In this 
way, the influence of the efficiency of the judicial system on the progress of private 
investors was studied. 
 
Table 6.18 below was generated using SPSS. It contains a number of private 
investors that fall into each combination of groups. More than half of the respondents 
said that their ISD was affected by problems in the judicial system. Accordingly, 106 
private investors delayed due to the inefficiency of the judicial system (57% of the 
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total that delayed) and of these 32 (49%) were found in the started group and 74 
(62%) were found in the non-started group. That is, the overall survey result 
indicated that the majority of private investors in the manufacturing sector felt that 
the judicial system in the state had delayed the progress of their investment status 
because of its inefficiency. Generally, almost half of the respondents in the started 
group were delayed and nearly two-thirds of respondents in the non-started group 
were prevented from proceeding to the implementation status due to problems in the 
judicial system. The progress of only 79 private investors did not affect by the judicial 
system of the study area (43% of the total that delayed) and of those 33 (51%) were 
found in started group and 46 (38%) in the non-started group. 
 
Table 6.18: The impact of the judicial system on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-
delayed 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 74 62 3 75 32 49 38 57 106 57 41 58 
Didn’t have 
impact 
46 38 1 25 33 51 29 43 79 43 30 42 
Total 120 100 4 100 65 100 67 100 185 100 71 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In this study, the association of the two variables are assessed using the Pearson’s 
chi-square test and this statistic test value is 1.995. The value is insignificant 
(p < .158), indicating that the type of status group found has an insignificant effect on 
whether an investor delays because of the judicial system (see Appendix A). This 
result indicates that there is no relationship between the type of status group and 
whether the private investor delayed or not because of the judicial system. This 
means that the proportion of private investors delayed to those that did not in the two 
status groups is not significantly different. This insignificant finding reveals the fact 
that when found in the non-started group, about 62% of the private investors are 
delayed because of the impact of the judicial system and 38% are not. Similarly, 
when found in the started group, about 49% were impacted and 51% not (see 
Table 6.18). 
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In the case of private investors who replied that the inefficiency of the judicial system 
influences their investment status, more than three-fourths of both status groups said 
a lack of independence and inability to enforce the rulings, delayed court rulings, and 
corruption were the major reasons for judicial inefficiency. Only 70% of these 
respondents found in the non-started group replied that the acute problem causing 
the inefficiency of the judicial system of the state was also a lack of motivation (see 
Table 6.19). 
 
Table 6.19: Shortcomings of the judicial system to private investors 
Acute 
shortcoming  Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Lack of 
independence 
Yes 70 91 52 73 122 82 
No 7 9 19 27 26 18 
Inability to 
enforce ruling  
Yes 68 88 58 82 126 85 
No 9 12 13 18 22 15 
Delayed court 
rulings 
Yes 65 84 45 63 110 74 
No 12 16 26 37 38 26 
Lack of 
motivation  
Yes 54 70 30 42 84 57 
No 23 30 41 58 64 43 
Corruption 
Yes 61 79 60 85 121 82 
No 16 21 11 15 27 18 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
This survey also ranked the level of the challenges related to the judicial system in 
order of their severity. Table 6.20 below presents this information. According to both 
status groups, the most acute shortcoming for the inefficiency of the judicial system 
is a lack of independence. The second-worst problem for the started group is the 
inability to enforce rulings and for the non-started group, it is a lack of motivation. 
Finally, the third most acute shortcoming is a delay court in rulings for all private 
investors. 
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Table 6.20: Ranking of judicial system inefficiencies 
Level of difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Lack of independence (1) 32 42 23 32 55 37 
Inability to enforce rulings (2) 12 16 20 31 32 23 
Lack of motivation (2) 25 34 7 11 32 23 
Delay court rulings (3) 28 44 11 21 39 34 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In addition to the above-stated reasons for the inefficiency of the judicial system, 
private investors in the FGD said that the discrimination among the investors in 
making decisions on investment activities is also a problem. During the FGD, a lack 
of skilled manpower or lack of capacity among lawyers is also a major reason for the 
inefficiency of the judicial system. However, some groups stated that efficiencies 
develop through the process and mostly just requires hard work. In other words, they 
acknowledge that there are problems but feel that the efficiency of the judicial 
system will improve given time. 
 
The major reasons for the problems related to the legal system stated in the FGDs 
are summarised: 
i. There are poor legal systems in place that open the door to corruption in the 
state. 
ii. The legal system is not efficient enough to fight corruption. 
iii. The major challenge is not the gap in the legal system, but rather problems 
with the individuals empowered in the legal system. 
iv. Sometimes private investors felt that it would be better to pay a bribe in order 
to get their work done faster. 
v. Investors always complain, and this is a clear sign of the prevalence of 
corruption. 
vi. Clear answers are not given by the persons assigned to handle queries from 
private investors. 
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i) Bureaucratic red tape and investment status group 
 
The study also investigated the impact of bureaucratic red tape on the investment 
status due to the delay in receiving public services like investment licenses, bank 
loans, vehicle registrations, police services and other utilities. As indicated in 
Table 6.21 below, more than three-fourths of the respondents replied that they were 
subjected to delays in their status because of bureaucratic red tape in getting public 
services and said that this did not facilitate their investment status. However, almost 
one-fourth of the respondents replied that they were not subjected to ISD due to 
bureaucratic red tape. After analysing the data in SPSS, a total of 153 private 
investors (82% of the total that delayed) were delayed due to bureaucratic red tape. 
Of these, 50 (77%) were found in the started group and 103 (85%) in the non-started 
group. In general, more than three-fourths of the respondents were affected by the 
problem of bureaucratic red tape. However, 33 private investors said that it did not 
influence their investment status (18% of the total that did delay) and of those that 
did delay 15 (23%) were found in the started group and 18 (15%) were found in the 
non-started group. 
 
Table 6.21: Bureaucratic red tape impact on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 103 85 4 100 50 77 42 62 153 82 46 64 
Didn’t have 
impact 
18 15 0 0 15 23 26 38 33 18 26 36 
Total 121 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As per the Pearson’s chi-square test, the value of the chi-square statistic is 9.645. 
This value is significant (p =.002), indicating that the type of status group found had a 
significant effect on whether a private investor would delay due to bureaucratic red 
tape (see Appendix A). This significant result indicates that there is a relationship 
between the type of investment status group and whether the private investor delays 
or not. By relationship here, we mean that the pattern of responses in the two status 
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groups is significantly different due to the bureaucratic red tape. This significant 
finding (see Table 6.21 above) reveals the fact that when found in the non-started 
group, about 85% of the private investors become delayed due to bureaucratic red 
tape and 15% do not, whereas when found in the started group, things are 
somewhat different; about 77% are impacted and 23% are not. What is noteworthy is 
that, in the case of non-delayed private investors, the impact of bureaucratic red tape 
in the non-started group is greater (100%) than in the started group (62%). 
 
In the case of the private investors who replied that their investment status was 
delayed due to bureaucratic red tape, around three-fourths of the respondents said 
that getting bank loans and utility services (like water, electric power, and telephone 
lines) were the major obstacles. But, the other public services (like investment 
licenses, the land access process, vehicle registrations and police services) did not 
much impact the delay of investment status arising from bureaucratic red tape (see 
Table 6.22). 
 
Table 6.22: Public services delay due to bureaucratic red tape 
Public services Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Investment 
license 
Yes 28 26 23 25 51 26 
No 78 74 69 75 147 74 
Bank loan 
Yes 87 82 64 70 151 76 
No 19 18 28 30 47 24 
Land access 
Yes 45 43 32 35 77 39 
No 61 57 60 65 121 61 
Register vehicle 
Yes 26 25 12 13 38 19 
No 80 75 80 87 160 81 
Police services 
Yes 4 4 6 7 10 5 
No 102 96 86 93 188 95 
Utility services 
Yes 88 83 55 60 143 72 
No 18 17 37 40 55 28 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
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The severity of the problem to investors in getting the public services listed above is 
ranked in Table 6.23 below. It is evident that the first and second public services 
most subjected to delay due to bureaucratic red tape are access to a bank loan and 
utility services (water, electric and telephone) for all respondents of private investors 
in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 6.23: Ranking of public services delayed due to bureaucratic red tape  
Level of difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Bank loan (1) 56 53 45 51 101 52 
Utilities (2) 56 61 25 42 81 53 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In addition to the above, private investors in the FGDs and officials interviewed 
mentioned the poor delivery of the following public services as causes of delay due 
to bureaucratic red tape. 
i. Inefficiency of customs and duty authority in facilitating taxes, customs duties, 
etc. 
ii. Inadequate services by the transport authority in granting licenses and other 
services. 
iii. Inefficiency of the municipal office, especially in construction design activities. 
iv. Unwillingness of the investment office in permitting them to invest as per their 
interest. 
v. Inadequate service by the telecommunications authority, especially the 
internet service problem. 
 
It was also noted that the reasons for the delay in getting public services are a lack 
of capacity of the employees. This capacity no longer matches the need because of 
the growth in investment activities. 
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j) Corruption and investment status group  
 
The perception of private investors on corruption as a cause of ISD was studied. In 
particular it refers to the impact on ISD due to the level of corruption in getting 
services like a bank loans, investment permits, licenses, municipal services, etc. 
 
Accordingly, out of the total respondents, more than half of the private investors that 
are delayed reported that their investment status was negatively influenced by the 
high challenge of corruption in the state to get different services. From the SPSS 
output in Table 6.24 below, it can be seen that 102 private investors delayed 
because of the challenge of corruption in the state to get different services (56% of 
the total that delayed) and of these 30 (48%) were found in the started group and 72 
(60%) were found in the non-started group. That is, near to half of the respondents in 
the started group and above half of the respondents in the non-started suffered due 
to a problem with corruption. Of the 126 investors who stated that corruption did not 
impact their investment status, 81 (44% of the total that were delayed), 33 (52% of 
the started group that were delayed) and 48 (40% of the non-started group that were 
delayed) have actually been delayed. 
 
Table 6.24: Corruption impact on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 72 60 3 75 30 48 19 30 102 56 22 33 
Didn’t have 
impact 
48 40 1 25 33 52 44 70 81 44 45 67 
Total 120 100 4 0 63 100 63 100 183 100 67 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
In addition, the value of the chi-square test from SPSS is 11.188. This value is 
significant (p < .001), indicating that the type of status group found had a significant 
effect on whether a private investor would delay (see Appendix A). The significant 
result indicates that there is an association between the type of status group and 
whether the private investor delayed or not. That is, the proportion of private 
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investors that delayed due to the proportion that did not in the two status groups is 
significantly different. This significant finding reflects the fact that when found in the 
non-started group, about 60% of private investors were affected and 40% were not, 
whereas in the started group, the opposite is true (about 52% were not influenced 
and 48% were impacted). The impact of corruption was greater for the non-started 
group in the case of non-delayed private investors than for the started group (see 
Table 6.24). 
 
After analysing the impact of corruption as reported by the private investors, the 
effect of corruption on PIMS was examined. Accordingly, the FGDs showed that 
corruption had a negative effect on private investors in the manufacturing sector in 
particular and on the overall economic sectors in general. Moreover, the FGD 
participants added that corruption levels in the state is still at a lower level than other 
developing countries. Nevertheless it has the following negative effects on 
investment: 
i. It affects the economic, political and social conditions and so can create crises 
in the state. 
ii. It hampers development and consumes the public wealth of the state. 
iii. It enhances a rent-seeking attitude and hinders poverty reduction endeavors. 
iv. It affects the quality of production and competition. 
v. It could push private investors to shift from the state to other areas where 
there is a relatively good investment environment and so decrease job 
opportunities and other investment benefits. 
vi. It enhances partiality among investors, especially in the services of financial 
institutions. 
 
k) Investment incentives and investment status group  
 
The investment incentives given by the government to private investors were also 
studied so as to ascertain whether these incentives promote the investment status or 
not. Here, income tax holidays, customs duty, access to low land lease prices and 
market incentives are considered. 
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The relevant information here is presented in Table 6.25 below. In total, 20 private 
investors delayed their status due to a lack of investment incentives (11% of the total 
that delayed) and of these, 8 (12%) were found in the started group and 12 (10%) in 
the non-started group. However, 166 private investors were not affected at all by the 
challenges to get investment incentives provided by the government (89% of the 
total that delayed) and of those that did not delay, 57 (88%) were found in the started 
group and 109 (90%) were found in the non-started group. 
 
Table 6.25: Investment incentives impact on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 12 10 0 0 8 12 7 10 20 11 7 10 
Didn’t have 
impact 
109 90 4 100 57 88 61 90 166 89 65 90 
Total 121 100 4 0 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire (2014) 
 
To examine the association between the two variables, the Pearson’s chi-square 
statistic test was done and its value is 0.042. This value is highly insignificant 
(p = .837), indicating that there is no relationship between the type of status group 
and whether the private investor delayed or not due to incentives given by 
government (see Appendix A). That means the pattern of responses in the two 
status groups is not significantly different. This insignificant finding reflects the fact 
that when found in the non-started group, about 10% of private investors are delayed 
and 90% are not. When found in the started group, about 12% of private investors 
are delay because of investment incentives problems and 88% are not (see 
Table 6.25). 
 
The impact on delays of types of investment incentives given by the government to 
encourage private investors in the manufacturing sector was also examined. From 
the total respondents, around three-fourths of the investors replied that income tax 
holidays, customs duty, and access to low lease price of land were significant 
motivators to them to invest in the state. However, 56% of the respondents in this 
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group of investors in the manufacturing sector replied that market incentives did not 
motivate them much to invest in the state (see Table 6.26). 
 
Table 6.26: Investment incentives that promote private investors 
Investment 
incentives Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Income tax holidays 
Yes 127 77 39 60 166 72 
No 39 24 26 40 65 28 
Custom duty 
Yes 134 81 41 63 175 76 
No 32 19 24 37 56 24 
Bank loan 
Yes 112 68 38 59 150 65 
No 54 32 27 41 81 35 
Access to low land 
lease price 
Yes 149 90 46 71 195 84 
No 17 10 19 29 36 16 
Market incentives 
Yes 81 49 21 32 102 44 
No 85 51 44 68 129 56 
Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire (2014) 
 
The investment incentives that promote private investments are ranked according to 
the responses of the private investors. Table 6.27 below shows that the investment 
incentive which significantly helps to promote private investment is access to a low 
lease of land. Customs duty was the second most important investment incentive 
that promoted the private investment in the state. 
 
Table 6.27: Ranking of investment incentives that promote private investors 
Level of difficulty 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Low lease price of land (1) 40 24 26 40 66 29 
Custom duty (2) 42 31 17 33 59 32 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
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l) Political instability risk and investment status group  
 
The risk of political instability in the study area in relation to border conflicts, security 
systems, trade restrictions and public offices, as well as unnecessary interference 
are examined in this section. 
 
As shown in Table 6.28 below, in total 29 private investors constrained their status 
due to the impact of risk of political instability (16% of the total that delayed) and of 
these 5 (8%) were found in the started group and 24 (20%) in the non-started group. 
Moreover, 157 private investors did not affect their investment at all due to political 
stability in the state that hinders the operation of the private investors in the 
manufacturing sector (84% of the total that delayed) and of those that were not 
affected, 60 (92%) were found in the started group and 97 (80%) in the non-started 
group. 
 
Table 6.28: Political instability risk impact on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 24 20 0 0 5 8 7 10 29 16 7 10 
Didn’t have 
impact 97 80 4 100 60 92 61 90 157 84 65 90 
Total 121 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 186 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
To examine the relationship between variables, Pearson’s chi-square statistic was 
calculated and it is 5.672. This value is less significant (p = .017), indicating that the 
type of status group found had a small significant effect on whether an investor 
would delay due to the risk of political instability (see Appendix A). The significant 
result indicates that there is an association between the type of status group and 
whether the private investor delays or not due to political instability risks. This shows 
that the difference in the pattern of responses (i.e. the proportion of investors that 
delayed to the proportion that did not) in the two status groups is significantly small. 
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This finding reflects the fact that when found in the non-started group, about 20% of 
private investors were impacted by political instability and risk and 80% were not. In 
the started group, about 8% of private investors delay due to risk and 92% did not 
delay because of risks of political instability (see Table 6.28). 
 
Out of those who replied that there is a risk of political instability (36 investors), 97% 
and 86% of the respondents in the two groups reported that border conflicts and 
unnecessary interference from officials were the major causes of political instability 
and risk in the state. However, security systems and trade restrictions were not 
deemed risky for private investors in the manufacturing sector (see Table 6.29). 
 
Table 6.29: Causes of political instability risks to private investors  
Risks Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Border conflict Yes 28 97 7 100 35 97 
No 1 3 0 0 1 3 
Weak security 
system 
Yes 1 3 1 14 2 6 
No 28 97 6 86 34 94 
High trade 
restriction 
Yes 2 7 5 71 7 19 
No 27 93 2 29 29 81 
Public offices 
unnecessary 
interference  
Yes 28 97 3 43 31 86 
No 1 3 4 57 5 14 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The risks of political instability components were ranked in order to show their 
influence on the investment undertakings of the private investors. Table 6.30 below 
shows that the major political instability risk for private investment is border conflicts 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The second major political instability risk is 
unnecessary interference from public offices/officials in the private investors’ 
activities. 
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Table 6.30: Ranking of political instability risks to private investors 
Incentives  
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Border conflict (1) 28 97 7 100 35 97 
Unnecessary interference from 
public offices (2) 
26 93 2 29 28 80 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
m) Investment locations and investment status group 
 
The impact of investment location on private investment progress was also included 
in the study. As Table 6.31 below shows, in total 5 private investors were influenced 
by the problem of the investment locations (3% of the total that delayed) and of these 
3 (5%) were found in the started group and 2 (2%) in the non-started group. 
However, 179 private investors were not at all affected because of their investment 
location (97% of the total that did not delay) and of those that did not delay, 62 (95%) 
were found in the started group and 117 (98%) in the non-started group. 
 
Table 6.31: Impact of investment location on investment status delay 
Attributes  
Non-started Started Total 
Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed Delayed Non-delayed 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Had impact 2 2 0 0 3 5 20 29 5 3 20 28 
Didn’t have 
impact 117 98 4 100 62 95 48 71 179 97 52 72 
Total 119 100 4 100 65 100 68 100 184 100 72 100 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The value of the chi-square statistic is 17.633. This value is highly significant 
(p < .001), indicating that the type of status group found had a significant effect on 
whether an investor would delay due to investment location (see Appendix A). The 
highly significant result indicates that there is an association between the type of 
status group and whether the private investor delayed or not due to location. That is, 
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the proportion of private investors that delayed to the proportion that did not in the 
two status groups is significantly different. This significant finding reflects the fact 
that, when found in the non-started group, only 2% of private investors became 
delayed due to the impact of investment location and 98% did not, but when found in 
the started group, about 5% of private investors delayed because of investment 
location and 95% did not (see Table 6.31). 
 
Table 6.32: Investment location problems to private investors 
Location problems Attributes 
Types of status group 
Total 
Non-started Started 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Long distance to raw 
material 
Yes 0 0 17 74 17 68 
No 2 100 6 26 8 32 
Long distance to sell 
products 
Yes 0 0 8 35 8 32 
No 2 100 15 65 17 68 
Shortage of skilled and 
customer attractive 
labor force 
Yes 0 0 2 9 2 8 
No 2 100 21 91 23 92 
Higher cost of house 
rents 
Yes 0 0 3 13 3 12 
No 2 100 20 87 22 88 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
As Table 6.32 above reveals, out of the total respondents who replied that they had 
investment location problems, 68% (17 investors) stated that the long distances to 
raw materials was the major problem in the manufacturing sector in the study area. 
This is because Mekelle town (the main city in the State of Tigray) is far (780 km) 
from the capital city of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa) and even further from the port of 
Djibouti. 
 
6.1.4. Summary of the descriptive analysis 
 
To summarise, the results of the descriptive analysis reveals the impact of each 
variable on the ISD out of the total number of respondents that delayed. The impact 
of the different variables on the ISD varies within the types of investment statuses. 
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Some variables are influenced in one status group but not in another, for example 
the judicial system. Other variables impact on both statuses but with a different 
percentage level, for example access to credit. Table 6.33 below provides a detailed 
summary of the results of the descriptive analysis in relation to the impact of the 
explanatory variables on the investment status. 
 
Table 6.33: Summary of Descriptive analysis results 
Variables Non-started group Started group All respondents 
Educational 
level 
Primary & Secondary 
Schools highly delayed 
but the level of delay is 
high in secondary 
school.  
Primary & Secondary 
Schools highly delayed 
but the level of delay in 
the primary school is 
high.  
Primary & Secondary 
School educational levels 
highly delayed 
Investment 
area 
Food, non-metallic 
mineral products, Basic 
metals more delayed 
industries  
Food, non-metallic 
mineral products, Basic 
metals more delayed 
industries and here the 
level of delay is high 
comparing with the 
other group. 
Food, non-metallic 
mineral products, Basic 
metals more delayed 
industries  
Access to 
credit 
Had an impact for the 
delay (80%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (66%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (76%) 
Interest rate Did not have impact for 
the delay (77%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (78%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (77%) 
Infrastructure 
facilities  
Did not have impact for 
the delay (80%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (84%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (80%) 
Access to 
land 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (64%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (71%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (66%) 
Judicial 
system 
Had an impact for the 
delay (62%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (51%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (57%) 
Bureaucratic 
red tape 
Had an impact for the 
delay (85%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (77%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (82%) 
Corruption Had an impact for the 
delay (60%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (52%) 
Had an impact for the 
delay (56%) 
Investment 
incentives 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (90%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (88%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (89%) 
Political 
instability 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (80%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (92%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (84%) 
Investment 
location 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (98%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (95%) 
Did not have impact for 
the delay (97%) 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
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6.2. Results of econometric model 
 
As explained in the methodology section, the duration analysis was used to 
complement the preceding descriptive result. The descriptive analysis focuses on 
explaining factors that determine the delay of private investment from one 
investment stage to the next. 
 
The duration of domestic private investment, that is, the time from the application for 
an investment permit at the investment office until the investment license is granted 
and operation begins, is influenced by various factors which have been discussed in 
previous empirical works. Identification of both dependent and independent variables 
for this study was guided by the conceptual framework of the study and review of 
related literature. Due consideration was given to include relevant variables and 
appropriate post-estimation tests were made. The duration model was used to 
estimate the potential effect of each explanatory variable on the condition to continue 
the private investment status timeline. 
 
Different pre- and post-estimation tests were made to minimise bias, inconsistency 
and inefficiency estimators. To consider the problem of heteroscedasticity, it was 
estimated robust standard errors and there is no serious multicollinearity problem 
that results in the estimation of biased estimators. A multicollinearity problem arises 
when two or more independent variables in a regression equation are highly 
correlated. If there is the presence of collinearity between the independent variables, 
it is difficult to separate out the effect of each parameter estimate on the dependent 
variable. It is quite difficult to estimate accurately the effect of that variable and so 
there is little confidence in policy prescriptions on these estimates. It is thus 
important to test for the presence of collinearity between variables before running a 
regression (see Appendix D). 
 
The link test was used whether or not the model is correctly specified and whether 
included irrelevant variable or excluded important variable. When the specification is 
correct, one is unable to find additional predictors that significantly affect the 
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response variable. To do this, after the regression, a command for a specification 
test is often used. The predicted value should be a significant predictor since it is the 
predicted value from the model. This will be the case unless the model is completely 
miss-specified. On the other hand, if the model is properly specified, the variable 
predicted value squared should not have much predictive power other than by 
chance. Therefore, if the predicted value squared is significant, then the link test is 
significant. That means that it is either an omitted relevant variable(s) or the link 
function is not correctly specified. The link test result in the case of this study was 
found to be not statistically significant. All of the duration estimations made on the 
specification test result in the study, as shown in Appendix D, justify that absence of 
specification problem. Thus, including an explanatory variable in each of the duration 
analyses improves the fitness of the model. 
 
The previous section comprehensively pointed out the investment status delay and 
factors affecting both the non-started and started groups of private investment 
status. However, understanding the extent to which these factors determine the 
private investment status could be pointed out by employing an econometric 
analysis. For this purpose, as discussed in the methodology section, a 
duration/hazard model is used to identify the major determinants of private ISD for 
the non-started and started groups of private investors. The variables which were 
used in descriptive analysis and found to have more explanatory power are 
discussed below. The effects of explanatory variables are consistent with the prior 
descriptive analysis, literature reviews, and theories. However, some variables either 
do not have a significant influence or affect at a high significance levels, i.e. a 10% 
significance level. 
 
6.2.1. Determinants of all statuses of private investment 
 
This section discusses factors affecting the start of a private investment in the state 
and uses the inception of operation as a guide. This model (i.e. all statuses of private 
investors) includes data from all private investors across all three statuses in order to 
ascertain the impact of the variables as a whole. Accordingly, the model identifies 
the variables that affect private investment status delay for all private investors, or as 
a whole. Investors already in the operation phase are included in the sample 
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because they overcame challenges in the previous statuses in order to reach the 
production stage. 
 
The study used to index (infrstra) – calculated using factor analysis by combining 
different infrastructure dummies – is an infrastructure indicator. A low infrastructure 
index likely delays an investor’s status and ultimately also the start of operations in 
the State of Tigray for all forms of industries. That is, the infrastructure facilities 
variable has a negative effect on the significant level of 5% of the entire private ISD. 
Infrastructure facilities is equal to 0.556193 and this indicates that the decrease in 
infrastructure facilities results in an increase in the ISD of the private investors, thus 
the null hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. 
 
This study also proves that the judicial system has a significant and negative effect 
on the significant level of 10% of the private ISD. The hazard ratio of the judicial 
system is 0.3598874 which indicates that the lack of efficient judicial systems causes 
private ISD, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. Private investors that 
complained about the inefficiency of judiciary system started operations later than 
those that did not complain about an efficiency problem. 
 
Considering the food industry as a reference category of investment type, it was 
found that textile and textile products, leather and leather products, paper and paper 
products, chemical and chemical products, computer, electronic and optical 
products, and electrical product industries take a longer time to proceed to their next 
status (see Appendix D). Even if the economic/practical significance of this variables 
is very low, the longer time period in the phases for industries mentioned relative to 
food industries implies that the initial investment capital for food industries is low 
relative to other industries and may require a relatively low level of human capital for 
the investment status to progress, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. Those investment areas in which investors 
are less involved are more delayed than those which have a higher number of 
investors (e.g. the food industry and basic metals). 
 
The interest rate variable has a significant and positive effect on the significant level 
of 1% of the private ISD in the State of Tigray with the hazard ratio of the interest 
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rate of 3.943876, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. This result means that a decreased interest rate helps 
the progress of private investors in the manufacturing sector. More firms observed 
that low-interest rate payments on loans meant they could enter into production 
sooner. Firms that reported high-interest payments cited them as barriers to running 
a business. This suggests that low-interest rate payments are not perceived as a 
barrier to entering into operation in the state. 
 
Similarly, the investment location variable has a significant positive effect on the level 
of 1% of the private ISD. Investment location is equal to 6.754458 and this indicates 
that investment location is less of a problem and results in a decrease in the private 
ISD, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1)is not rejected. This indicates that problems linked 
with the investment location reported by private investors of a firm are not 
detrimental to business startups. Investors are more likely to start operations than 
their counterparts who claim the existence of location-related problems. However, all 
remaining variables fail to significantly affect the start of operations in different 
industrial categories in the state (see Table 6.34). 
 
Table 6.34: Duration model results of entire private investors 
Variables Haz. Ratio Robust Std. Err. Z p> z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Educ 1.033874 0.060814 0.57 0.571 0.9212951 1.16021 
Accred 0.8528625 0.4600843 -0.30 0.768 0.2962721 2.45509 
Inrat 3.943876*** 1.848065 2.93 0.003 1.574193 9.88072 
Infrstra  0.5619453** 0.1334421 -2.43 0.015 0.3528287 0.8950025 
Accland 0.7863514 0.4377426 -0.43 0.666 0.2641031 2.341315 
Judsys 0.3598874* 0.1903964 -1.93 0.053 0.1275979 1.015056 
Bureta 0.6377256 0.3826259 -0.75 0.453 0.1967549 2.067008 
Corrupt  0.5970556 0.3051861 -1.01 0.313 0.2192409 1.625953 
Invinc 0.561424 0.4653851 -0.70 0.486 0.1105856 2.850253 
Polins 0.5758247 0.478464 -0.66 0.507 0.1129823 2.934745 
Invloc 6.754458*** 2.843994 4.54 0.000 2.959295 15.41674 
Invtyp1 See Appendix D for detail investment areas results 
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Statistics: 
Number of observation 215  
Wald chi2 (24)  16964.76  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Log pseudo likelihood  -160.61179  
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
***, ** and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
6.2.2. Determinants of the started group of private investment 
 
Started group includes investors in the implementation and operation statuses, i.e. 
those that have begun with the construction and installation of machinery for 
investment and those who have an investment license and have commenced with 
production. This model (i.e. implementation status) only includes private investors in 
the implementation and operation statuses. The model sought to establish the 
impact of variables on investors beyond the pre-implementation phase. The model 
assumes that when the investors completed the questionnaire, they took into 
account all the problems they experienced in the previous phase(s). 
 
In this status group, infrastructure facilities has a significant and negative effect on 
the private ISD in the State of Tigray with a hazard ratio of 0.4933319, thus the null 
hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. The results indicate that a low infrastructure index is 
likely to increase the duration of implementation status in the state for all forms of 
industries. 
 
In addition, the investment incentives have a negative and significant effect on the 
ISD with a ratio of 0.1636076, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. It indicates that private investors benefit 
from different investment incentive packages (invinc) but not enough to encourage 
them to begin operations than firms who do not benefit from such packages. 
 
Meanwhile, taking the food industry as a reference category for investment type, the 
study found that the industries of beverages, leather and leather products, wood, and 
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vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers take a longer time to begin operating (see 
Appendix D). This means that investment types having less involvement from private 
investors are more delayed, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. 
 
Furthermore, investment location has a positive and significant effect on the private 
ISD with a ratio of 4.196411. This means that most of the private investors reported 
problems associated with the investment location of a firm. Those that do not claim 
the existence of firm location-related problems are more likely to end the 
implementation phase and start with operations than their counterparts, thus the null 
hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. However, all remaining variables fail to significantly 
affect the start of implementation in different industrial categories (see Table 6.35). 
 
Table 6.35: Duration model results of started group (implementation and operation) 
Variables Haz. Ratio Robust Std. Err. Z p> z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Educ 1.059013 0.0585137 1.04 0.299 0.95032 1.180138 
Accred 1.431114 0.7487494 0.69 0.493 0.5132526 3.990408 
Inrat 2.037712 0.9757267 1.49 0.137 0.797183 5.208677 
Infrstra  0.4933319*** 0.1223361 -2.85 0.004 0.3034302 0.8020834 
Accland 0.9020224 0.450644 -0.21 0.836 0.3388153 2.401439 
Judsys 0.4533852 0.2418342 -1.48 0.138 0.159382 1.28972 
Bureta 0.6018874 0.367993 -0.83 0.406 0.18159 1.99498 
Corrupt  0.6523761 0.3584489 -0.78 0.437 0.2222308 1.915102 
Invinc 0.1636076* 0.1545032 -1.92 0.055 0.0257022 1.041447 
Polins 0.8114946 0.5937262 -0.29 0.775 0.193423 3.404577 
Invloc 4.196411*** 1.847801 3.26 0.001 1.770392 9.946873 
Invtyp1 See Appendix D for detail investment areas result 
Statistics: 
Number of observation 106  
Wald chi2 (22)         7540.13  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Log pseudo likelihood  -143.28594  
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(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
***, ** and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
6.2.3. Determinants of the non-started group of private investment  
 
This section analyses factors that explain the start of the pre-implementation status, 
that is, the time from when an investor has been granted an investment permit from 
investment office and been given access to land for private investment until the time 
that he/she starts the next status i.e. implementation. This model (i.e. pre-
implementation status) includes all private investors in all three statuses in order to 
establish the impact of variables when they were in the first status of investment. 
Consequently this model takes into account what the impact of the delay was when 
private investors were in the pre-implementation status. 
 
The study used to index (infrstra) – calculated using factor analysis by combining 
different infrastructure dummies – is the infrastructure indicator. Infrastructure 
facilities have a negative and significant relationship with a level of 1% of private 
ISD. The hazard ratio of infrastructure facilities is 0.578503, meaning that the access 
to infrastructure facilities increases the probability of time elapsed in the primary 
phase of private investment, i.e. pre-implementation status, and thus the null 
hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. Automatically therefore, low levels of infrastructure 
index may discourage investment flow and delay activities required for operation. It 
was also observed that by taking the food industry as a reference category of 
investment type, wood products, printing, basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations, and electrical products industries take a longer time to 
end the pre-implementation status of investment duration (Appendix D), thus the null 
hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected and the alternative hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. 
 
According to Table 6.36 below, the interest rate has a significant and positive effect 
on the level of 1% of the private ISD. The ratio of the interest rate is 4.415411 which 
indicates that the interest rate of bank credits were not a cause for private ISD in the 
manufacturing sector of the State of Tigray, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis (Ho2) is accepted. In addition, most of the private 
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investors replied that high-interest rate payments (inrat) on borrowed money is not a 
barrier to business start-up and they are likely to terminate the pre-implementation 
phase duration and continue to the next status earlier than their counterparts who 
observed that high-interest rate payments on the loan is a barrier to starting a 
business. This is consistent with the descriptive finding of private investors who 
reported that there are no problems to starting businesses to be associated with a 
firm’s location (invloc). They are more likely to complete the pre-implementation 
status than those who replied that there are location-related challenges to carrying 
out private investment. Investment location has a significant positive effect on the 
level of 1% of the private investment. This variable is equal to 5.96439 and this 
indicates that the location of the private investors in the State of Tigray does not 
have an impact on ISD, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. 
 
On the other hand, a delay in the primary phase (pre-implementation status) of 
private investment has no statistically significant correlation with the level of 
education, access to credit, access to land, the judicial system, bureaucratic red 
tape, corruption, investment incentive and political instability risk. 
 
Table 6.36: Duration model results of non-started group (Pre-implementation) 
Variables Haz. Ratio Robust Std. Err. Z p> z  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Educ 1.002549 0.0517416 0.05 0.961 0.9060982 1.109267 
Accred 0.9075571 0.3886886 -0.23 0.821 0.3920318 2.101003 
Inrat 4.415411*** 1.644153 3.99 0.000 2.128197 9.160736 
Infrstra  0.578503*** 0.1126304 -2.81 0.005 0.3949869 0.8472831 
Accland 0.8044996 0.3738691 -0.47 0.640 0.32355890 2.000315 
Judsys 0.5269336 0.2169822 -1.56 0.120 0.2350963 1.181044 
Bureta 0.8047878 0.3998161 -0.44 0.662 0.3039535 2.130864 
Corrupt  0.8345099 0.3436616 -0.44 0.660 0.3723026 1.87054 
Invinc 1.052308 0.8818085 0.06 0.951 0.2036368 5.437874 
Polins 0.732676 0.4800937 -0.47 0.635 0.2028398 2.646493 
Invloc 5.96439*** 2.131494 5.00 0.000 2.960548 12.016 
Invtyp1 See Appendix D for detail investment areas results  
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Statistics: 
Number of observation 215  
Wald chi2 (25) 11547.80  
Prob > chi2 0.0000  
Log pseudo likelihood  -238.45585  
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
***, ** and * indicate level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
 
The table below provides a summary of the econometric analysis results of the three 
types of investment status in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Table 6.37: Summary of econometrics analysis results 
Variables Non-started group Started group All respondents 
Educational level Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment area Negative Negative Negative 
Access to credit Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Interest rate Positive Insignificant Positive 
Infrastructure facilities  Negative Negative Negative 
Access to land Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Judicial system Insignificant Insignificant Negative 
Bureaucratic red tape Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Corruption Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment incentives Insignificant Negative Insignificant 
Political instability Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment location Positive Positive Positive 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
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6.3. Constraints of investors in the production phase 
 
The survey obtained from the private investors in the State of Tigray concerning their 
assessment of the relative magnitude of obstacles inhibiting their efforts of 
operations identified various constraints. Investors in the production phase were 
asked to rank the obstacles experienced based on their degree of constraints. Using 
SPSS for Windows Version 20, the results of individual investors were analysed by 
factor analysis to ascertain the influence of the different factors of constraints for 
private investors in the operation phase of the manufacturing sector. 
 
Twenty questions were included in the questionnaire. Each was a statement followed 
by a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘no limitation’ to ‘very high limitation.’ The 
questionnaire was designed to discover the factors that limit the operations of private 
investment. In other words, the variables included in the questionnaire tested the 
level of constraint for the operations of private investors in the last investment status 
(the production phase). According to Field (2009), factor analysis is appropriate 
when the sample size is above 50. For the constraints of private investment, 60 of 
the 62 respondents were fit for the analysis which means that the sample size is 
appropriate for factor analysis. 
 
6.3.1. Preliminary analysis 
 
Table 6.38 depicts the descriptive statistics and shows variables under investigation 
in the output. Typically, the mean, standard deviation and number of respondents (N) 
who participated in the survey are given. According to the mean output result from 
the table below, macroeconomic uncertainty (i.e. exchange rate, inflation, etc.), raw 
material problems, and tax rate and administration have the highest mean result and 
rank from first to third. 
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Table 6.38: Descriptive statistics 
Q. No. Variables Mean Std. Deviation Analysis N 
Q1 Number of financial institutions 1.50 1.066 60 
Q2 Cost of financing i.e. interest rates 1.97 1.207 60 
Q3 Tax rate & administration 2.45 1.294 60 
Q4 Macroeconomic uncertainty e.g. inflation, 
exchange rate 3.08 1.608 60 
Q5 Cost of investment 1.87 1.096 60 
Q6 Research and development work 1.83 1.152 60 
Q7 Appropriate technology supply 1.95 1.268 60 
Q8 Transportation infrastructures 2.00 1.074 60 
Q9 Electric power 2.35 1.300 60 
Q10 Telecommunication service 1.65 .988 60 
Q11 Water supply 2.30 1.344 60 
Q12 Air transport 1.37 .688 60 
Q13 Port facilities 1.90 1.245 60 
Q14 Awareness works with investment laws 1.58 1.169 60 
Q15 Demand for your product 1.67 1.084 60 
Q16 Promotion medias for your product 1.55 .982 60 
Q17 Pricing for your product 1.52 .873 60 
Q18 Skilled and customer attractive labor force 1.75 1.230 60 
Q19 Raw materials needed 2.92 1.453 60 
Q20 Location to sell your product 1.65 1.162 60 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The correlation matrix contains the correlation coefficient of all pairs of questions. 
The majority value in the matrix is greater than 0.05. The correlation coefficients are 
less than 0.9 which indicates that there is no problem of singularity in the data. The 
determinant of the correlation matrix value is 0.00008 which is greater than the 
necessary value of 0.00001. That means multicollinearity is not a problem for this 
data. To summarise, all questions in the data correlate fairly well and none of the 
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correlation coefficients are particularly large, therefore, there is no need to consider 
eliminating any questions at this stage (Appendix E). 
 
Table 6.39 below shows several very important parts of the output: the KMO 
measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. The KMO measures 
the sampling adequacy which should be greater than 0.5 for satisfactory factor 
analysis. Kaiser (1974) recommends accepting values greater than 0.5 as being 
acceptable. The KMO index ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.50 considered suitable for 
factor analysis. The Bartlett’s test should be significant (p < .05) for factor analysis to 
be suitable. Accordingly, the KMO value of the study is 0.726, and Bartlett’s test is 
significant (p < .001), showing the appropriateness of the data for factor analysis. 
 
Table 6.39: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin and Bartlett’s test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy .726 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 601.808 
Df 190 
Sig. .000 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
 
6.3.2. Factor extraction  
 
Table 6.40 below lists the eigenvalues associated with each linear component 
(factor) before extraction, after extraction and after rotation. SPSS identified 20 linear 
components in the data set before extraction. This shows all the factors extractable 
from the analysis along with their eigenvalues, the percent of variance attributable to 
each factor, and the cumulative variance of the factor and the previous factors. 
 
The eigenvalues associated with each factor represent the variance explained by 
that particular linear component and the output displays the eigenvalue in terms of 
the percentage of variance explained i.e. factor 1 explains 32.673% of the total 
variance. Here, the first few factors explain relatively large amounts of variance 
(especially factor 1) whereas subsequent factors explain only small amounts of 
variance. Using Kaiser’s criterion, components that have an eigenvalue of 1 or more 
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are a base to determine how many components are to be extracted. Looking at the 
Total Variance Explained (see Table 6.40), only the first six components recorded 
eigenvalues above 1. These explain a total of 70.116% of the variance. 
 
The values in the extraction sums of squared loadings of the table are the same as 
the values before extraction, except that the values for the discarded factors are 
ignored (hence, the table is blank after the sixth factor). In the final part of the table 
(labeled Rotation sums of squared loadings) the eigenvalues of the factors after 
rotation are displayed. The rotation has the effect of optimising the factor structure 
and one consequence for these data is that the relative importance of the six factors 
is equalised. Before rotation, factor 1 accounted for considerably more variance than 
the remaining five (32.673% compared to others), however, after extraction, it 
accounts for only 18.264% of variance compared to another percent (see 
Table 6.40). 
 
Table 6.40: Total variance explained 
Comp
onent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumula-
tive % 
1 6.535 32.673 32.673 6.535 32.673 32.673 3.653 18.264 18.264 
2 1.937 9.687 42.361 1.937 9.687 42.361 3.089 15.443 33.707 
3 1.745 8.727 51.088 1.745 8.727 51.088 2.591 12.955 46.662 
4 1.556 7.778 58.866 1.556 7.778 58.866 1.695 8.475 55.137 
5 1.162 5.812 64.678 1.162 5.812 64.678 1.539 7.693 62.831 
6 1.088 5.438 70.116 1.088 5.438 70.116 1.457 7.285 70.116 
7 .866 4.328 74.444       
8 .843 4.217 78.661       
9 .711 3.554 82.215       
10 .671 3.355 85.569       
11 .565 2.824 88.393       
12 .509 2.543 90.936       
13 .409 2.045 92.981       
14 .363 1.813 94.794       
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15 .321 1.607 96.402       
16 .231 1.157 97.558       
17 .169 .847 98.405       
18 .138 .688 99.094       
19 .117 .584 99.678       
20 .064 .322 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The SPSS output in Table 6.41 below shows the communalities before and after 
extraction. Principal component analysis works on the initial assumption that all 
variance is common; therefore, before extract on the communalities are all 1. The 
communities in the column labeled Extraction reflect the common variance in the 
data structure. The communalities show how much of the variance in the variables 
has been accounted for by the extracted factors. For instance, over 87% of the 
variance in technology supply is accounted for while 50% of the variance in the 
macroeconomic uncertainty is accounted for. Put another way, 67.3% of the variance 
associated with a number of financial institutions is common or shared variance. 
 
Table 6.41: Communalities 
Variables Initial Extraction 
Number of financial institutions 1.000 .673 
Cost of financing i.e. interest rates 1.000 .627 
Tax rate & administration 1.000 .690 
Macroeconomic uncertainty e.g. inflation, exchange rate 1.000 .502 
Cost of investment 1.000 .706 
Research and development work 1.000 .846 
Appropriate technology supply 1.000 .875 
Transportation infrastructures 1.000 .660 
Electric power 1.000 .538 
Telecommunication service 1.000 .763 
Water supply 1.000 .601 
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Air transport 1.000 .730 
Port facilities 1.000 .737 
Awareness works with investment laws 1.000 .710 
Demand for your product 1.000 .723 
Promotion medias for your product 1.000 .642 
Pricing for your product 1.000 .844 
Skilled and customer attractive labor force 1.000 .733 
Raw materials needed 1.000 .760 
Location to sell your product 1.000 .661 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
Table 6.42 below shows the component matrix before rotation. This matrix contains 
the loadings of each variable on each factor. By default, SPSS displays all loadings; 
however, the SPSS requested that all loadings less than 0.4 be suppressed or 
blocked in the output and so there are blank spaces for many of the loadings. 
 
Table 6.42: Component matrix 
Variables 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Awareness works with investment laws .830      
Cost of financing i.e. interest rates .749      
Telecommunication service .727      
Port facilities .719 -.401     
Appropriate technology supply .684 .482     
Cost of investment .679   .421   
Location to sell your product .664      
Promotion medias for your product .626      
Pricing for your product .609      
Research and development work .601 .595     
Raw materials needed .577    -.564  
Water supply .492 -.459     
Transportation infrastructures .480      
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Macroeconomic uncertainty e.g. inflation, 
exchange rate .458      
Electric power .465 -.519     
Skilled and customer attractive labor force .465  -.614    
Air transport   .607   -.408 
Number of financial institutions    .713   
Tax rate & administration     .555  
Demand for your product .429 -.400    .462 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 6 components extracted. 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
6.3.3. Factor rotation 
 
The next SPSS output, component matrix, shows the rotated component matrix (also 
called the rotated factor matrix in factor analysis) which is a matrix of the factor 
loadings for each variable onto each factor of rotated loadings of each of the items 
on the components. This matrix contains the same information as the component 
matrix in the SPSS output of Table 6.42, except that it is calculated after rotation. 
Comparing this matrix with the unrotated solution, most variables before rotation 
loaded highly onto the first factor and the remaining factors did not really get a look 
in. However, the rotation of the factor structure has six factors and variables load 
very highly onto only one factor. It shows the loadings of the 20 variables on the six 
factors extracted. The suppression of loadings less than 0.4 and ordering variables 
by loading size makes interpretation of the data considerably easier. The higher the 
absolute value of the loading, the more the factor contributes to the variables (see 
Table 6.43). 
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Table 6.43: Rotated component matrix 
Variables 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Port facilities .812      
Telecommunication service .773      
Water supply .694      
Transportation infrastructures .654      
Electric power .592      
Awareness works of investment laws .489 .479 .432    
Research and development works  .878     
Appropriate technology supply  .878     
Raw materials needed  .697     
Cost of financing i.e. interest rates .422 .507     
Skilled and customer attractive labor force   .816    
Pricing for your product   .641   .490 
Location to sell your product   .598 .413   
Promotion medias for your product   .484    
Number of financial institutions    .800   
Cost of investment  .405 .469 .520   
Demand for your product     .722  
Air transport .462    -.616  
Macroeconomic uncertainty e.g. inflation, 
exchange rate     .576  
Tax rate & administration      .803 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
 
The next step is to look at the content of questions that load onto the same factor to 
try and identify common themes. The questions that load highly on factor 1 seem to 
all relate to port facilities, telecommunication services, water supply, transport 
infrastructure and electric power factors. The two questions that load highly on factor 
2 all seem to relate to research and development works and appropriate technology 
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supply. The question that loads highly on factor 3 seems to be a skilled and 
customer attractive labor force demanded by investment activities. The questions 
that load highly on factors 4, 5 and 6 are the availability of sufficient numbers of 
financial institutions, a demand for their product in the market, and tax rate and 
administration problems respectively. 
 
This analysis shows that various problems exist that hinder the operation of private 
investors. The main one concerns infrastructure facilities. The second is problems 
related to technological issues and this is followed by a lack of further development 
through the support of research and new innovated technologies. Other important 
problems are economic and financial factors, location concerns, and challenges with 
the market for outputs from the production phase. 
 
6.4. Summary of results 
 
The major objective of the study was to identify the determinants of PIMS in the 
State of Tigray. The study results have mainly focused on the influence of 
independent variables on the dependent variables. The dependent variables were 
respondents from all statuses and they could be either in the started group 
(implementation and operation statuses) or non-started group (pre-implementation 
status). The independent variables were level of education, investment area, credit 
access, interest rate, access to infrastructure facilities, land access, the judicial 
system, bureaucratic red tape, corruption, investment incentives, the risk of political 
instability, and investment location. The data was collected from 259 private 
investors that are invested in the manufacturing sector. These respondents were 
divided into pre-implementation (125), implementation (72) and operation (62) 
statuses. For the descriptive analysis, SPSS software was used to analyse the data. 
For the econometric analysis of the study, the duration model was used to quantify 
the impact of independent variables on the dependent variables. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, most of the private investors were delayed 
from proceeding though the status levels because of access to credit, the judicial 
system, bureaucratic red tape, and corruption. The chi-square statistic value result 
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showed that level of education, access to credit, infrastructure facilities, bureaucratic 
red tape, corruption, risks of political instabilities, and investment locations are 
significant, indicating that the type of status group found had a significant effect on 
whether an investor would delay in the manufacturing sector. This means that the 
level of ISD varies within the type of groups due to the above stated variables. 
However, investment area, interest rate, land access, the judicial system, and 
investment incentives are insignificant. 
 
According to the duration model, in the entire private investors, those investment 
areas in which investors are less involved are more delayed than those which have a 
higher number of investors. Infrastructure facilities and the judicial system had a 
significant and negative influence on the progress of investment status. However, 
interest rate and investment location boosted the progress of investment status. 
 
According to the factor analysis results, macroeconomic uncertainty has the highest 
mean value in the production stage. In the analysis, the first six components 
recorded eigenvalues above 1. The rotated component matrix result shows most of 
the items load quite strongly on the six components. Finally, variables with a higher 
value of loading are infrastructure, technology, and economic and financial factors 
that limit the operation of private investors in the manufacturing sector in the study 
area. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In this chapter, the key points of this research are discussed and conclusions drawn 
from all information collected. Recommendations are also made for each of the three 
investment status groups. 
 
7.1. Discussions on private investment status 
 
7.1.1. Background 
 
Investment encompasses any reasonable activity or asset, that is, any form of 
investment which adds to the existing capital formation of a country. Economists 
usually reserve the term investment for transactions that increase the magnitude of 
real aggregate wealth in the economy. This includes mainly the purchase (or 
production) of new, real and durable assets such as factories and machines (Bayai & 
Nyangara, 2013). Investment is a very important determinant of the long-term 
improvement of an economy’s competitiveness, and it plays an important role in an 
economy by increasing a country’s productive capacity, creating employment 
opportunities, promoting technical progress and causing serious fluctuations to 
economic activities, thereby increasing private investment. 
 
Private investment is a major drive of the economic growth of a country and has a 
strong, favorable effect on growth. Generally, it is a powerful means of innovation, 
economic growth and poverty reduction. It creates job opportunities, generates 
revenue and increases the income of the poor, so it is very important for an economy 
to increase its investment in the private sector. Despite all this, in many developing 
countries including Ethiopia, investment rates are low, incentives for innovation are 
insufficient and even returns on investment are not very predictable. These are just a 
few of the causes of slow growth in a developing economy. In addition, the slow 
progress of new business and the complicating investment factors discussed above, 
hinders the growth of investment in an economy. 
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The purpose of this study was to investigate the determining factors of private 
investment status in the manufacturing sector in the State of Tigray, Ethiopia. Its 
main objective was to identify the major variables that affect the ISD and the 
constraints on operations of private investors that are already in production phase in 
the manufacturing sector. Both quantitative and qualitative primary data was used, 
and relevant secondary data was properly reviewed. For the primary data, a 
questionnaire was designed, pre-tested and then employed. The respondents are 
259 private investors in the manufacturing sector and include 18 females. In addition, 
in-depth interviews and FGDs were conducted and the information generated here 
was used as the main source for the qualitative data. The respondents were from the 
six zones in the State of Tigray. The study also included descriptive and econometric 
analysis. In the descriptive and econometric analyses, explanatory variables were 
used. In the case of the descriptive analysis, all the explanatory variables were 
analysed. However, in the case of econometric analysis, only the variables 
significant to the ISD were analysed. The following discussion focuses on the 
descriptive and econometric analysis. 
 
Private investment has three statuses: pre-implementation, implementation and 
operation. In the survey study, the status distribution of the sample private investors 
in the manufacturing sector during the data collection period was: 125 (48%) in the 
pre-implementation status, 72 (28%) in the implementation status and 62 (24%) in 
operation status. This shows that most of the private investors in the manufacturing 
sector were in the pre-implementation status. The supports the known reality that 
although many project applications are received for investment certificates, the 
number of projects that make the transition to permanent license (to operation) are 
very few indeed. 
 
The standard period to proceed from pre-implementation status to implementation 
status is six months; the standard period to proceed from implementation status to 
operation status is 30 months. After this, an investor should receive their investment 
permit from the investment office and start their operation status within 36 months. 
For this study purpose, private investors are divided into non-started and started 
groups based on their investment status. Investors who have not yet started any 
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implementation activities (pre-implementation status) are called the non-started 
group, whereas those investors who have started with investment activities and 
commenced operation are called the started group. The second group includes 
investors in the implementation and operation statuses. 
 
7.1.2. Discussion on the determinants of all statuses of private investors 
 
Concerning gender, around 93% respondents of the private investors in the study 
area were males. This percentage is more or less constant between the started and 
non-started groups of investment status. One can conclude therefore that the private 
investor groups in the manufacturing sector in the State of Tigray are owned and 
dominated by males. Concerning age, the survey concluded that around 92% of the 
respondents were above 30 years of age. This percentage is the same in the started 
and non-started groups of status. One can conclude therefore that all investors were 
adults and most were mature adults. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, about 80% of the private investors had a 
primary and secondary school educational level but the status progress of the 
majority of these was delayed. The highest ratio of ISD was in the primary and 
secondary school educational levels, next was the diploma and above educational 
level. In general, investors with more than a secondary school level of education 
were proceeding with their investment status on time. The chi-square test value 
indicates a statistically insignificant difference (less than 5%) between the two status 
groups with regard to delayed rates due to educational level. Moreover, on average, 
the proportion of graduates delayed in both the non-started and started groups was 
less than the number of investors with only a high school educational level 
(Appendix A). This result is consistent with findings by Bigsten and Soderbom (2006) 
that showed that manufacturing sectors in Africa are positively correlated with 
education. Similarly, empirical studies by Baye et al. (2005) also show that an 
investor can more easily make a good investment if he/she has a higher formal 
education. The result of the duration model of this study shows that educational level 
is insignificant for the ISD. 
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Out of the total delayed respondents in the study, about 29% of the private investors 
were from the food industries area of investment; this group was followed by the 
non-metallic mineral products (15%) and basic metals (11%) industries. Private 
investors in both the non-started and started groups were similarly delayed and the 
percentages were markedly higher than those in the other industries examined. The 
chi-square statistic value also shows that there is no statistically significant difference 
in the rate of delay due to investment areas between the two status groups. This 
result is consistent with the empirical studies of Baye et al. (2005) which showed that 
investment areas make no difference to delays. The econometric result shows that 
some of the industries (e.g. textile and textile products, leather and leather products, 
paper and paper products, chemical and chemical products, computer, electronic 
and optical products, and electrical products) were delayed from beginning 
operations within the specified time periods. Thus, the research null hypothesis is 
rejected and the alternative hypothesis which says, “All private investment areas of 
the manufacturing sectors are, more likely, not equally subject to investment status 
delay” is accepted according to the econometric statistical results. 
 
Concerning private investors’ finance, 96% of the respondents explained that the 
source of finance for their investment activities was from their own contribution. This 
result was consistent with previous studies undertaken in Kenya, which found that 
private savings positively affect the change in private investment in the short run 
(Olweny & Chiluwe, 2012). Majeed and Khan (2008) also suggest that sources of 
finance are significant and positive determinants of private investment. In addition, 
nearly half of the respondents of the study reported that loans from formal financial 
institutions like banks were an added source of finance for their investment activities. 
However, 97% of the respondents explained that shared contributions and informal 
financial sources were not used as a source of finance for their investment activities. 
This result is similar to Workie’s (1996) which argues that own contributions play a 
dominant role and says that the next important source of finance for private investors 
is formal financial institutions (like banks). 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, around two-thirds of the respondents stated 
that they requested a loan from formal financial institutions. 170 private investors 
requested a loan (see Table 6.9 above) and three-fourths of the respondents that 
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delayed were affected because of a lack of access to credit. Private investors found 
in the non-started group were more delayed than those in the started group because 
of issues regarding access to credit from banks. The major problems in this regard 
was shown to be bank paperwork requirements or delays in loan delivery and 
inadequate credit. The chi-square test value also indicates that the difference 
between the status groups with regard to access to credit was statistically significant 
at less than 1% level. This study result is consistent with Batra et al. (2003) who 
found that as the credit access decreases, investors become more discouraged and 
hesitant to invest. However, this result differs from Munir et al. (2010) and 
Getachew’s (1997) conclusions on financing. Nevertheless, the duration model result 
of this study shows that access to credit has an insignificant impact on the ISD at 
95% of confidence level; however, if this level decreases, the significance of the 
variable becomes similar to the descriptive result. 
 
In the FGDs, private investors stated that they experience problems getting 
adequate and timely bank loans for their investment from financial institutions. In 
addition, banks request high collateral requirements and do not treat investors 
equally when assessing loan applications. During the interview with the loan officers 
of the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the reasons cited for problems with credit 
access were a lack of sufficient budget being allocated by the top management of 
the commercial bank of Ethiopia. This was true even if the allocated budget was 
prioritised by the government to the selected sectors and depended on the actual 
situations. The bank officers felt that investors demand more finance than they need 
so as to be able to divert the money into other businesses they own. In addition to 
this, increasing inflation in the market, a lack of knowledge (traditional investors) and 
insufficient information during assessments by bank experts were the major reasons 
for inadequate credit being available to private investors. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, only 23% of the total delayed respondents 
were affected by the interest rate paid to banks. The started and non-started groups 
were equally affected by this (same percentage as above). This shows that most of 
the private investors in the manufacturing sector were not affected by the interest 
rate level set by financial institutions for bank credit. The value of chi-square statistic 
confirms that the difference in delay rate between the started and non-started groups 
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of private investors with regard to interest rate was statistically insignificant. The 
duration model result showed that interest rates have a significant and positive effect 
on the investment status progress of the private investors at 1% significant level. So, 
this result is consistent with the McKinnon (1973) and Shaw’s (1973) theories which 
suggest that there could be a positive relationship between investment and interest 
rate. Frimpong and Marbuah (2010) and Getachew (1997) concluded that the user 
cost of capital, proxied by the interest rate, has a significant positive impact on 
private investment and this is consistent with this study model. The null hypothesis of 
the study, “The interest rate on bank loans has a negative impact on the investment 
status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector” is not accepted. 
 
As per the descriptive result of the averaged public services, about 18% of the total 
respondents that delayed reported that access to infrastructure facilities affected 
their ISD in the manufacturing sector. This shows that most of the respondents that 
delayed were not influenced by the availability of infrastructure facilities. The 
proportion of investors affected by access to infrastructure facilities for started group 
was slightly smaller than that of the non-started group. The chi-square statistic value 
also indicated that there is a significant difference between the two status groups at 
1% level. To summarise, the non-started group of private investors delayed because 
of infrastructure facilities is less than the started group. This indicates that 
infrastructure facilities did contribute to the ability of most of the private investors to 
proceed early to their next investment status. 
 
This result is consistent with Baye et al. (2005) who state that infrastructure facilities 
increase private investment and encourage people to invest more. The duration 
model result in this study, however, indicates that access to infrastructure facilities 
has a significant and negative effect on investment status progress at 5% level of 
significance. This indicates that a decrease in the facilities of infrastructure results in 
a delay in the progress of investment. The fact shows that infrastructure facilities like 
roads, telephone lines and electricity is very limited in the State of Tigray and that it 
does affect the delay. This result is similar to Soneta et al. (2012), Batra et al. (2003) 
and Getachew (2007) who showed that investment in infrastructure is inversely 
proportional to the growth of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan. Therefore, 
according to the econometric analysis result, the null hypothesis “Access of 
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infrastructure facilities affect negatively on the investment status delay of private 
investors in the manufacturing sector” is not rejected. During the FGDs, most of the 
private investors reported that the availability of electric power, telephone 
communications, water supply and transport facilities are major obstacles which 
affect their status progress. In addition, the interviews with the TIO experts and 
investors revealed that a lack of electricity and problems with transformers, poles 
and electric power meters are the main problems for private investors in this regard. 
 
The descriptive analysis shows that around one-third of the respondents that 
delayed was because of difficulties with access to land for their investment projects. 
The major problems in this regard are complications arising from bureaucratic 
procedures and the land tenure system. Significantly though, two-thirds of the total 
that delayed did not have the problems with access to land. This result is similar to 
the studies on industries in Ethiopia by the Embassy of Japan (2008) which found 
that investors in Ethiopia consider the land system advantageous since the 
government of Ethiopia leases the land for a significantly lower price and for long 
terms. To summarise, most of the private investors found in both types of status 
groups did not delay because of problem with access to land. The chi-square test 
result from the survey also shows that there is no significant difference in progress 
between the two status groups regarding this variable. The duration model result 
also showed that land access has an insignificant effect on the ISD. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, about 57% of the respondents that delayed 
were affected due by the inefficiency of the judicial system. The major 
shortcomings here are the inability to enforce rulings, a lack of independence of 
employees, corruption, and delayed court rulings. The private investors in both the 
non-started and started groups were equally delayed by the judicial system. The chi-
square test value considering the judicial system problems indicated that the 
difference between non-started and started groups was not significant. In the 
discussions with private investors, the legal system of the state was seen as not 
being robust enough to solve their problems. They added that the competence of the 
employees in the legal system was not sufficient for them to implement their 
responsibilities properly. Likewise, the duration model result shows that the judicial 
system has a significant and negative impact on the ISD. This is similar to Weder’s 
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(1998) study. Therefore, the null hypothesis, “The judicial system has a negative 
effect on the investment status delay of private investors in the manufacturing sector” 
is not rejected. 
 
The descriptive analysis shows that about 82% of the respondents that delayed were 
subjected to delay due to bureaucratic red tape in securing public services. 
Generally it is understood that securing public services takes a long time because of 
the bureaucratic red tape required by private investors in the state. The bank loan 
process and utility service procedures are especially involved and these are the 
worst problems for the ISD. This implies that the existence of bureaucratic red tape 
hinders the progress of private investment. Most of the private investors found in the 
non-started group were delayed by bureaucratic red tape, more so than the started 
group. The chi-square statistic test value also showed that there is a significant 
difference between the two status groups at 1% level. Private investors in the FGDs 
also described that they struggled to get investment permits and licenses because of 
the bureaucratic red tape. This shows that the public services delay has a negative 
influence on the investment status progress of the private investors. This finding is 
consistent with Seruvatu and Jayaraman (2001) and Baye et al. (2005) and shows 
that bureaucratic red tape affects private investment negatively. But, the duration 
model result in this study indicates that bureaucratic red tape has no impact on the 
ISD and this is because of the 95% of confidence level in the statistics. This shows 
that these two variables may have a relationship at less than the 95% of confidence 
level. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, more than half of the respondents that delayed 
their investment status said that the private investors’ perception of corruption in 
their state negatively affects the progress of the investment status groups. That is, 
the level of corruption in connection to public services (like a bank loans, investment 
permits and license, municipal works and infrastructure facilities) impacts the ISD. 
Overall, when found in the non-started group most private investors would delay, but 
when found in the started group most private investors would not delay because of 
the impact of corruption. The survey result shows that corruption is statistically 
significant at a 1% level. The chi-square statistic value indicates that there is a 
significant difference between the two status groups. That is, the impact of corruption 
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varies within the status groups. Therefore, according to the descriptive analysis, 
corruption has a negative impact on the investment status progress of the private 
investors in the manufacturing sector. This finding is consistent with the study by 
Everhart and Sumlinski (2002) which evidenced that if a corrupt country raises the 
level of public investment, the productivity of the new public investment put in place 
is low, and private investment falls. The studies by Bakare (2011), Asiedu and 
Freeman (2009) and Basar and Zyck (2012) show that corruption hampers domestic 
investment and this is consistent with the above findings. 
 
The Corruption Perception Index ranks countries according to the perception of 
corruption in the public sector on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). 
In Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perception Index, Ethiopia ranked 
103 out of 177 rated countries and according to Doing Business in Ethiopia, 
Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies (2015),  Ethiopia ranks 132th out of 189 rated 
countries in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Report. Contradictorily, the 
UN Investment Guide to Ethiopia (2004) asserts that routine bureaucratic corruption 
is virtually non-existent in Ethiopia. The guide adds that bureaucratic delays certainly 
exist but are not devices by which officials seek bribes. The econometric result of 
this study shows that corruption had an insignificant impact on the progress of the 
investment status at 95% of confidence level. This result was consistent with the 
study made in Afghanistan on the impact of corruption on investment and found that 
corruption was not a severe problem across Afghanistan (Basar & Zyck, 2012). 
 
Concerning the impact of investment incentives, about 89% of the total whose 
investments were delayed were of the opinion that investment incentives provided by 
the government encouraged investment status promotion. The major investment 
incentives that promote private investors are a low lease price of land and free 
custom duty. Only 11% of the respondents that delayed were affected by the 
investment incentives. A similar proportion of private investors delayed because of 
investment incentives were found in both types of the status group. The chi-square 
test result shows that the feelings of sample respondents of the two status groups to 
this question were the same. This implies that investment incentives encourage 
more investors to proceed with their status. The study by Baye et al. (2005) showed 
that investment incentives to investors encourages private investment and this is 
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consistent with this study. This result is inconsistent with The IMF (Chua, 1995) 
which concluded that tax incentives do not stimulate investment significantly. This 
study added that firm surveys routinely show incentives provided by governments 
are not particularly important in determining the decision to invest. The duration 
model result of all respondents also showed that investment incentives have an 
insignificant impact on the ISD. 
 
According to the descriptive analysis, about 84% of the total delayed private 
investors replied that political instability risks did not affect their investment status 
in the State of Tigray. This is consistent with the findings of World Bank’s Doing 
Business in Ethiopia 2012 which stated that Ethiopia has been relatively stable and 
secure for investors. In addition to this, the study by Naa-Idar et al. (2012) concluded 
that the influence of political stability on private investment recorded a positive sign 
in the short run and that the long run periods are significant. The remaining 16% of 
the total delayed private investors found political instability to be a problem for ISD. 
Though the delay rate was small in both groups, private investors found in the non-
started group were highly affected by the political instability risk when compared with 
the started group. The chi-square test result also shows that there was a significant 
difference between the two status groups at 5% level. Besides, the duration model 
result of this study also disclosed that political instability risks have an insignificant 
impact on the ISD. The study by Busari and Amaghionyeodiwe (2007) which 
indicated that political instability does not have any significant direct impact on 
private investment is consistent with the findings of this study. 
 
According to the interview with investors, the major political risks are border conflict 
and the unnecessary interference of public offices. This is consistent with the 
findings of Mamo (2008) which concludes that during the period of the Ethio-Eritrea 
conflict, the number of investors registered to invest in Ethiopia decreased 
substantially. Moreover, the border conflict significantly impeded investment flows to 
regions neighboring Eritrea like the State of Tigray. After the border conflict war was 
resolved, investment began to increase significantly. 
 
The descriptive result reveals that about 97% of the respondents that delayed were 
not negatively affected by their investment location. Only 3% of these investors 
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were delayed and this was due to long distances of travel for raw materials. To 
summarise, even though there is little difference between the statuses groups, most 
of the private investors in both types of the status groups that they would not delay 
because of location problems. The chi-square statistic result indicates that there was 
a significant difference between the two status groups at 1% significance level. The 
duration model result also shows that investment location is significantly positive to 
private investment at 1% level of significance. This is similar to the study made by 
Abuka et al. (2006). As a result, the research null hypothesis which states, “The 
investment location of private investors relates positively to investment status delay 
in the manufacturing sector” is not rejected. 
 
7.1.3. Discussion of the determinants of the started group investors 
 
Started group of investors includes the implementation and operation status of 
private investment. The number of investors in the implementation status are 72 
(28% of the total respondents) and in the operation status are 62 (24% of the total). 
About 93% of the private investors from this group are males and around 91% of are 
older than 30 years of age. 
  
Out of the respondents found in the started group, 80% of the total that delayed had 
only a primary and secondary school educational level. The remaining 20% of the 
group that delayed had at least a diploma. In other words, there are more private 
investors with a low level of educational in the started but delayed group. The 
duration model result confirms that the level of education has an insignificant impact 
on ISD. 
 
From the private investors found in the started group, 55% of the total that delayed 
were found in the food, other non-metallic mineral products and basic metals 
industries. A similar number of respondents in these investment areas fall into the 
started and non-started groups. The highest ratio (19%) of private investors found in 
started group was invested in the food industry; the rest were invested in other 16 
types of manufacturing industries (see Appendix B). In addition, by setting the food 
industry as a reference category, the duration model result shows industries like 
beverage, leather and leather products, wood, and vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
 145 
take a longer time to begin operation in the started group. From this is can be 
concluded that the null hypothesis (Ho0) be rejected and the alternative hypothesis 
“All private investment areas of the manufacturing sectors are, more likely, not 
equally subject to investment status delay” is accepted. 
 
Out of the private investors found in the started group who requested bank loans, 
about 66% of the total that delayed their status were negatively affected because of 
a lack of access to credit. In other words, private investors found in the started 
group would delay because of credit access problems less than those in the non-
started. However, the econometric result indicates that access to credit has an 
insignificant impact on the delay of the started group at 95% of confidence level. But, 
in the started group, about 78% of the total respondents that delayed were not 
affected by the level of the interest rate set by financial institutions. To summarise, 
most private investors found in this group would not delay any more than the non-
started group because of the interest rate. In the same way, the econometric result 
confirms that interest rate has insignificant influence on the started group ISD. 
 
Out of the total private investors in the started group that delayed, 84% of the 
respondents were not affected by infrastructure facilities. Also, the delay rate of 
this group is less than that of the non-started group. However, the econometric result 
confirms infrastructure facilities have a significant and negative influence on the 
progress of the started group of investment status at 1% significant level. Thus the 
null hypothesis (Ho1) is not rejected. About 71% of the respondents in the started 
group were not affected by land access for their investment activities. To 
summarise, most of the private investors found in this group did not delay due to a 
problem with access to land. The duration model result also showed that access to 
land had no significant impact on the ISD. 
 
In this group, nearly half of the total number that delayed were affected by the 
judicial system of the state and were thus unable to proceed to the next status. 
Overall, most of the private investors found in this group were equally delayed. The 
econometric result confirms that the judicial system had an insignificant impact on 
the started group of ISD at 95% of confidence level. Additionally, 77% of the 
respondents that delayed in the started group were affected by bureaucratic red 
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tape and had problems securing public services. This impeded the investment 
progress in the manufacturing sector. The delay measured in the private investors 
that made up the started group was less than the delay of the non-stared group. As 
per the econometric result, there was an insignificant influence on the status 
progress of the started group of investors at 95% of confidence level. 
 
The perception of nearly half of the total respondents in the started group felt that  
the level of corruption was a contributing fact to the delays of their projects. The 
started group of investors did not delay more than the non-started group. The 
duration model result confirms that corruption has an insignificant impact on the ISD 
of the started group of private investors. 
 
In this status group, about 88% of the total respondents that delayed reported that 
their firms did not limit their investment progress due to a lack of benefits rendered 
by the government investment incentives. To summarise, most of the private 
investors found in the started group did not delay due to the problem of investment 
incentives. However, the duration model showed that investment incentives 
negatively influenced the investment progress of this group at a 10% level of 
significance. The coefficient of investment incentives was negatively and significantly 
related to the dependent variable, thus the null hypothesis (Ho0) is rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis “Investment incentives to private investors negatively 
influence investment status delay in the manufacturing sector” is accepted. This 
implies that the existence of incentive problems discourage investment progress in 
this group. At this stage the construction and installation of machines and equipment 
is important and the incentives process of government officials, especially in the form 
of duty-free custom, is not as speedy as that required by the private investor. 
 
92% of the total delayed respondents said that there was no risk related to political 
instability in the state and that this did not create a delay for started group of 
investment. But, the remaining private investors replied that there were political 
instability risks because of border conflict and the unnecessary interference of public 
offices in the state which hindered operations. In general, most of the private 
investors found in the started group would not delay because of the problem of risk 
of political instability. This proves also that the started group delayed less when 
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compared with the non-started group in this regard. In addition, the duration model 
shows that political instability risks have no significant influence over the progress of 
the started group of private investors. 
 
Finally, around 95% of the started group that were delayed did not feel that their 
investment status progress was affected by investment location in the state. But 
the remaining respondents reported that long distances from raw materials was a 
hindrance that could be related to their investment location. On average, the 
proportion of delayed investors in the started group is larger than the proportion of 
delayed investors in the non-started group. The duration model confirmed that the 
investment location has a significant and positive impact on the ISD at 1% level of 
significance, thus the null hypothesis (Ho0) is not rejected. 
 
7.1.4. Discussion of the determinants of non-started group investors 
 
The total number of respondents in this group is 125 (48%) and it includes those in 
the pre-implementation status. Of these investors, about 94% are males and 93% 
are above 30 years of age.  
 
The description analysis result shows that out of the respondents found in the non-
started group (pre-implementation status), 80% of the total that delayed were found 
to be in the primary and secondary schools of educational level. The delay rate of 
the non-started group with a secondary school education is greater than that of the 
started group. In addition, the duration model showed that the level of education has 
an insignificant impact on the progress of investment status. This indicates that 
educational levels have no impact on the progress of investment status of private 
investors found in the pre-implementation status. 
 
Most of the respondents in the pre-implementation status invested in the food, other 
non-metallic mineral products, and basic metals industries were more delayed than 
the other industries. According to the econometric result and taking the food industry 
as a reference category, the investment types like wood products, printing, basic 
pharmaceutical products and preparations, and electrical products took more time to 
proceed from to the started group of investment status. Thus, the null hypothesis of 
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this study is rejected and the alternative hypothesis “All private investment areas of 
the manufacturing sectors are, more likely, not equally subject to investment status 
delay” is accepted. This shows a high ISD rate in the investment areas having fewer 
investors than those with a large proportion of private investors. 
 
The source of finance for the non-started group was their own contributions; the next 
important source was a bank loan and two-thirds of them had requested one from 
the financial institutions. However, 80% of these applicants and 100% of those that 
delayed were affected by a lack of access to bank credit. This implies that the 
unavailability of access to credit had a negative influence on the ISD, i.e. it boosted 
the ISD. Private investors in the manufacturing sector were more delayed in the non-
started than the started group. However, the econometric result shows that access to 
credit has a insignificant effect on the delay of this group of investors at a 95% of 
confidence level. 
 
Around three-fourths of the total delayed respondents who had requested loans 
reported that the interest rate paid to financial institutions did not influence private 
investors. Around one-fourth felt that their progress was affected by the bank’s 
interest rate. The econometric result shows that the interest rate has a positive and 
significant impact on the investment status progress at a 1% level of significance. 
Thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is not accepted but the alternative hypothesis “The 
interest rate of bank loans has a positive impact on the investment status delay of 
private investors in the manufacturing sector” is accepted. 
 
On average, 82% of the total that delayed in the pre-implementation status were not 
affected by a lack of access to infrastructure facilities. Whereas, only 18% were 
influenced by this lack and this was particularly due to problems with electric power 
and municipal facilities. This indicates that most of the private investors were not 
affected by problems with infrastructure facilities. On the other hand, the duration 
model result reported that infrastructure facilities was negative and significant at a 
1% level of significance related to the ISD, thus the null hypothesis (Ho0) is not 
rejected. This implies that difficulties in access to infrastructure facilities highly 
boosts the delay rate of private investors in the non-started group. 
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In this group, the status of 64% of the total delayed respondents was not influenced 
by problems with access to land. To summarise, most of the private investors found 
in this group did not delay due to such problems. The econometric result also 
reported that access to land has an insignificant influence on the ISD. This implies 
that access to land was not a factor for the ISD of this group of private investors. 
 
About 62% of the total respondents that delayed in this group were affected by the 
inefficiency of the judicial system. However, the econometric result showed that the 
judicial system has an insignificant impact on the ISD at a 95% confidence level. 
 
Out of the respondents of the non-started group, about 85% of the total that delayed 
were subjected to problems in getting public services because of bureaucratic red 
tape. According to this group responses, there was a delay in getting a bank loan 
and utility services like water, electric power and telephone services, and this delay 
could be directly attributed to bureaucratic red tape. In general, most of the private 
investors found in the non-started group would delay more because of this variable 
than those in the started group. The duration model result shows that bureaucratic 
red tape has an insignificant influence on the ISD at a 95% confidence level. 
 
About 60% of the total that delayed in this group replied that the level of corruption 
in getting public services had an impact on their ISD. That is, when private investors 
were found in the non-started group, they would delay more because of corruption. 
Overall, the proportion of non-started group delayed was larger than that in the 
started group. The chi-square statistic result also indicated that there is a difference 
between the two status groups with regard to corruption, and this was found to be 
statistically significant. However, the econometric result concluded that this variable 
is insignificant for the non-started group at a 95% confidence level. 
 
Private investors in general benefited from the investment incentives provided by 
the government. Consequently, about 90% of the non-started group were not 
delayed because of investment incentives. To summarise, most of the private 
investors found in this group would not delay due to the problems with investment 
incentives. The econometric result showed also that it had an insignificant impact at 
a 95% confidence level.  
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Around 80% of the non-started group were not influenced by risks associated with 
political instability in the state. To summarise, most of the private investors found 
in this group did not delay, however, this proportion is greater than the proportion in 
the started group. The econometric result also confirmed that the risk of political 
instability has an insignificant influence on the delay of the progress of investment 
status. 
 
Finally, the progress of about 98% of the private investors in the non-started group 
was not constrained due to problems with investment location. Generally, most of 
the private investors found in this group would not delay more than the started group. 
The duration model also showed that investment location has a significant and 
positive impact on this group’s status progress, thus the null hypothesis (Ho1) is not 
rejected. 
 
Table 7.1 below presents a summary of the results of the hypotheses tests, and their 
associated decisions from the econometric model results of the study. Accordingly, 
the null hypotheses of the independent variables for all private investors was 
rejected for these variables: investment areas, access to credit, interest rates, 
access to infrastructure facilities, the judicial system, bureaucratic red tape, 
corruption and investment location. The remaining independent variables were 
insignificant for the decision. In the case of the started and non-started groups, the 
results of the variables did however start to differ. 
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Table 7.1: Hypotheses tests and decisions 
Independent 
Variables Null Hypotheses (Ho0) 
Entire 
private 
investors 
Started 
group 
Non-
started 
group 
Educational 
level   
The more the private investor is educated, 
the less is the probability of investment 
status delay. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment 
areas  
All private investment areas of the 
manufacturing sectors are, more likely, 
equally subject to investment status delay. 
Rejected Rejected Rejected 
Access to 
bank loan 
There will be no negative influence of 
access to a bank loan on the investment 
status delay of private investors in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Interest rate 
The interest rate on bank loans has a 
negative impact on the investment status 
delay of private investors in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Rejected Insignificant Rejected 
Access to 
infrastructure 
facilities 
Access to infrastructure facilities negatively 
affects the investment status delay of 
private investors in the manufacturing 
sector. 
Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  
Access to 
land 
Access to land will negatively affect the 
investment status delay of private investors 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Judicial 
system 
Judicial system affects negatively the 
investment status delay of private investor 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Accepted Insignificant Insignificant 
Bureaucratic 
red tape 
Public services delays due to bureaucratic 
red tape has a negative impact on the 
investment status delay of private investors 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Corruption 
Investment status delay is negatively 
affected by the level of private investors’ 
perception of corruption in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment 
incentives 
Investment incentives for private investors 
positively influences investment status 
delays in the manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Rejected  Insignificant 
Political 
instability 
risks 
There will be no negative impact from 
political instability risks on the investment 
status delay of private investors in the 
manufacturing sector. 
Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Investment 
location 
The investment location of private investors 
relates positively to investment status delay 
in the manufacturing sector 
Accepted  Accepted  Accepted  
(Source: Self compiled from Survey Questionnaire, 2014) 
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7.1.5. Discussion of the constraints of private investors 
 
A survey study of the private investors in the production phase was analysed 
according to operational constraints and considering the economic and financial, 
technological, infrastructural, political, regulatory, social, environmental, marketing 
and location factors of private investment in manufacturing sector found in the State 
of Tigray. 
 
Accordingly, the factor analysis result shows that the following categories have the 
highest mean value: macroeconomic uncertainty (i.e. exchange rate, inflation, etc.), 
problems with raw materials, tax rate and administration issues, and electric power 
shortages. The component matrix results also report that infrastructural, 
technological, and economic and financial factors are the highest absolute values of 
the loading factor. This finding is similar to the study by Abuka et.al. (2006) which 
concluded that water supply constrains the operation and growth of firms. This result 
is consistent with Workie (1996) who concluded that electric power is the leading 
constraint for the operations of private investment. 
 
7.2. Conclusions on private investment status 
 
This study has investigated the factors influencing or determining private investment 
delays in each investment status, and the operational constraints of private investors 
in the manufacturing sector in the State of Tigray. The study was conducted based 
on the data collected from a sample private investors in the manufacturing sector 
operating in the State of Tigray. Thereafter, both descriptive and econometric 
analyses were used for analytical purposes. 
 
For the descriptive analysis, SPSS software was used to analyse the influence of 
independent variables on the private ISD by calculating the frequency and 
percentage of the investors’ status groups and chi-square test results. In addition, 
factor analysis was used to analyse the constraining factors for operations of private 
investors in the manufacturing sector. Econometric software called Stata was 
employed to estimate the duration model and identify factors influencing the delay of 
 153 
the investment status. The duration model was chosen because, unlike other 
models, it can reveal the probability of ISD. 
 
7.2.1. Conclusions applicable to all private investment statuses 
 
1. Although the level of education of private investors had a varied influence for the 
ISD, level of education has a statistically insignificant impact on the progress of 
investment status in the manufacturing sector. To conclude, the level of 
education insignificantly influences the private investors in the manufacturing 
sector. That is, the variable of the level of education has no effect on private 
investment delay in the State of Tigray. That means that a low or high level of 
education will not affect the progress of private investment status. This 
conclusion is valid irrespective of whether the private investors are found in the 
started or non-started status groups. 
 
2. As per the econometric result, manufacturing industries with fewer investors were 
delayed more than industries with a higher number of investors. To conclude, the 
type of investment area of private investors significantly influences the private 
investors’ ISD. This variable therefore has a negative and significant effect on 
private ISD. It means that, if an investment area has a decreased investor 
involvement, the ISD will increase and vice versa. This shows that investors 
select investment areas that have fewer complications associated with progress. 
This conclusion applies to private investors found in both the started and non-
started status groups. 
 
3. Concerning the source of finance, most private investors used their own money 
to finance their investment; the second biggest source was a bank loan. All 
respondents stated that the source of finance from shared contributions and 
informal sources was an insignificant factor in their investment. As per the 
descriptive analysis, most of the private investors whose progress was delayed, 
were influenced by access to credit. This means that access to credit 
contributes to the ISD of private investors in this study sector. This is because all 
the investors expect to get a bank loan for the purchase of construction materials 
and machinery from outside. However, as per the econometric statistical 
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analysis, the variable of access to credit has no effect on the ISD. This means 
that the decrease in access to credit by financial institutions did not create ISD. 
 
4. Most of the respondents reported that the interest rates of bank loans were not a 
cause for the delay of their progress in investment status, especially when 
compared to the benefits of the loan. Access to credit was considered the most 
important factor for the progress of private investment and the interest rate paid 
to the lender was less important. 
 
5. The variable of access to infrastructure facilities affects the private investment 
status significantly, but it has a negative relationship. This means that most of the 
delayed private investors were influenced in their progress of investment status 
by a lack of efficient access to infrastructure facilities. Therefore, access to 
infrastructure facilities significantly and negatively influences private investors’ 
ISD. 
 
6. Based on the analyses results, most of the private investors had no problems 
with access to land for their investments. Considering the total number of 
respondents it was clear that land access had no impact on their investment 
status. Therefore, the variable of access to land has a positive impact on the 
progress of private investment status in the State of Tigray. This conclusion 
applies to private investors found in both the started and non-started status 
groups. 
 
7. Most of the private investors who delayed were constrained in their investment 
status progress due to inefficiencies in the judicial system in the state. The 
variable of the judicial system has a significant and negative impact on the 
investment status progress. This means that the inefficiency of the judicial system 
results in the ISD of private investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
8. The investment of private investors was delayed because of problems in getting 
public services due to bureaucratic red tape. To conclude, the variable of 
bureaucratic red tape has a negative influence on private ISD, but the 
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econometric result shows this factor to be insignificant. This conclusion is 
applicable to both two status groups. 
 
9. On average, the perception of private investors on the level of corruption 
experienced when trying to secure public services in the state, is that it delays 
their investment status. The study concludes that corruption influences private 
investors and affects their status group significantly. 
 
10. Investment incentives did not impact the progress of most of the private 
investors, even those who are delayed. The study concludes that, irrespective of 
the status group, the investment incentives in the manufacturing sector did not 
significantly influence their progress. 
 
11. Most of the private investors were not delayed because of the risk of political 
instability in the state. This conclusion applies to private investors found in both 
the started and non-started status groups. 
 
12. Problem associated with investment location do not delay the investment 
activities of private investors. The investment location was shown to have a 
significant and positive impact on the progress of the investment status. Finally, 
the study concludes that the type of status group found ,significantly influences 
the progress of private investors. This conclusion is the same for both two status 
groups. 
 
The following conclusions are applicable to the started and non-started groups of 
investment status. In this section, the variables that have a similar effect as that 
discussed above (and applicable to all investors) are not included. Only variables 
that have a significant but different effect than the above conclusions are included. 
 
7.2.2. Conclusions applicable to the started group of private investment status 
 
1. Most of the private investors in this group used their own contributions to cover 
their investment costs. When this was not sufficient, they would apply for a bank 
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loan. More than half of this group had difficulties with bank credit access. About 
half of these investors were delayed from beginning operations because of this. 
To conclude, access to credit caused the started group to delay less than it did 
the non-started group. 
 
2. The variable of access to infrastructure facilities has a significant and negative 
effect on the private ISD. This means that access to infrastructure facilities 
negatively influences the investment progress of this status group and increases 
the probability of the started group being delayed in their progress. 
 
3. The perception of private investors in the started group regarding the influence of 
corruption differed from that of the non-started group; they felt it was less 
significant. Therefore, the study concludes that corruption did not influence the 
private investors found in the started group, and that it did not impact on their 
investment progress. 
 
4. The variable of investment incentives has a negative effect on the private 
investment status. That means that private investors found in the started group 
did not benefit from the investment incentives given by the government. 
Therefore, the study concludes that investment incentives negatively affected the 
progress of the started group of investors in the manufacturing sector. 
 
5. Finally, the interest rate and judicial system have an insignificant effect on the 
private ISD as per the analyses of the study. 
 
7.2.3. Conclusions applicable to the non-started group of private investment 
status 
 
1. Concerning the source of finance, all the investors in the pre-implementation 
status made use of their own contributions, followed by a bank loan, to finance 
their venture. Though most of them had requested a bank loan, only a few were 
given credit access and their ISD was also high. Therefore, the study concludes 
that access to credit delayed private investors found in the non-started group of 
investors in the manufacturing sector. 
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2. In the case of private investors in the pre-implementation status, the interest rate 
does not affect their investment status. Rather, the interest rate has a significant 
positive impact and boosted private investors to proceed to the next status of 
investment within the standard period. 
 
3. Most of the respondents in this group delayed more when compared to the 
started group because of problems with infrastructure facilities. The study 
concludes that infrastructure facilities significantly influences private investors to 
delay in the non-started group. 
 
4. A few more of the private investors found in this group delayed their progress of 
investment status because of the inefficient judicial system when compared to 
the started group. Overall, the judicial system influenced the non-started group of 
private investors to delay their progress to proceed to the next status. 
 
5. Concerning the level of corruption to get different public services, private 
investors in this status were significantly delayed. Therefore, the type of status 
found significant influences on private investors due to corruption. 
 
6. Investment incentives given by the government benefited most of the private 
investors in the pre-implementation status and helped to promote their 
investment. To conclude, private investors did not delay due to investment 
incentives in the manufacturing sector. 
 
7.2.4. Conclusions of the constraints in the production phase 
 
Out of the 20 constraint factors included in the factor analysis, the following have the 
highest mean value: macroeconomic uncertainty (i.e. exchange rate, inflation, etc.), 
problem with raw materials, tax rate and administration issues and electric power 
shortages. In addition, the highest absolute value of the loading factor is 
infrastructural, technological, and economic and financial factors. 
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7.2.5. Summary of discussions and conclusions 
 
The main aim of this paper was to identify the determinants of private investment in 
the manufacturing sector. This required the investigation of factors that influence the 
status of private investment within the context of the State of Tigray. Accordingly, the 
study has identified the main microeconomic determinants of all respondents, the 
started group and a non-started group of private investors using an econometric 
model analysis in the State of Tigray, Ethiopia. 
 
First, the result of all respondent investors shows that access to infrastructure 
facilities, the judicial system, and few investment areas have a significant and 
negative impact on the ISD. The result also shows that variables like interest rate 
and investment locations have statistically significant positive influences on the 
investment status progress. Nevertheless, the remaining variables of the study were 
not statistically significant based on the methodology adopted. 
 
Second, the econometric model revealed interesting results in the started group of 
investment status with regard to access to infrastructure facilities, investment 
incentives, and few investment areas. These are significant, negative determinants 
of private investors. Also, investment location is a significant but positive determinant 
for the progress of investment status. The remaining variables were shown to be 
insignificant for this specific status group. 
 
Third, analysis of the determinants of private investment in the non-started group 
concluded that the factors that have a significant and negative impact on the ISD 
were access to infrastructure facilities and few investment areas. Factors identified 
as having a positive but significant influence were interest rate and investment 
locations. The remaining variables are insignificant for the non-started group of 
private investors. 
 
In addition to the above conclusions, the descriptive statistical analysis shows that 
access to credit, bureaucratic red tape and corruption discourages the progress of 
private investors found in all statuses of private investment. 
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In the following, final section, recommendations are put forward to investors and 
concerned bodies of the government for further inputs in the development and 
encouragement of private investment. This is followed by further research ideas and 
a summary of the contribution of the study. 
 
7.3. Recommendations 
 
On the basis of the results of this study, the following recommendations are put 
forward to be considered in future intervention strategies. They are aimed at the 
promotion of private investment status in the study area. 
 
1. It was found that not all private investors in all statuses were equally prompted; 
important aspects like their licensing, the construction of buildings and installation 
of machinery did not receive equal attention and this affected their progression to 
the production phase. This delay occurred more in the investment areas where 
private investors invested less and needed more finance. To tackle this problem: 
 
a. Private investors in the pre-implementation status should critically study 
the opportunities and challenges of the investment areas they have 
chosen prior to getting an investment permit, with a particular focus on 
efficient manpower in all phases. The private investors should develop a 
thorough business plan and consult with professionals and experienced 
experts in the selected investment areas before starting with their 
investment activities. 
 
b. Private investors in the started group should first identify sources of 
finance for the required building construction and installation of machinery. 
Clear and open discussions with the banks must take place to establish 
the investment areas allocated for loan access set by government policy. 
  
c. In addition, the investment agency office of the state should carefully 
assess the feasibility of all possible types of investments first and only then 
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select and grant investment permits for a specific investment area. Areas 
of investment for potential investors should also be clearly specified. If the 
first choice of private investors is not successful, they should get quick 
feedback so that they can amend their proposal or change their 
investment type. 
 
2. The availability of domestic credit is believed to promote private investment 
statuses. However, the study confirmed that there is very little credit available to 
all statuses of investments, but especially to those in the early production phase 
in the State of Tigray. It is recommended therefore that: 
 
a. Access to credit for private investors should be made more accessible by 
banks and should be timeous and through the establishment of fair 
collateral requiring credit schemes, efficient bank paperwork, and the 
supply of a sufficient amount of credit. 
 
b. If the private sector is to play a major role in economic growth and 
development, they must receive the greatest share of domestic credit 
allowed by financial institutions so as to enable them to render their 
services efficiently and avoid delays in their investment status. In addition, 
the government should increase its budget and efforts towards assisting 
the private sector through the issuing of credit which goes a long way to 
boosting private investment. 
 
c. Private investors should also prepare a sound financial application in line 
with financial institutions’ policies and procedures and the credit requested 
should only be the amount required and used for the intended purpose. 
 
3. The analyses revealed that the availability of infrastructure facilities was an 
important determining factor in delaying all private investment statuses. 
Therefore: 
 
a. There is still a need for the regional state and federal government to 
develop the infrastructural base of the economy and so boost the private 
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sector. Furthermore, inefficiencies and a shortage of materials and 
services like transformers, internet facilities, water supplies and the long 
distance of access to port services have been cited as the major obstacles 
which delay the investment status in the state. All this needs continuous 
improvements. Therefore, improving the availability and quality of utilities 
such as electricity, water, and telecommunications is important to 
minimising the delay of status of private sectors. 
 
b. The State of Tigray should consider better ways of coping with insufficient 
infrastructure facilities. For example, access to port and dry port services 
and the facilitating of the construction of train services will make a big 
difference. The State is far away from the coast and an efficient and 
effective transport system will greatly improve investment inputs and 
outputs. 
 
c. The substandard construction of public infrastructure affects private 
investment progress and the corrupt tender system aggravates this. In 
addition and because of corruption, the public services are not efficient 
and are exposed to a grave misuse of resources. In general, the 
government should rise to the challenge and invest some of its available 
resources in the provision of infrastructures which will ultimately decrease 
private investment delay. 
 
d. The State of Tigray should allocate development funds for infrastructure, 
especially roads, electricity and other public facilities that facilitate the 
progress of investment status and act as an incentive for private investors 
to invest and start operation as per the standard. 
 
4. The judicial system has been found to be a significant and negative factor for the 
ISD in the study area. Therefore: 
 
a. Individual judges should have the capacity to make decisions 
independently and honestly on the issues of court. The system should 
create an environment that enables the enforcement of rules and fast court 
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rulings. Court rulings and decisions should be based on legality and equity 
and efficient employees should be assigned to matters. In this way judicial 
system problems will be minimised. 
 
b. Private investors should get a fast decision for questions raised in relation 
to their investments and their cases should be assessed with equality. The 
application of the legal system should be transparent. In addition, 
regulations related to investment and tax related information are key 
elements that facilitates the progress of investment conditions. These 
should be consistent as they are essential for economic development. 
 
5. It was found that bureaucratic red tape is one of the major determinants of ISD in 
the study area. Thus, 
 
a. In order to encourage the investment status progress of private investors, 
the government should act to eliminate the time consumed by  
bureaucratic procedures in the public services. For example, problems 
securing investment permits can be minimised by assigning employees 
who have the required skills and experience to assess all applications. 
 
b. To simplify the application and approval process of public services, 
decisions should be quicker and more transparent. This refers to 
investment licensing, the bank loan process, and utility services. Policy 
makers and leaders (like investment and municipality officials) should 
observe and discuss what is done on the ground with the private investors. 
 
c. Furthermore, the commitment of private investors and government 
employees should be promoted in order to encourage investment at a 
regional level. 
 
6. Corruption was found to be a major determinant of private investment delays. 
Even though the government has taken measures to protect against corruption, it 
admits that corruption not only undermines investor confidence and increases the 
cost of doing business in Ethiopia, it also leads to an increase in the incidence of 
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poverty. As mentioned earlier, the cost of doing business may rise substantially if 
the investor is forced to pay bribes to speed up the passage through the system. 
 
a. The State of Tigray should, therefore, act more to revise the regulations on 
investment permits and licensing, land access and custom duty services, 
as it is these that are most exposed to corruption and where a lot of delay 
is created. Having an efficient and motivated workforce makes a big 
difference and this could reduce the incidence of corruption. 
 
b. The legal system should be strong enough to weaken corruption in the 
state. There should be strict follow up procedures in place so that the 
implementation of the existing laws protect against corruption. 
 
c. The government has to strive to prosecute those who have abused their 
power, failed to achieved what is required of them and misappropriated 
public funds irrespective of their posts. There is a strong and independent 
institution which is responsible for dealing with these problems. Admittedly, 
the fight against corruption is not an easy task and should not be left to 
government alone; it is rather expected that the government, citizens and 
other stakeholders should be able to address this most difficult challenge – 
fighting corruption by strengthening strategies. Therefore, it is the 
responsibility of every stakeholder to respond to the effort of creating a 
corrupt-free and transparent civil service where fair competition in the free 
market can thrive and where participatory good governance can ensure 
equity and social justice. 
 
d. In addition, the establishment of comprehensive, reliable and timely 
information on corruption in the business sectors is needed. Finally, the 
strengthening of institutions like the judiciary and legislature is required to 
minimise corruption. 
 
7. The analysis results indicated that investment incentives were found to 
significantly and negatively influence the ISD of the started group of investors. To 
solve this problem: 
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a. The government should clearly market existing investment incentives to 
the investors effectively and timeously. It should give also an incentives 
priority for those private investors who invest in the remote zones and the 
area perceived to be less secure. 
 
b. The government should diversify the types and areas of investment 
incentives. It would, for example, help if the period before the start of 
production were extended as this would help to motivate more investors to 
proceed with their investment activities within the required period. The 
government must also provide special incentives like prioritised loan 
payments and the fast facilitation of customs and duty-free benefits for 
private investment in specific industries. Places where improvement is 
needed is the industries of beverage production, leather and leather 
products, wood products, vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers products. 
 
c. Private investors allocate the investment incentive benefits (such as 
customs and duty-free) to the allowed investment areas. Government 
bodies should strictly follow up on the investment incentives, especially 
those pertaining to customs and duty-free benefits which are some times 
used for purposes other than that which is intended. 
 
8. Though the political instability risk in the state is low, ISD still exists in all 
statuses. The area near the border with Eritrea is a place where few private 
investors are willing to make a large investment. Then, 
 
a. The government should continue working at political solutions to keep the 
peace in the border areas and to achieve long-term investment benefits. 
 
b. In addition, the government should not interfere by making trade 
restrictions on the type of products to be manufactured and fixing the price 
of their output. 
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c. Private investors should also be able to set the price of their products 
according to the principles of a free market economy where a fair profit 
margin can be applied and which does not affect the purchasing power of 
customers. 
 
9. Investment and municipal officers should supervise the investment activities on 
the ground to identify the real problems of investors and to encourage them to 
perform well. The top management of the state should also observe and control 
the decisions made on investment at lower levels of administration. 
 
10. The development of awareness of investment laws within the circle of private 
investors should be a priority at universities, within the regional state and 
amongst investors. The achievement of these requirements will lay a concrete 
foundation for a productive and competitive private sector in the state. 
 
11. It is clear that taxes collected by the government are important for the 
development of the economy of a country as they enable the government to 
invest in things like the expansion of infrastructures. However, the government 
should work with the investors to improve their awareness of the procedures and 
implementation of taxation so as to ensure that they pay their tax with a full 
understanding of the procedures of tax collections. Finally, all private investors 
should also register for value added tax (VAT) if they fulfill the requirements for 
doing so as this is part of fair market competition. 
 
To summarise, the micro level analysis was made based on the specific data 
collected in a single state. In light of this, the findings of the micro level study could 
be used to improve the investment climate so as to promote private investment in the 
state. The state-level development policies and strategies can give the desired 
results only if supported by appropriate research for effective implementation. 
Therefore, the micro-level implementation of development plans and strategies need 
to take into account local socio-economic and institutional factors that are directly 
and indirectly related to private investment. These micro-level determinants of 
private investment will improve the investment climate at state (regional) level. The 
clear message that has emerged from this research is that having well-formulated 
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policies is not enough to induce investors to succeed. A host of microeconomic 
factors, coupled with a favorable socio-political environment, is essential for 
promoting private investment. 
 
7.4. Further research areas and the contribution of the study 
 
7.4.1. Further research areas 
 
Like all scientific research projects, this study has certain limitations. The following 
two points are significant and they lead to areas for possible future research 
 
1. The study aimed to investigate the determinants of PIMS in the State of Tigray by 
taking only a single investment sector in which serious delay rates are observed. 
Therefore, the results of this research and recommendations made based on the 
data collected cannot be generalised to other private investment sectors. 
 
2. As per the descriptive analysis, explanatory variables like access to credit, 
bureaucratic red tape and corruption were identified as having an impact on the 
ISD in the State of Tigray. As per the econometric analysis however, these 
variables had no effect on private ISD. This means that a difference has been 
identified because of the analysis method of independent variables. 
 
Therefore, further studies on these issues are recommended to fill the research gap. 
In the end, the results of this study need to be interpreted and assessed with these 
limitations in mind. 
 
7.4.2. Contribution of the study 
 
As this is an in-depth study into a specific state and investment sector, the research 
has made the following contributions to literature:  
 
1. The current study was made on the determinant factors of the three types of 
investment statuses. Until now, no research has been conducted into the three 
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types of investment status (pre-implementation, implementation and operations) 
in Ethiopia and other developing countries. This research identifies the major 
determinant factors of private ISD in the manufacturing sector in the State of 
Tigray, Ethiopia for the first time. Factors that hinder each investment status have 
been identified and these are a good indication of problems in other regional 
states in Ethiopia and other developing countries. 
 
2. In previous research studies, the focus was on all types of investment sectors 
(i.e. agriculture, services, manufacturing, constructions, etc.) and the overall 
determinants of private investment (like delay, performance, profitability, etc.) 
were identified. However, the main focus of the current study was the 
manufacturing sector and in particular on what caused delays in this area. This 
contributes to body of knowledge as it is specific and relates to a complex 
investment sector. 
 
3. Most of the research studies previously undertaken in Ethiopia and other 
developing countries on the determinants of private investment used variables at 
a macroeconomic level. The common ones have been the exchange rate, 
inflation, GDP, external debt, international trade, public investment, real interest 
rates, trade openness, etc. The variables studied in this research are totally 
different as an independent variable was selected and studied on a 
microeconomic level. Therefore, this study contributes new findings that are 
focused at firm level variables that affect each investment status type. This 
means that it contributes new findings specifically for the State of Tigray on the 
factors that determine and constrain the investment status progress and 
operation of private investment on a microeconomic level. 
 
4. The models used to analyse previous research are those that fit objectives like 
Ordinary Lease Square, error correction, Autoregressive Distributed Lag, an 
eclectic version of flexible accelerator, panel estimation, etc. In this study, the 
duration model was selected as it best fits the objectives of the research. 
Therefore, the research results using this model have their own unique 
contribution to make to the body of scientific knowledge. 
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5. This study can be used to support the literature study of future studies into the 
types of investment statuses in Ethiopia and other countries. 
 
6. Finally, the State of Tigray specifically, and FDRE in general, can use this 
research as material for the development of advanced polices and strategies on 
investment. 
 
 
To sum up, for the past two decades, private and foreign investments have been 
encouraged in Ethiopia, and development procedures put in place to support the 
different sectors. In order to solve problems facing investors, the government of 
Ethiopia has now established investment zones for the manufacturing sector in 
different states of the country including the State of Tigray. These are already under 
construction. Therefore, considering the above progress and the overall 
development of investment in the country, as well as the increase of private 
investment in the State of Tigray, this research has a clear contribution to make. If 
steps are taken to solve the problems identified by this study, a measurable 
difference will be evident in the State of Tigray and elsewhere. The problems have 
been identified at the level of each investment phase and not as pertains to the total 
investment. This helps to find ways to address the underlying causes of delays in 
entering production. This is a difficult problem in all countries where the development 
of investments is being encouraged. My study makes a contribution to specific, 
quantifiable knowledge in Ethiopia and has important policy implications for the State 
of Tigray. These can be extended beyond the regional boundaries within Ethiopia 
and even into other developing countries.
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A: CHI-SQUARE TEST 
 
Crosstabs 
 
[DataSet1] D:\SPSS DATA\Arranged Thesis data for factor analysis March, 
2014.sav 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Did they delay due to education level? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to investment areas? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to access to credit? 170 65.6% 89 34.4% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to interest rate? 163 62.9% 96 37.1% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to infrastructure facilities? 228 88.0% 31 12.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to land access? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Didn't they delay due to judicial system? 257 99.2% 2 0.8% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to bureaucratic red tape? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to corruption? 251 96.9% 8 3.1% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to investment incentives? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to risks of political instability? 259 100.0% 0 0.0% 259 100.0% 
Did they delay due to investment location? 257 99.2% 2 0.8% 259 100.0% 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to education level? What was their 
educational level? 
 
Cross tabulation 
What was their educational level? Did they delay due to 
education level? 
Total 
Yes No 
Up to high 
school 
 
Non-started 
group 
Count 32 68 100 
Expected Count 41.4 58.6 100.0 
% within Types of status group 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 39.0% 58.6% 50.5% 
% of Total 16.2% 34.3% 50.5% 
Std. Residual -1.5 1.2  
Started group 
Count 50 48 98 
Expected Count 40.6 57.4 98.0 
% within Types of status group 51.0% 49.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 61.0% 41.4% 49.5% 
% of Total 25.3% 24.2% 49.5% 
Std. Residual 1.5 -1.2  
Total 
Count 82 116 198 
Expected Count 82.0 116.0 198.0 
% within Types of status group 41.4% 58.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 41.4% 58.6% 100.0% 
Graduate 
 
Non-started 
group 
Count 3 22 25 
Expected Count 3.7 21.3 25.0 
% within Types of status group 12.0% 88.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 33.3% 42.3% 41.0% 
% of Total 4.9% 36.1% 41.0% 
Std. Residual -.4 .1  
Started group 
Count 6 30 36 
Expected Count 5.3 30.7 36.0 
% within Types of status group 16.7% 83.3% 100.0% 
% within Did they? 66.7% 57.7% 59.0% 
% of Total 9.8% 49.2% 59.0% 
Std. Residual .3 -.1  
Total 
Count 9 52 61 
Expected Count 9.0 52.0 61.0 
% within Types of status group 14.8% 85.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 201 
% of Total 14.8% 85.2% 100.0% 
Total 
 
Non-started 
group 
Count 35 90 125 
Expected Count 43.9 81.1 125.0 
% within Types of status group 28.0% 72.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 38.5% 53.6% 48.3% 
% of Total 13.5% 34.7% 48.3% 
Std. Residual -1.3 1.0  
Started group 
Count 56 78 134 
Expected Count 47.1 86.9 134.0 
% within Types of status group 41.8% 58.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 61.5% 46.4% 51.7% 
% of Total 21.6% 30.1% 51.7% 
Std. Residual 1.3 -1.0  
Total 
Count 91 168 259 
Expected Count 91.0 168.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 35.1% 64.9% 100.0% 
% within Did they? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 35.1% 64.9% 100.0% 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.397a 1 .020 .027 .014  
Continuity Correctionb 4.809 1 .028    
Likelihood Ratio 5.435 1 .020 .027 .014  
Fisher's Exact Test    .027 .014  
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.376c 1 .020 .027 .014 .007 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 43.92. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is -2.319. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to investment areas? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
investment areas? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 36 89 125 
Expected Count 33.3 91.7 125.0 
% within Types of status group 28.8% 71.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 52.2% 46.8% 48.3% 
% of Total 13.9% 34.4% 48.3% 
Std. Residual .5 -.3  
Started  
Count 33 101 134 
Expected Count 35.7 98.3 134.0 
% within Types of status group 24.6% 75.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 47.8% 53.2% 51.7% 
% of Total 12.7% 39.0% 51.7% 
Std. Residual -.5 .3  
Total 
Count 69 190 259 
Expected Count 69.0 190.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 26.6% 73.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 26.6% 73.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square .576a 1 .448 .484 .268  
Continuity Correctionb .383 1 .536    
Likelihood Ratio .576 1 .448 .484 .268  
Fisher's Exact Test    .484 .268  
Linear-by-Linear Association .574c 1 .449 .484 .268 .084 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 33.30. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is .758. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to access to credit? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
access to credit? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started 
Count 68 16 84 
Expected Count 55.8 28.2 84.0 
% within Types of status group 81.0% 19.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 60.2% 28.1% 49.4% 
% of Total 40.0% 9.4% 49.4% 
Std. Residual 1.6 -2.3  
Started 
Count 45 41 86 
Expected Count 57.2 28.8 86.0 
% within Types of status group 52.3% 47.7% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 39.8% 71.9% 50.6% 
% of Total 26.5% 24.1% 50.6% 
Std. Residual -1.6 2.3  
Total 
Count 113 57 170 
Expected Count 113.0 57.0 170.0 
% within Types of status group 66.5% 33.5% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 66.5% 33.5% 100.0% 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 15.625a 1 .000 .000 .000  
Continuity Correctionb 14.367 1 .000    
Likelihood Ratio 16.037 1 .000 .000 .000  
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000  
Linear-by-Linear Association 15.533c 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 170      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.16. 
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b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.941. 
 
Types of status group: Did they delay due to interest rate? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
interest rate? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 19 61 80 
Expected Count 21.6 58.4 80.0 
% within Types of status group 23.8% 76.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 43.2% 51.3% 49.1% 
% of Total 11.7% 37.4% 49.1% 
Std. Residual -.6 .3  
Started  
Count 25 58 83 
Expected Count 22.4 60.6 83.0 
% within Types of status group 30.1% 69.9% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 56.8% 48.7% 50.9% 
% of Total 15.3% 35.6% 50.9% 
Std. Residual .5 -.3  
Total 
Count 44 119 163 
Expected Count 44.0 119.0 163.0 
% within Types of status group 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.0% 73.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square .839a 1 .360 .383 .230  
Continuity Correctionb .547 1 .460    
Likelihood Ratio .841 1 .359 .383 .230  
Fisher's Exact Test    .383 .230  
Linear-by-Linear Association .834c 1 .361 .383 .230 .093 
N of Valid Cases 163      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 21.60. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is -.913. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to infrastructure facilities? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
infrastructure facilities? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 47 65 112 
Expected Count 30.9 81.1 112.0 
% within Types of status group 42.0% 58.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they? 74.6% 39.4% 49.1% 
% of Total 20.6% 28.5% 49.1% 
Std. Residual 2.9 -1.8  
Started  
Count 16 100 116 
Expected Count 32.1 83.9 116.0 
% within Types of status group 13.8% 86.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 25.4% 60.6% 50.9% 
% of Total 7.0% 43.9% 50.9% 
Std. Residual -2.8 1.8  
Total 
Count 63 165 228 
Expected Count 63.0 165.0 228.0 
% within Types of status group 27.6% 72.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 27.6% 72.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 22.615a 1 .000 .000 .000  
Continuity Correctionb 21.228 1 .000    
Likelihood Ratio 23.349 1 .000 .000 .000  
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000  
Linear-by-Linear Association 22.516c 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 228      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 30.95. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 4.745. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to land access? 
 
 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.734a 1 .188 .230 .118  
Continuity Correctionb 1.401 1 .237    
Likelihood Ratio 1.735 1 .188 .230 .118  
Fisher's Exact Test    .230 .118  
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.728c 1 .189 .230 .118 .045 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 40.06. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 1.314. 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
land access? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 45 80 125 
Expected Count 40.1 84.9 125.0 
% within Types of status group 36.0% 64.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 54.2% 45.5% 48.3% 
% of Total 17.4% 30.9% 48.3% 
Std. Residual .8 -.5  
Started 
Count 38 96 134 
Expected Count 42.9 91.1 134.0 
% within Types of status group 28.4% 71.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 45.8% 54.5% 51.7% 
% of Total 14.7% 37.1% 51.7% 
Std. Residual -.8 .5  
Total 
Count 83 176 259 
Expected Count 83.0 176.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 32.0% 68.0% 100.0% 
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Types of status group: Didn't they delay due to judicial system? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
judicial system? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 77 47 124 
Expected Count 71.4 52.6 124.0 
% within Types of status group 62.1% 37.9% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 52.0% 43.1% 48.2% 
% of Total 30.0% 18.3% 48.2% 
Std. Residual .7 -.8  
Started 
Count 71 62 133 
Expected Count 76.6 56.4 133.0 
% within Types of status group 53.4% 46.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 48.0% 56.9% 51.8% 
% of Total 27.6% 24.1% 51.8% 
Std. Residual -.6 .7  
Total 
Count 148 109 257 
Expected Count 148.0 109.0 257.0 
% within Types of status group 57.6% 42.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 57.6% 42.4% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 1.995a 1 .158 .167 .099  
Continuity Correctionb 1.654 1 .198    
Likelihood Ratio 1.999 1 .157 .167 .099  
Fisher's Exact Test    .167 .099  
Linear-by-Linear Association 1.987c 1 .159 .167 .099 .037 
N of Valid Cases 257      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 52.59. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is -1.410. 
 
 208 
 
Types of status group: Did they delay due to bureaucratic red tape? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
bureaucratic red tape? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 107 18 125 
Expected Count 96.5 28.5 125.0 
% within Types of status group 85.6% 14.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 53.5% 30.5% 48.3% 
% of Total 41.3% 6.9% 48.3% 
Std. Residual 1.1 -2.0  
Started  
Count 93 41 134 
Expected Count 103.5 30.5 134.0 
% within Types of status group 69.4% 30.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 46.5% 69.5% 51.7% 
% of Total 35.9% 15.8% 51.7% 
Std. Residual -1.0 1.9  
Total 
Count 200 59 259 
Expected Count 200.0 59.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 77.2% 22.8% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 77.2% 22.8% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 9.645a 1 .002 .003 .001  
Continuity Correctionb 8.746 1 .003    
Likelihood Ratio 9.876 1 .002 .002 .001  
Fisher's Exact Test    .003 .001  
Linear-by-Linear Association 9.608c 1 .002 .003 .001 .001 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 28.47. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.100. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to corruption? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due 
to corruption? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started 
Count 75 49 124 
Expected Count 61.8 62.2 124.0 
% within Types of status group 60.5% 39.5% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 60.0% 38.9% 49.4% 
% of Total 29.9% 19.5% 49.4% 
Std. Residual 1.7 -1.7  
Started  
Count 50 77 127 
Expected Count 63.2 63.8 127.0 
% within Types of status group 39.4% 60.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 40.0% 61.1% 50.6% 
% of Total 19.9% 30.7% 50.6% 
Std. Residual -1.7 1.7  
Total 
Count 125 126 251 
Expected Count 125.0 126.0 251.0 
% within Types of status group 49.8% 50.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 49.8% 50.2% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 11.188a 1 .001 .001 .001  
Continuity Correctionb 10.359 1 .001    
Likelihood Ratio 11.272 1 .001 .001 .001  
Fisher's Exact Test    .001 .001  
Linear-by-Linear Association 11.143c 1 .001 .001 .001 .000 
N of Valid Cases 251      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 61.75. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 3.338. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to investment incentives? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
investment incentives? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 13 112 125 
Expected Count 13.5 111.5 125.0 
% within Types of status group 10.4% 89.6% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 46.4% 48.5% 48.3% 
% of Total 5.0% 43.2% 48.3% 
Std. Residual -.1 .0  
 
Count 15 119 134 
Expected Count 14.5 119.5 134.0 
% within Types of status group 11.2% 88.8% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 53.6% 51.5% 51.7% 
% of Total 5.8% 45.9% 51.7% 
Std. Residual .1 .0  
Total 
Count 28 231 259 
Expected Count 28.0 231.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 10.8% 89.2% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 10.8% 89.2% 100.0% 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square .042a 1 .837 .845 .499  
Continuity Correctionb .000 1 .996    
Likelihood Ratio .042 1 .837 .845 .499  
Fisher's Exact Test    1.000 .499  
Linear-by-Linear Association .042c 1 .837 .845 .499 .155 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 13.51. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is -.205. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to risks of political instability? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to risks 
of political instability? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started  
Count 24 101 125 
Expected Count 17.4 107.6 125.0 
% within Types of status group 19.2% 80.8% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 66.7% 45.3% 48.3% 
% of Total 9.3% 39.0% 48.3% 
Std. Residual 1.6 -.6  
Started  
Count 12 122 134 
Expected Count 18.6 115.4 134.0 
% within Types of status group 9.0% 91.0% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 33.3% 54.7% 51.7% 
% of Total 4.6% 47.1% 51.7% 
Std. Residual -1.5 .6  
Total 
Count 36 223 259 
Expected Count 36.0 223.0 259.0 
% within Types of status group 13.9% 86.1% 100.0% 
% within Did they? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 13.9% 86.1% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 5.672a 1 .017 .020 .014  
Continuity Correctionb 4.848 1 .028    
Likelihood Ratio 5.745 1 .017 .020 .014  
Fisher's Exact Test    .020 .014  
Linear-by-Linear Association 5.650c 1 .017 .020 .014 .009 
N of Valid Cases 259      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.37. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is 2.377. 
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Types of status group: Did they delay due to investment location? 
 
Crosstab 
Types of status group Did they delay due to 
investment location? 
Total 
Yes No 
 
Non-started 
Count 2 121 123 
Expected Count 12.0 111.0 123.0 
% within Types of status group 1.6% 98.4% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 8.0% 52.2% 47.9% 
% of Total 0.8% 47.1% 47.9% 
Std. Residual -2.9 .9  
Started  
Count 23 111 134 
Expected Count 13.0 121.0 134.0 
% within Types of status group 17.2% 82.8% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 92.0% 47.8% 52.1% 
% of Total 8.9% 43.2% 52.1% 
Std. Residual 2.8 -.9  
Total 
Count 25 232 257 
Expected Count 25.0 232.0 257.0 
% within Types of status group 9.7% 90.3% 100.0% 
% within Did they delay? 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 9.7% 90.3% 100.0% 
 
 
Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Point 
Probability 
Pearson Chi-Square 17.633a 1 .000 .000 .000  
Continuity Correctionb 15.907 1 .000    
Likelihood Ratio 20.679 1 .000 .000 .000  
Fisher's Exact Test    .000 .000  
Linear-by-Linear Association 17.564c 1 .000 .000 .000 .000 
N of Valid Cases 257      
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.96. 
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table 
c. The standardized statistic is -4.191. 
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APPENDIX B: INVESTMENT AREAS 
 
Investment 
areas 
Status group Delayed Not-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. %. Freq. % 
 
Food industry 
Non-started 30 94 2 6 32 100 
Started 23 47 26 53 49 100 
Total 53 68 28 32 81 100 
Beverage 
industry  
Non-started 2 100 0 0 2 100 
Started 1 33 2 67 3 100 
Total 3 60 2 40 5 100 
Textile and 
textile products 
industry 
Non-started 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Started 2 50 2 50 4 100 
Total 5 71 2 29 7 100 
Leather and 
leather products 
industry 
Non-started 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Started 2 67 1 33 3 100 
Total 5 83 1 17 6 100 
 
 
 
 
Investment 
areas 
Status 
group 
Delayed Not-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Wood products 
industry 
 
Non-started 5 100 0 0 5 100 
Started 1 50 1 50 2 100 
Total 6 86 1 14 7 100 
Paper and paper 
products industry 
Non-started 6 100 0 0 6 100 
Started 1 50 1 50 2 100 
Total 7 87 1 13 8 100 
 
Printing industry 
Non-started 4 100 0 0 4 100 
Started 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Total 4 80 1 100 5 100 
Chemical and 
chemical 
products industry 
Non-started 6 100 0 0 6 100 
Started 3 75 1 25 4 100 
Total 9 90 1 10 10 100 
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Investment 
areas 
Status group Delayed Not-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Pharmaceutical 
product industry 
Non-started 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Started 2 100 0 0 2 100 
Total 5 100 0 0 5 100 
Rubber and 
plastics 
products ind. 
Non-started 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Started 7 70 3 30 10 100 
Total 10 77 3 23 13 100 
Non-metallic 
mineral 
products ind. 
Non-started 21 100 0 0 21 100 
Started 7 37 12 63 19 100 
Total 28 70 12 30 40 100 
Basic metals 
industry 
Non-started 13 100 0 0 13 100 
Started 7 39 11 61 18 100 
Total 20 65 11 35 31 100 
 
 
 
 
Investment 
areas 
Status group Delayed Not-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Fabricated 
metal products 
industry  
Non-started 4 100 0 0 4 100 
Started 5 71 2 29 7 100 
Total 9 82 2 18 11 100 
Electrical 
products 
industry 
Non-started 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Started 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 3 100 0 0 3 100 
Machinery/ 
equipment 
industry 
Non-started 17 100 0 0 17 100 
Started 4 50 4 50 8 100 
Total 21 84 4 16 25 100 
 
Others 
Non-started 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Started 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Total 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Total of all 
industries 
Non-started 125 100 0 0 125 100 
Started 65 49 68 51 133 100 
Total 190 74 68 26 258 100 
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APPENDIX C: ACCESS TO INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES 
 
i. Overall access of infrastructure facilities response by all private 
investors  
Infrastructure Quality and 
efficiency of 
services 
Delayed Non-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Road 
authority 
Good 171 92 64 89 235 92 
Bad 14 8 7 11 21 8 
Telephone 
authority  
Good 179 96 62 86 241 93 
Bad 7 4 10 14 17 7 
Electric 
power 
Good 106 57 48 67 154 60 
Bad 80 43 24 33 104 40 
Water 
authority 
Good 113 61 56 78 169 66 
Bad 73 39 16 22 89 34 
Postal 
services 
Good 183 98 69 96 252 98 
Bad 3 2 3 4 6 2 
Port services Good 154 93 53 74 207 90 
Bad 11 7 12 26 23 10 
Investment 
office 
Good 172 92 67 93 239 93 
Bad 14 8 5 7 19 7 
Municipality  Good 98 53 51 71 149 58 
Bad 86 47 21 29 107 42 
Customs and 
Revenue 
Good 142 80 57 81 199 80 
Bad 36 20 13 19 49 20 
Others Good   1  1  
Bad       
Total Good 1318 80 528 83 1846 81 
Bad 324 20 111 17 435 19 
Average (10) Good 146 80 59 83 205 81 
Bad 36 20 12 17 48 19 
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ii. Overall access of infrastructure facilities response by started group 
 
Infrastructure Quality and 
efficiency of 
services 
Delayed Non-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Road 
authority 
Good 58 89 60 90 118 89 
Bad 7 11 7 10 14 11 
Telephone 
authority  
Good 60 92 58 85 118 89 
Bad 5 8 10 15 15 11 
Electric 
power 
Good 46 71 46 68 92 69 
Bad 19 29 22 32 41 31 
Water 
authority 
Good 50 83 54 79 104 78 
Bad 15 17 14 21 29 22 
Postal 
services 
Good 64 98 65 96 129 97 
Bad 1 2 3 4 4 3 
Port services Good 50 89 49 80 99 85 
Bad 6 11 12 20 18 15 
Investment 
office 
Good 58 89 64 94 122 92 
Bad 7 11 4 6 11 8 
Municipality  Good 42 65 49 72 91 68 
Bad 23 35 19 28 42 32 
Customs and 
Revenue 
Good 52 85 54 82 106 83 
Bad 9 15 12 18 21 17 
Others Good 0 0 1 100 1 100 
Bad 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Good 480 84 500 83 980 85 
Bad 92 16 103 17 195 15 
Average (10) Good 48 84 50 85 98 84 
Bad 9 16 10 15 19 16 
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iii. Overall access of infrastructure facilities response by non-started group 
 
Infrastructure Quality and 
efficiency 
of services 
Delayed Non-delayed Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Road authority Good 113 94 4 100 117 94 
Bad 7 6 0 0 7 6 
Telephone 
authority  
Good 119 98 4 100 123 198 
Bad 2 2 0 0 2 2 
Electric power Good 60 49.6 2 50 62 49.6 
Bad 61 50.4 2 50 63 50.4 
Water 
authority 
Good 63 52 2 50 65 52 
Bad 58 48 2 50 60 48 
Postal 
services 
Good 119 98 4 100 123 98 
Bad 2 2 0 0 2 2 
Port services Good 104 96 4 100 108 96 
Bad 5 4 0 0 5 4 
Investment 
office 
Good 110 94 3 75 117 94 
Bad 7 6 1 25 8 6 
Municipality  Good 56 47 2 50 58 47 
Bad 66 53 2 50 68 53 
Customs and 
Revenue 
Good 90 77 3 75 93 77 
Bad 27 23 1 25 28 23 
Others Good 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bad 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total Good 866 78 0 0 866 78 
Bad 243 22 0 0 243 22 
Average (10) Good 87 78 0 0 87 78 
Bad 24 22 0 0 24 22 
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APPENDIX D: SPECIFICATON TESTS 
 
• For entire private investors   
 
                                                                              
   infrstr1a     .5619453   .1334421    -2.43   0.015     .3528287    .8950025
      invloc     6.754458   2.843994     4.54   0.000     2.959295    15.41674
      polins     .5758247    .478464    -0.66   0.507     .1129823    2.934745
      invinc      .561424   .4653851    -0.70   0.486     .1105856    2.850253
     corrupt     .5970556   .3051861    -1.01   0.313     .2192409    1.625953
      bureta     .6377256   .3826259    -0.75   0.453     .1967549    2.067008
      judsys     .3598874   .1903964    -1.93   0.053     .1275979    1.015056
       inrat     3.943876   1.848065     2.93   0.003     1.574193     9.88072
              
         15      7.91e-17   5.04e-17   -58.23   0.000     2.27e-17    2.76e-16
         14      1.28e-16   1.15e-16   -40.61   0.000     2.19e-17    7.49e-16
         12      .2478775   .2937651    -1.18   0.239     .0242918    2.529383
         11      .5985619   .3054227    -1.01   0.315     .2201782    1.627211
         10      .6520684   .2951329    -0.94   0.345     .2685534    1.583273
          9      .5038201   .4425543    -0.78   0.435     .0900704    2.818181
          8      3.25e-17   4.37e-17   -28.22   0.000     2.32e-18    4.54e-16
          7      .3298771   .3132343    -1.17   0.243     .0512974    2.121335
          6      2.56e-16   1.80e-16   -51.26   0.000     6.50e-17    1.01e-15
          5      .8540523   .7272267    -0.19   0.853     .1609478    4.531936
          4      9.02e-17   6.01e-17   -55.45   0.000     2.44e-17    3.33e-16
          3      9.01e-17   8.29e-17   -40.14   0.000     1.48e-17    5.47e-16
          2      .4261691    .284685    -1.28   0.202     .1150724    1.578311
     invtyp1  
              
      accred     .8528625   .4600843    -0.30   0.768     .2962721     2.45509
     accland     .7863514   .4377426    -0.43   0.666     .2641031    2.341315
        educ     1.033874    .060814     0.57   0.571     .9212951     1.16021
                                                                              
          _t   Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =   -160.61179                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(24)   =  16964.76
Time at risk         =         9453
No. of failures      =           38
No. of subjects      =          215                Number of obs   =       215
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      _hatsq    -.0228063   .1034164    -0.22   0.825    -.2254987    .1798861
        _hat     .9900673   .1538376     6.44   0.000     .6885512    1.291583
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =   -160.58687                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   LR chi2(2)      =     62.81
Time at risk    =         9453
No. of failures =           38
No. of subjects =          215                     Number of obs   =       215
 
 
  
  Mean VIF      1.45
----------------------------------------------------
 infrstr1a      2.20    1.48    0.4549      0.5451
    invloc      1.07    1.03    0.9378      0.0622
    polins      2.06    1.43    0.4860      0.5140
    invinc      1.13    1.06    0.8871      0.1129
   corrupt      1.53    1.24    0.6523      0.3477
    bureta      1.49    1.22    0.6720      0.3280
    judsys      1.35    1.16    0.7400      0.2600
     inrat      1.17    1.08    0.8560      0.1440
   invtyp1      1.07    1.03    0.9340      0.0660
    accred      1.79    1.34    0.5586      0.4414
   accland      1.51    1.23    0.6639      0.3361
      educ      1.10    1.05    0.9110      0.0890
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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• For started group (Implementation & operation statuses)   
 
 
. 
                                                                              
     factor2     .4933319   .1223361    -2.85   0.004     .3034302    .8020834
      invloc     4.196411   1.847801     3.26   0.001     1.770392    9.946873
      polins     .8114946   .5937262    -0.29   0.775      .193423    3.404577
      invinc     .1636076   .1545032    -1.92   0.055     .0257022    1.041447
     corrupt     .6523761   .3584489    -0.78   0.437     .2222308    1.915102
      bureta     .6018874    .367993    -0.83   0.406       .18159     1.99498
      judsys     .4533852   .2418342    -1.48   0.138      .159382     1.28972
       inrat     2.037712   .9757267     1.49   0.137      .797183    5.208677
              
         16      5.45e-16   5.03e-16   -38.02   0.000     8.89e-17    3.33e-15
         13      .2527867   .2759065    -1.26   0.208     .0297647    2.146874
         12      .6163383   .2739232    -1.09   0.276     .2579373    1.472733
         11       .934268   .4543541    -0.14   0.889     .3601757     2.42342
         10      .2910962    .302846    -1.19   0.236     .0378859    2.236639
          8      .2229821   .2108654    -1.59   0.113     .0349399    1.423043
          6      1.545061   .9059136     0.74   0.458      .489623    4.875616
          5      7.78e-16   9.87e-16   -27.42   0.000     6.47e-17    9.35e-15
          4      7.22e-16   8.13e-16   -30.99   0.000     7.97e-17    6.55e-15
          3       .508343   .3478259    -0.99   0.323     .1329643    1.943473
          2      3.69e-16   3.52e-16   -37.28   0.000     5.70e-17    2.39e-15
     invtyp1  
              
      accred     1.431114   .7487494     0.69   0.493     .5132526    3.990408
     accland     .9020224    .450644    -0.21   0.836     .3388153    2.401439
        educ     1.059013   .0585137     1.04   0.299       .95032    1.180138
                                                                              
          _t   Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =   -143.28594                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(22)   =   7540.13
Time at risk         =         3013
No. of failures      =           38
No. of subjects      =          106                Number of obs   =       106
 
 
                                                                              
      _hatsq     .0220273   .0121524     1.81   0.070     -.001791    .0458456
        _hat     1.051976   .1875737     5.61   0.000     .6843383    1.419614
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =   -143.15261                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   LR chi2(2)      =     41.59
Time at risk    =         3013
No. of failures =           38
No. of subjects =          106                     Number of obs   =       106
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  Mean VIF      1.42
----------------------------------------------------
   factor2      1.76    1.33    0.5689      0.4311
    invloc      1.07    1.03    0.9353      0.0647
    polins      1.83    1.35    0.5466      0.4534
    invinc      1.14    1.07    0.8802      0.1198
   corrupt      1.55    1.25    0.6449      0.3551
    bureta      1.53    1.24    0.6516      0.3484
    judsys      1.66    1.29    0.6024      0.3976
     inrat      1.16    1.08    0.8624      0.1376
   invtyp1      1.08    1.04    0.9295      0.0705
    accred      1.70    1.30    0.5891      0.4109
   accland      1.48    1.22    0.6757      0.3243
      educ      1.10    1.05    0.9052      0.0948
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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• For non-started group (Pre-implementation status)  
 
 
 
   infrstr1a      .578503   .1126304    -2.81   0.005     .3949869    .8472831
      invloc      5.96439   2.131494     5.00   0.000     2.960548      12.016
      polins      .732676   .4800937    -0.47   0.635     .2028398    2.646493
      invinc     1.052308   .8818085     0.06   0.951     .2036368    5.437874
     corrupt     .8345099   .3436616    -0.44   0.660     .3723026     1.87054
      bureta     .8047878   .3998161    -0.44   0.662     .3039535    2.130864
      judsys     .5269336   .2169822    -1.56   0.120     .2350963    1.181044
       inrat     4.415411   1.644153     3.99   0.000     2.128197    9.160736
              
         16      .4352454   .3436413    -1.05   0.292     .0926149    2.045442
         15      1.72e-15   1.51e-15   -38.75   0.000     3.09e-16    9.62e-15
         13       .212469   .2390505    -1.38   0.169     .0234208    1.927476
         12      .5802777   .2537229    -1.24   0.213     .2462936    1.367158
         11      .5944514   .2432762    -1.27   0.204     .2665425    1.325764
         10      .6376117   .4202971    -0.68   0.495     .1751726    2.320846
          9      1.38e-15   1.54e-15   -30.64   0.000     1.54e-16    1.23e-14
          8      .3189939   .3088742    -1.18   0.238     .0478172    2.128044
          7      3.00e-15   1.89e-15   -53.03   0.000     8.70e-16    1.03e-14
          6      .5700535   .5164734    -0.62   0.535     .0965427    3.365981
          5      1.55e-15   9.02e-16   -58.56   0.000     4.95e-16    4.85e-15
          4      .7909664   .8592332    -0.22   0.829     .0940786    6.650054
          3      .4113838   .2914285    -1.25   0.210     .1026236      1.6491
          2      3.721918    3.64845     1.34   0.180     .5449636    25.41945
     invtyp1  
              
      accred     .9075571   .3886886    -0.23   0.821     .3920318    2.101003
     accland     .8044996   .3738691    -0.47   0.640     .3235589    2.000315
        educ     1.002549   .0517416     0.05   0.961     .9060982    1.109267
                                                                              
          _t   Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =   -238.45585                Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   Wald chi2(25)   =  11547.80
Time at risk         =         6471
No. of failures      =           51
No. of subjects      =          215                Number of obs   =       215
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
      _hatsq      .015881   .0931649     0.17   0.865    -.1667189    .1984809
        _hat     .9889959   .1502052     6.58   0.000     .6945991    1.283393
                                                                              
          _t        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood  =   -238.44178                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000
                                                   LR chi2(2)      =     60.53
Time at risk    =         6471
No. of failures =           51
No. of subjects =          215                     Number of obs   =       215
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 Det(correlation matrix)    0.0947
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        18.5094 
---------------------------------
    13     0.0201         18.5094
    12     0.0637         10.4018
    11     0.1156          7.7250
    10     0.2090          5.7448
    9     0.2401          5.3598
    8     0.2903          4.8746
    7     0.3940          4.1839
    6     0.4968          3.7259
    5     0.7375          3.0581
    4     0.7754          2.9825
    3     0.9833          2.6485
    2     1.7770          1.9701
    1     6.8972          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      1.46
----------------------------------------------------
 infrstr1a      2.20    1.48    0.4549      0.5451
    invloc      1.07    1.03    0.9369      0.0631
    polins      2.06    1.43    0.4862      0.5138
    invinc      1.13    1.06    0.8871      0.1129
   corrupt      1.53    1.24    0.6521      0.3479
    bureta      1.49    1.22    0.6720      0.3280
    judsys      1.35    1.16    0.7396      0.2604
     inrat      1.17    1.08    0.8558      0.1442
   invtyp1      1.08    1.04    0.9295      0.0705
    accred      1.79    1.34    0.5578      0.4422
   accland      1.51    1.23    0.6642      0.3358
      educ      1.10    1.05    0.9080      0.0920
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
(obs=216)
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APPENDIX E: CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
1 1.000 -.013 -.018 .005 .261 .028 .105 .059 .057 -.246 -.045 .060 .198 
2 -.013 1.000 .270 .325 .586 .508 .487 .225 .416 .419 .200 .404 .403 
3 -.018 .270 1.000 .071 .091 .267 .072 -.012 .149 .391 .019 -.007 .163 
4 .005 .325 .071 1.000 .285 .236 .264 .386 .271 .162 .242 .308 .297 
5 .261 .586 .091 .285 1.000 .371 .441 .204 .416 .286 .264 .418 .641 
6 .028 .508 .267 .236 .371 1.000 .290 .023 .292 .373 .209 .498 .247 
7 .069 .531 .262 .268 .446 .864 .391 .062 .240 .284 .090 .485 .402 
8 -.030 .353 .085 .059 .115 .315 .463 .248 .193 .235 .000 .185 .095 
9 -.153 .289 -.065 .205 .236 .006 .506 .229 .219 .137 .278 .231 .318 
10 .105 .487 .072 .264 .441 .290 1.000 .301 .481 .233 .206 .215 .438 
11 -.177 .215 .028 .129 .177 .066 .425 .244 .207 .313 .138 .334 .144 
12 .162 .301 -.055 -.028 .223 .078 .416 -.106 -.028 .046 -.030 .065 .057 
13 -.051 .438 -.014 .343 .325 .225 .632 .364 .393 .423 .161 .258 .374 
14 .020 .615 .126 .262 .551 .464 .561 .317 .454 .464 .315 .478 .652 
15 .059 .225 -.012 .386 .204 .023 .301 1.000 .446 .221 .343 .079 .229 
16 .057 .416 .149 .271 .416 .292 .481 .446 1.000 .513 .411 .199 .395 
17 -.246 .419 .391 .162 .286 .373 .233 .221 .513 1.000 .548 .315 .365 
18 -.045 .200 .019 .242 .264 .209 .206 .343 .411 .548 1.000 .377 .412 
19 .060 .404 -.007 .308 .418 .498 .215 .079 .199 .315 .377 1.000 .294 
20 .198 .403 .163 .297 .641 .247 .438 .229 .395 .365 .412 .294 1.000 
 
1  .460 .444 .485 .022 .417 .213 .328 .333 .029 .366 .324 .064 
2 .460  .018 .006 .000 .000 .000 .042 .000 .000 .063 .001 .001 
3 .444 .018  .294 .245 .020 .292 .464 .128 .001 .444 .480 .107 
4 .485 .006 .294  .014 .035 .021 .001 .018 .108 .031 .008 .011 
5 .022 .000 .245 .014  .002 .000 .059 .000 .013 .021 .000 .000 
6 .417 .000 .020 .035 .002  .012 .432 .012 .002 .054 .000 .029 
7 .300 .000 .022 .019 .000 .000 .001 .320 .032 .014 .248 .000 .001 
8 .411 .003 .258 .327 .190 .007 .000 .028 .070 .035 .500 .079 .235 
9 .122 .013 .311 .058 .035 .483 .000 .039 .047 .149 .016 .038 .007 
10 .213 .000 .292 .021 .000 .012  .010 .000 .037 .057 .049 .000 
11 .087 .049 .415 .162 .088 .309 .000 .030 .056 .007 .146 .005 .136 
12 .108 .010 .338 .416 .043 .276 .000 .210 .417 .363 .410 .311 .332 
13 .349 .000 .459 .004 .006 .042 .000 .002 .001 .000 .110 .023 .002 
14 .438 .000 .169 .021 .000 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 .007 .000 .000 
15 .328 .042 .464 .001 .059 .432 .010  .000 .045 .004 .274 .039 
16 .333 .000 .128 .018 .000 .012 .000 .000  .000 .001 .064 .001 
17 .029 .000 .001 .108 .013 .002 .037 .045 .000  .000 .007 .002 
18 .366 .063 .444 .031 .021 .054 .057 .004 .001 .000  .001 .001 
19 .324 .001 .480 .008 .000 .000 .049 .274 .064 .007 .001  .011 
20 .064 .001 .107 .011 .000 .029 .000 .039 .001 .002 .001 .011  
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APPENDIX F: SUMMARY OF ARTICLES 
 
Appendix F (1): Summary of Articles on Private Investments by previous 
studies 
 
     
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
1 Francis Naa-
Idar, Desmond 
Tutu Ayentimi, 
Joseph Magnus 
Frimpong 
(2012) 
 A Time Series Analysis of 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Ghana (1960-
2010) 
co-integration 
and error 
correction 
modeling 
GDP, inflation, political stability, 
external debt, exchange rate, 
public investment, aid, trade 
openness and credit provided to 
private sector. 
2 Pinondang 
Nainggolan, 
Ramli, Murni 
Daulay, 
Rujiman (2015) 
in Indonesia 
An Analysis of Determinant on 
Private Investment in 
North Sumatra Province, 
Indonesia 
Error 
Correction 
Model (ECM) 
method 
Economic growth, government 
investment, interest rate, 
exchange rates, 
investment credit, inflation, 
international interest rates, and 
economic crisis 
3 BATISTAR 
MWANGI 
KINGORI (2015) 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE 
SECTOR INVESTMENT IN 
KENYA USING THE 
AUTOREGRESSIVE 
DISTRIBUTED LAG (ARDL) 
APPROACH 
ARDL model Real gross domestic product, 
Openness,  
Real interest rate,  
Inflation, Credit to the private 
sector, Real exchange rate, 
Foreign direct investment,  
External debt, Public investment  
4 MANJAPPA. D. 
HOSAMANE 
AND 
NIRANJAN, R. 
(2010) 
DETERMINANTS OF 
INVESTMENT PATTERN IN 
INDIAN MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRIES  A PANEL DATA 
STUDY 
Panel 
estimation 
models 
Output, sales, net assets, bank 
borrowings, equity capital, cost of 
capital  
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Ser
. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
5 Muhdin 
Muhammedhuss
en Batu (2016) 
Determinants of Private 
Investment: A Systematic 
Review 
Systematic 
review 
Gross Domestic product, Public 
Investment, Exchange Rate, 
Inflation, Interest rate, Credit, 
International Trade,  
6 PABLO ACOSTA 
and ANDRÉS 
LOZA (2005) 
SHORT AND LONG RUN 
DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT IN ARGENTINA 
ADF tests exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, public investment, 
credit markets 
 
7 
Islam Mohamed 
Elbanna (2016) 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Egypt 
Multiple - 
Regression 
Models 
Gross Domestic Production (GDP), 
Government investment (GI), Net 
Commercial banks and other 
lending (PPG + 
PNG), lending interest rate (IR), 
exchange rate (EXCHR), Money 
supply (MS), and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) 
8 Hailu Adugna 
(2013) 
Determinants of private 
investment in Ethiopia 
Multiple 
regressions – 
using OLS 
model 
Nominal Public Investment, Real 
GDP Per-capita, Inflation Rate, 
Real Lending Interest Rate, 
External Debt Burden, Official 
Exchange Rate, International 
Trade as % of nominal GDP, 
Corporate Tax Rate as % of total 
corporate taxable income, 
Structural Dummy   
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
9 Motahareh 
Alsadat 
Majdzadeh, 
Arezoo 
Ghazanfari,  
Mohsen Mehr 
Ara (2014) 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Iran based on 
Bayesian Model Averaging 
Bayesian 
Model 
Averaging 
(BMA) 
approach 
internal environment variables (such as 
production growth, the share or 
structure of economic sectors in 
production and business cycles), 
external environment variables (like oil 
exports and import) and price and 
monetary variables (Like rate and the 
amount of credit, exchange rate and 
inflation) 
10 Khaled Sakr, 
1993 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Pakistan 
Natural 
logarithms 
Financing availability, Foreign capital 
inflows, External debt, Profitability and 
market structure, Uncertainty, 
Government expenditure 
11 Al-Jundi, Salem 
A.  
Hijazi, Rafiq H, 
2013 
DETERMINANTS OF 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
Vector Error-
Correction 
Model 
non-oil GDP and real public 
expenditure 
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12 Kadir Karagoz, 
2010 
Determining factors of 
private investments: An 
empirical analysis for 
Turkey 
Auto-
regressive 
distributed 
lags (ARDL) 
Approach 
real GDP, real exchange rate, ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP, private 
external debt, inflation and trade 
openness 
13 Niranjan. R, 
Manjappa. D. 
Hosamane, 
2015 
Investment behavior in 
private manufacturing 
sector in India: An 
empirical analysis 
Generalized 
least squares 
(GLS) 
technique 
Operating profit, borrowing, equity and 
financial liberalization index 
14 G. G. Ambaye, 
T. Berhanu, G. 
Abera, 2014 
Modeling the Determinants 
of Domestic Private 
Investment 
in Ethiopia 
Autoregressiv
e Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) 
model 
Real GDP growth rate, Inflation, Real 
exchange rate, external debt, Gross 
domestic saving, domestic credit, 
government expenditure and Foreign 
direct investment 
15 Kazeem Bello 
Ajide & 
Olukemi 
Lawanson, 
2012 
Modelling the Long Run 
Determinants of Domestic 
Private 
Investment in Nigeria 
Auto-
Regressive 
Distributed 
Lag (ARDL) 
bounds 
testing 
approach 
private domestic investment, public 
investment, real gross domestic 
product, Rate of Inflation, Real 
exchange rate, Real rate of interest 
rate, real credit to the private sector, 
export divided by import price 
multiplied by 100, external debt, foreign 
direct investment   
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques used  
Variables used 
16 Bazoumana 
Ouattara 2004 
Modelling the Long Run 
Determinants 
of Private Investment in 
Senegal 
Johansen 
cointegration 
technique and the 
ARDL bounds 
approach 
public sector investment; real GDP; 
credit to the private sector; foreign 
aid; terms of trade 
17 Juthathip 
Jongwanich and 
Archanun 
Kohpaiboon, 
2006 
Private Investment: 
Trends and 
Determinants in 
Thailand 
neoclassical model 
(Jorgenson, 1967 
and 1971) 
output growth, growth of real cost of 
capital, availability of financing, 
public investment, output growth 
uncertainty, inflation uncertainty, 
terms of trade uncertainty, real 
exchange rate uncertainty, output 
gap, real exchange rate 
18 Sosthène Ulrich 
Gnansounou, 
2010 
The Determinants of 
Private Investment in 
Benin: 
A Panel Data Analysis 
First-order 
autoregressive 
process using panel 
data 
Level of the demand, the cost of 
capital utilization, the cost of labour, 
and demand uncertainty 
19 Abbas 
Valadkhani, 2004 
What determine private 
investment in Iran? 
Johansen 
Multivariate 
cointegration 
technique and a 
short-run dynamic 
model. 
non-oil GDP, rate of inflation 
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Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques used  
Variables used 
20 ABDISHU 
HUSSIEN, 2000 
FACTORS DETERMINING 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
IN 
ETHIOPIA 
Eclectic version of 
flexible accelerator 
model 
Macroeconomic variables included 
in the regression are real per capita 
GDP growth rate, public 
investment, credit availability to 
private sector, foreign exchange 
reserve availability, real exchange 
rate, consumer price index and 
government budget deficit. 
21 Eric Kwaku 
Attefah and  
Dawud K. Enning, 
2016 
An OLS Approach to 
Modelling the 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Ghana 
linear regression 
using OLS estimator 
Real GDP, Public investment, Credit 
Supply to the Private Sector, 
Inflation, External debt, Real 
interest rate, Openness of the 
economy, Real exchange rate, 
corporate tax and democracy 
22 Sohail I. 
Magableh, Sameh 
A. Ajlou, 2016 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in Jordan: An 
ARDL Bounds 
Testing Approach 
ARDL 
cointegration 
approach 
Real income, real interest rates, real 
public investment, and the trends of 
private investment over time. 
23 Senei Molapo, 
Moeti Damane, 
2015 
DETERMINANTS OF 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
IN 
LESOTHO 
ARDL appraoch GDP, gross domestic expenditure 
deflator, public 
investment, and per capita GDP  
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques used  
Variables used 
24 Osmond Chigozie 
Agu, 2015 
DETERMINANTS OF 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
IN NIGERIA  
AN ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 
Cointegration and 
Error-Correction 
Methodology 
interest rate, infrastructure proxy 
by electricity, public investment, 
political stability, and Savings Rate 
25 Ogunbayo, E. I., 
Sangodoyin,A. A., 
Lawal, J. O., and 
V. O. Okoruwa, 
2014 
Macroeconomic analysis 
of the determinants of 
private investment in 
Nigeria 
Error correction 
model (ECM) 
Public investment; exchange rate; 
corruption perception index; 
inflation; savings rate; terms of 
trade; political instability; and credit 
to private sector. 
26 Nan Geng and 
Papa N'Diaye, 
2012 
Determinants of 
Corporate Investment in 
China: 
Evidence from Cross-
Country Firm Level Data 
dynamic panel data 
estimator 
Corporates capital expenditure (in 
relation to sales) on past capital 
expenditure, the capital output ratio 
squared, 
stock market capitalization in 
relation to GDP, real interest rates, 
the change in the real effective 
exchange rate, real GDP growth, the 
current account balance in relation 
to GDP, foreign debt to GDP ratio, 
the relative price of capital to 
output, and the volatility of output. 
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27 Salma Bibi, Urooj 
Akram Khan, 
Anbreen Bibi, 
2012 
DETERMINANTS OF 
INVESTMENT IN 
PAKISTAN 
co integration 
technique 
real capital formation, domestic 
saving, gross domestic product, 
trade openness 
28 Rabia Saghir,  
Azra Khan, 2012 
Determinants of Public 
and Private Investment 
An Empirical Study of 
Pakistan 
co-integration and 
error correction 
Government revenue, foreign aid 
and loan, Government investment, 
private investment, gross national 
product. 
29 XHENSILA ABAZI, 
ERMIRA KALAJ, 
2015 
FIRM LEVEL 
DETERMINANTS OF 
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS 
IN ALBANIA 
OLS3 
method and for the 
Godness to Fit data 
are used R2, 
F-test and p-value. 
Private investments, sales, liquidity, 
debt, profit (all in million ALL1), firm 
size (0 - small firms and 1 – large 
firms) and years of operating in the 
market. 
30 Ghassan Omet, 
Hadeel Yaseen & 
Tareq 
Abukhadijeh, 
2015 
The Determinant of Firm 
Investment: The Case of 
Listed Jordanian 
Industrial Companies 
Panel regression 
model 
Net fixed investments, cash flows, 
Sales set for sales revenues, Debt 
Ratio, QRatio is the current ratio 
31 Roberto 
Guimaraes and 
Olaf 
Unteroberdoerste
r, 2006 
What's Driving Private 
Investment in Malaysia? 
Aggregate Trends and 
Firm-Level Evidence 
vector-error 
correction model 
Financial development and 
availability of financing, Public 
investment, Exchange rate 
volatility, sales, cash flow, stock of 
liquid assets, leverage, firm size.    
This article is my thesis summary to compare with the methods and variables used in previous 
studies. 
Ser. 
No. 
Author 
and year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques used  
Variables used 
1 G Y 
Gebrewubet, 
2016 
An Analysis of the 
Determinants of Private 
Investment in the 
Manufacturing Sector: The 
Case of the State of Tigray, 
Ethiopia 
Duration model Level of education, investment area, 
access to credit, interest rate, judicial 
system, access to land, Infrastructure 
facilities, Bureaucratic red tape, 
corruption, political stability risk, 
investment incentives, investment 
location.        
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Appendix F (2): Summary of Articles on Foreign Direct Investments (Except 
serial number 1) 
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
1  Innocent M. 
Michael and 
Jehovaness 
Aikaeli, 2014 
Determinants of 
Private Investment in 
Tanzania 
Error 
Correction Model 
and employing 
time series data 
Public investment, exchange rate, 
degrees of openness of the economy, 
lending rate, GDP growth, and credit to 
private sector 
2 Yuki Tsuchiya, 
2015 
Determinants of 
Foreign Direct 
Investment in India 
Regional sector wise 
analysis  
 
multiple 
regression model 
based on cross-
state analysis 
using OLS 
GDP, GDP per capita, expenditure on 
education per capita, length of state and 
national highways, highway density, 
GDP of service sector, GDP of mining 
and quarrying sector, number of 
telephones per 100 populations, and 
amount of natural gas produced. 
3 Carike Claassen∗, 
Elsabe Loots† 
and Henri 
Bezuidenhout, 
2011 
Chinese Foreign 
Direct Investment in 
Africa 
Base Model, domestic investment of the host 
country, political stability, host 
country’s annual CPI inflation rate, 
gross secondary enrolment rate, trade 
openness, host country’s infrastructure 
4 Dr. Emam Khalil, 
2015 
ANALYSIS OF 
DETERMINANTS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN 
EGYPT (1970-2013) 
ARIMA, Exp 
smoothing, 
Random walk 
Gross Domestic Product GDP, Inflation, 
Unemployment, Population, Gross 
Government Expenditure, Households' 
Expenditure, Monetary Reserve, 
Domestic Investment (gross formation 
of fixed capital), Savings, Balance of 
Goods and Services,  Degree of trade 
exchange, Exchange Rate, Interest Rate   
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
5 Fayyaz Ahmad, 
Muhammad Umar 
Draz, Su-chang 
Yang, 2015 
Determinants of 
Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evidence 
from ASEAN and 
Selected Asian 
Countries 
 
 OLS 
Income, Interest rate, openness, 
exchange rate, Technology, human 
capital 
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6 P. Srinivasan and  
M. Kalaivani,  
2015 
Determinants of Foreign 
Institutional 
Investment in India: An 
Empirical 
Analysis 
ARDL modelling 
approach 
exchange rate, Indian equity market 
returns, returns on S&P CNX Nifty 
index of India, returns on S&P 500 
index of US, volatility of S&P CNX 
Nifty, S&P 500 index, WPI of India 
7 Viktorija1Igošina, 
2015 
FDI TO EU15 AND NEW 
MEMBER STATES: 
COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF INFLOW 
DETERMINANTS 
Gravity model 
approach 
Market related variables (GDP, GDP 
growth rate, and existing FDI stock), 
Distance related variables 
(economical distance, trade 
performance, openness of imports, 
political and economic risk), 
endowment related variables (unit 
labour costs in host country, per 
capita income). 
8 Priti Jha, 2015 IMPACT OF 
DETERMINANTS OF FDI 
ON INDIAN ECONOMY 
descriptive study Stable Policies, Economic Factors, 
Cheap and Skilled Labour, Basic 
Infrastructure, Unexplored Markets, 
Availability of Natural Resources,  
Advancement of technology   
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
9 Marco Mele, 
Floriana Nicolai, 
23015 
ON THE 
DETERMINANTS OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN 
EMERGING 
COUNTRIES: THE CASE 
OF CHINA 
multivariate 
regressions 
model 
market seeking, resource seeking, 
political risk, cultural proximity, real 
interest rate, exchange rate, parabolic 
distance and openness to FDI 
10 Giovanni Di 
Bartolomeo,  
Stefano Papa, 
2015 
Some determinants of 
trust formation and pro 
social behaviours in 
investment games: An 
experimental study 
experiment 
based 
Social history, unilateral 
communication (cheap talk) and 
meditation. 
11 Dr. Hany Elshamy The Economic 
Determinants of 
Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Egypt 
long run co 
integration 
analysis and 
short run 
analysis (ECM) 
market size, endowments of natural 
resources, endowments of ownership 
advantages, inflation rates, rising 
levels of political and economic risk, 
Liberalisation of Chinese FDI policy 
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12 Nguyen Thi 
Tuong Anh, 2016 
Chinese Outward 
Foreign Direct 
Investment: Is ASEAN A 
New 
Destination? 
Pool OLS, 
Random 
effects, and fixed 
effects 
techniques 
Institution, natural resources, and 
China-ASEAN FTA 
  
Ser. 
No. 
Author and 
year  
Title of the study Method or 
techniques 
used  
Variables used 
13 Rania S. Miniesy 
and Eman Elish, 
2016 
IS MENA DIFFERENT? 
AN INVESTIGATION OF 
THE HOST 
COUNTRY 
DETERMINANTS OF 
CHINESE OUTWARD 
FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 
pooled ordinary 
least squares 
estimation 
technique 
Market seeking motive, Resource 
seeking motive, Efficiency seeking 
motive, Strategic asset seeking 
motive, Macroeconomic risk – high 
inflation, Political risk – poor 
governance,  
14 Safdar Husain 
Tahir, Hazoor 
Muhammad 
Sabir, 2015 
Ownership structures 
as determinants of 
financial decisions: 
Evidence from 
Pakistani family owned 
listed firms 
Generalized 
Method of 
Moments (GMM 
Internal fund, Tobin Q, debt ratio, 
dividend ratio and net earnings 
15 Stefano Bonini, 
2014 
Secondary Buyouts: 
Operating Performance 
and Investment 
Determinants 
Abnormal 
performance 
percentage 
change indicator 
Operating Margins Ratios, Turnover 
Ratio, Return on Investment Ratios, 
Return on Equity Ratios, Liquidity 
Ratios, Capital Structure Ratio 
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APPENDIX G: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
To be filled by Owners/Managers of Private Investment in manufacturing sector 
 
Dear Respondents, 
 
My name is Gizachew Yirtaw lecturer in Mekelle University, college of Business and 
Economics in the department of Accounting and Finance. By now, I am a student of 
Doctor of Business Leadership at University of South Africa (UNISA). And, I am 
undertaking a research study on “An analysis of the Determinants of Private 
Investment in the Manufacturing sector: The case of the State of Tigray, Ethiopia. 
The objective of the study is to analysis the factors that affects for the status i.e. pre-
implementation, implementation and operation of private investment in the 
manufacturing sector in Tigray. 
 
The objective of the research is for academic purpose to achieve my partial 
fulfillment of doctoral degree in the field of study stated above. Therefore, I would like 
your cooperation in to provide me your crucial information because it has very high 
value for the success of this study. I promise that your information will not be 
forwarded to any other third parties without your permission. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and consideration. 
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1. Background Information 
1.1. Name of the enumerator/interviewer: ________________________ 
Sign:  __________ Date: __________  Mobile No. __________ 
1.2. Approved by Researcher: Gizachew Yirtaw
Comment, if any __________________________________________ 
  Sign: ____________ 
1.3. Name and address of the firm: Name: _________________________  
Address: Region Tigray,
1.4. Position of the interviewee (Please circle one): 
 Zone _____________,  Wereda _________ 
1) Owner only 
2) Manager only 
3) Owner and Manager 
1.5. Gender of the respondent (Please circle one): 1) Male 2) Female 
1.6. Age of the respondent:  _____________ years 
1.7. Educational level of the respondent: ______________ grade 
1.7.1. Does your educational level affect to delay your status? 
1) Yes 
2) No  
 
2. Basic business information 
2.1. What is the status of your firm/organisation? Please circle one. 
1) At pre-implementation stage i.e. not yet started or acquired investment 
license and/or land 
2) Under implementation i.e. under construction and/or installation of 
machineries)  
3) At operation i.e. production stage 
2.2. When did you get your investment permit for your firm from investment 
bureau? (Duration) 
Date ______, Month _____, Year __________ 
2.3. If you are in the implementation and operation statuses, when did you start 
implementation status? (Duration) 
Date ______, Month _____, Year __________ 
2.4. If your answer in question No. 2.1 above is at operation phase (i.e. No. 3), 
when did you get your business license? 
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Date ______,  Month _________  Year: ________ 
2.5. What is this company’s current legal form? Please circle one. 
1. Sole proprietorship 
2. Partnership 
3. Private Limited company 
4. Share Company 
5. Others (specify) _________________________ 
2.6. What are the investment areas (types) of your firm? Please circle one or more 
if they are in one license. 
1) Food industry 
2) Beverage industry 
3) Textile and textile products industry 
4) Leather and leather products industry 
5) Wood products industry 
6) Paper and paper products industry 
7) Printing industry 
8) Chemical and chemical products industry 
9) Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations industry 
10) Rubber and plastics products industry 
11) Other non-metallic mineral products industry 
12) Basic metals industry (excluding mining of the mineral)  
13) Fabricated metal products industry (excluding machinery and equipment 
14) Computer, Electronic and optical products industry 
15) Electrical products industry 
16) Machinery/Equipment industry 
17) Vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers industry 
18) Others (specify) __________________________________ 
2.6.1. Does your type of investment areas affect to delay your status? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
 
3. Source and access of Finance 
3.1. What is your source of finance for your private investment? (Please circle one 
or more) 
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1) Own contributions 
2) Share contributions  
3) Formal financial institutions (banks and Micro finance) 
4) Informal financial sources (e.g. money lenders, family/friends) 
5) Others (specify) _________________________ 
3.2. If your answer in question No. 3.1 above is other source in addition to the 
formal financial institutions (i.e. No. 4), can you judge their level of difficulties? 
1) Very easy 
2) Easy 
3) Medium 
4) Difficult 
5) Very difficult 
3.3. Please explain for your answer in question No. 3.2 above: _________ 
___________________________________________________ 
3.4. After getting your investment permit, have you ever asked financial institutions 
like bank for loan? 
1) Yes 
2) No  
3.5. If your answer in question No. 3.4 above is yes, go to question No. 3.6. But, if 
your answer is no, after explaining the reason go to question No. 5.1. 
_________________________________________________________ 
3.6. If you asked to get a loan from financial institutions (like banks), have you 
experienced any difficulty in acquiring loan that create investment status delay 
(access to credit)? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3.7. If practiced any difficulty in acquiring banks loan, what were the problems? 
(Please circle one from listed number under Yes or No) 
No. Problems Yes No 
1 Collateral requirements of banks/financial institutions 1 2 
2 Bank paper work/bureaucracy/delay in loan delivery.  1 2 
3 High interest rate 1 2 
4 Corruption of bank officials: 1 2 
5 Inadequate credit/finance 1 2 
6 Banks require detailed feasibility study information on 1 2 
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customers:  
7 Others (specify) _______________________ 1 2 
3.8. From the problems to get bank loan in question No. 3.7 above, what are the 
most severe problem (Please fill the number on the given black space) ____, 
____ and _____. 
 
4. Cost of Finance 
4.1. If you asked for loan, does the level of interest payment for the loan from 
financial institutions like banks had high delay? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
4.2. Please explain for the answer to question No. 4.1 above: 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
5. Quality and Integrity of Public Services (Infrastructure facilities) 
5.1. Does the overall quality and efficiency of infrastructure facilities/services 
delivered by the following public agencies or services create investment 
status delay? 
 
No.  Public agencies or services Yes No 
1 Roads department/authorities 1 2 
2 Telephone Authority 1 2 
3 Electric power co/agency  1 2 
4 Water/sewerage agency  1 2 
5 Postal service/agency  1 2 
6 Port service office 1 2 
7 Investment Office 1 2 
8 Municipality 1 2 
9 Customs and revenue authority 1 2 
10 Others (explain) ___________ 1 2 
 
6. Access to land 
6.1. Do you encounter any delay problem like procedure to access, size and lease 
price in getting land for investment? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
6.2. If your answer in question No. 6.2 above is yes, go to question No. 6.4. But, if 
your answer is no, after explaining the reason go to question No 7.1. 
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_______________________________________________________ 
6.3. To get land for your investment, what were the problems? (Please circle one 
from listed number under Yes or No) 
No.  Land access Yes  No 
1 Existing land tenure system   1 2 
2 Bureaucratic procedure     1 2 
3 Lease price      1 2 
4 Other (specify) __________________ 1 2 
 
6.4. From the problems to get land for investment in question No. 6.3 above, List 
from the first to the third most severe problem. (Please fill the number on the 
given black space) ______, _____ and _____ 
 
7. Judicial/Legal System 
7.1. In your opinion, is the judicial system like independency, motivation and 
corruption of employees, and enforcing of rules in your region do not create 
investment status delay? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
3) Neutral 
7.2. If your answer in question No. 8.2 above is no, go to question No. 8.4. But, if 
your answer is yes or neutral, after explaining the reason go to question 8.6. 
________________________________________________________ 
7.3. If the judicial system create delay, what is/are the most acute shortcomings? 
(Please circle one from listed number under Yes or No) 
No. Shortcomings Yes No 
1 Lack of independence  1 2 
2 Inability to enforce rulings 1 2 
3 Delayed court rulings  1 2 
4 Lack of motivation  1 2 
5 Corruption  1 2 
6 Others (specify) ___________________ 1 2 
 
7.4. From the legal system shortcomings in question No. 7.3 above, list from the 
first to the third most severe shortcoming. (Please fill the number on the given 
black space) _____, _____ and _____ 
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8. Bureaucratic Red Tape 
8.1. Have you been subjected to delays in getting public services like investment 
license, bank loans, land, and infrastructure utilities due to the bureaucratic 
red tape? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
8.2. If your answer in question No. 8.1 above is yes, go to question No. 8.3. But, if 
your answer is no, after explaining the reason go to question 8.5. 
________________________________________________________ 
8.3. From the public services listed below, for what services do you subjected to 
dalliance due to bureaucratic red tape? (Please circle one from listed number 
under Yes or No) 
No. Public services Yes No 
1 To get investment license  1 2 
2 To get bank loans  1 2 
3 To get land  1 2 
4 To register vehicle  1 2 
5 To get police services  1 2 
6 To get utilities (water, electric and telephone) 1 2 
7 Others (specify) _________________  1 2 
 
8.4. From the dalliance due to bureaucratic red tape made by the public services 
in question No. 8.3 above, list the service from the first to third most subjected 
to delay? (Please fill the number on the given black space) _____, _____ and 
_____ 
8.5. In your perception, does corruption in this region to get different services like 
bank loan, investment permit and license, municipality works, infrastructure 
facilities that are related to your investment was high and enhance investment 
status delay? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
8.6. If your answer in question No. 8.5 above is yes, what effect do you think 
corruption has on investment? 
1) High negative effect 
2) Average negative effect 
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3) Neutral 
4) Average positive effect 
5) High positive effect 
8.7. Please explain for the answers in question No. 8.6 above: 
____________________________________________________ 
 
9. Investment incentive structure 
9.1. Does your firm delayed the progress of investment status due to not getting 
investment incentives like income tax holidays, custom duty free, and access 
to bank loan and land? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
9.2. If your answer in question No. 9.1 above is no, go to question No. 9.3. But, if 
your answer is yes, after explaining the reason go to question 10.1. 
____________________________________________________ 
9.3. Which one of the following investment incentives promotes you much to 
invest? (Please circle one from listed number under Yes or No) 
No. Investment incentives Yes No 
1 Income tax holidays   1 2 
2 Custom duty 1 2 
3 Access to bank loan 1 2 
4 Access to low lease price of land 1 2 
5 Market incentives     1 2 
6 Other (specify) ______________ 1 2 
 
9.4. From the investment incentives specified in question No. 9.3 above, list from 
the first to third most promotes you. (Please fill their number on the given 
black space) _____, _____ and ______ 
 
10. Political stability 
10.1. Does the risk of political instability like border conflict, security system and 
trade restrictions exist and create investment status delay in the region? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
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10.2. If your answer in question No. 10.1 above is yes, go to question No. 10.3. But, 
if your answer is no, after explaining the reason go to question 11.1. 
________________________________________________________ 
10.3. From the risks listed below, which of the following political stability risk exist in 
the region? (Please circle one from listed number under Yes or No) 
No. Risks Yes No 
1 Border conflict 1 2 
2 Weak security system 1 2 
3 High trade restriction 1 2 
4 Public offices unnecessary interference  1 2 
5 Others (specify) __________________ 1 2 
 
10.4. From the political instability risks specified in question No. 10.3 above, list 
from the first to third most risks. (Please fill the number on the given black 
space) ____, ____ and _____ 
 
11. Investment Location 
11.1. Are there any investment status delay problems that face to your firm because 
of your investment location like having long distance to raw materials and to 
sell your product? 
1) Yes 
2) No 
11.2. If your answer in question No. 12.1 above is yes, go to question No. 12.3. But, 
if your answer is no, after explaining the reason go to question 13.1 
_______________________________________________________ 
11.3. Please select from the following problems that face to your firm because of 
your investment location. (Please circle one from listed number under Yes or 
No) 
No. Problems Yes No 
1 Long distance to raw materials and that may lead to 
high transportation cost 
1 2 
2 Long distance to sell your product (loss of market by 
distance) 
1 2 
3 Shortage of skilled and customer attractive labor force 1 2 
4 Higher cost of house rents which do not concern the 
market  
1 2 
5 Others (specify) __________________________ 1 2 
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11.4. From the investment location problems specified in question No. 11.3 above, 
list from the first to the third most problem? (Please fill the number on the 
given black space) ____, ____ and ____ 
 
12. Constraints of private investment status 
12.1. Judge on a four-point scale how the following factors limit the operation of 
your business. Please circle one. 
 
12.1.1. Economic and Financial Factor in the region 
No. Factors No 
limit 
Little 
limit 
Moderate 
limit 
High 
limit 
Very high 
limit 
Q1 Number of financial 
institutions  
1 2 3 4 5 
Q2 Cost of Financing  1 2 3 4 5 
Q3 Tax rates and 
Administration 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q4 Macroeconomic uncertainty 
(e.g. inflation, exchange 
rate) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q5 Cost of Investment 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.1.2. Technological factors in the region 
No. Factors No 
limit 
Little 
limit 
Moderate 
limit 
High 
limit 
Very high 
limit 
Q6 Research and 
development works  
1 2 3 4  
Q7 Appropriate technology 
supply 
1 2 3 4  
 
12.1.3. Infrastructural factors in the region 
No. Factors No 
limit 
Little 
limit 
Moderate 
limit 
High 
limit 
Very high 
limit 
Q8 Road Transport 1 2 3 4 5 
Q9 Electric power  1 2 3 4 5 
Q10 Telecommunication 
service 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q11 Water supply 1 2 3 4 5 
Q12 Air transport  1 2 3 4 5 
Q13 Port facilities  1 2 3 4 5 
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12.1.4. Regulatory factors in the region 
No Factors No 
limit 
Little 
limit 
Moderate 
limit 
High 
limit 
Very high 
limit 
Q14 Awareness works of 
Investment laws  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.1.5. Marketing factors in the region 
No. Factors No 
limitation 
Little 
limitation 
Moderate 
limitation 
High 
limitation 
Very high 
limitation 
Q15 Demand for your 
product  
1 2 3 4 5 
Q16 Promotion medias for 
your product 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q17 Pricing for your product 1 2 3 4 5 
 
12.1.6. Location factors in the region 
No. Factors No 
limitation 
Little 
limitation 
Moderate 
limitation 
High 
limitation 
Very high 
limitation 
Q18 Skilled and customer 
attractive labor force 
1 2 3 4 5 
Q19 Raw materials needed 1 2 3 4 5 
Q20 Location to sell your 
product  
1 2 3 4 5 
 
13. Feed back 
13.1. If there were other problems (other than the described one), would you please 
list out them? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
13.2. What do you suggest as a solution for the above-mentioned problems? 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank again for your cooperation 
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APPENDIX H: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
 
1. Most of the respondents (i.e. 96%) replied that source of finance for their private 
investment was from their own contributions in addition to the formal financial 
institutions. Can you explain their level of difficulties whether they are easy or 
difficult to get the source from them? 
 
2. After getting their investment permit, around one-third of the respondents did not 
even asked financial institutions like banks for a loan. What are the reasons? 
 
3. Nearly three-fourths of the respondents out of the private investors who asked for 
a bank loan (i.e. 66%) replied that the level of interest payment for the loan from 
financial institutions like banks did not delay. Can you explain the reasons? 
 
4. Around two-thirds of the respondents of the private investors did not encounter 
problems in getting land for investment that delay investors investment status. 
Explain the reasons. 
 
5. Around 58% of the respondent of the private investors replied that the judicial 
system in their region created delay due to inefficiency. Can you explain the 
reasons? 
 
6. About three-fourths of the respondent of the private investors in the study replied 
that they have been subjected to delays in getting public services due to the 
bureaucratic red tape. Can you explain the reasons? 
 
7. Half of the respondents of the private investors in the study replied that in their 
perception corruption was high and that it influenced delay to get different 
services that are related to their investments. Can you please explain the 
reason? 
 
8. If you have an idea concerning to the domestic private investment (other than the 
ones described), would you please explain it. 
 
Thank you 
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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. In the questionnaire, most of the respondents were replied that they had a 
problem of credit access from banks. Why? 
 
2. Some investors replied that banks did not give adequate credit as per their 
proposal for the investment or as per their request. Why? 
 
3. Out of the private investors were reported that infrastructure facilities such as 
electric, telephone, and water are the obstacles for the progress of investment 
status. What is your opinion? 
 
4. Some of the investors were complaining with the investment permit period and 
investment license process. Why? 
 
5. Most of the investors were engaged in specific investment areas such as food 
industry. What are the reasons? 
 
6. Is there any practice made before to create awareness on the existing issues of 
investment like its rules, policies, procedures, taxes to private investors? 
